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FBIS-EEU-96-011 *17 January 1996*

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Hague Court Hopes for Arrests of War Criminals

AU1701083296 Paris AFP in English
0448 GMT 17 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Jan 17 (AFP)—The chief prosecutor of the international war crimes tribunal here, Richard Goldstone, will have talks Friday [19 January] with NATO secretary-general Javier Solana on cooperation in former Yugoslavia.

Tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said the court was hoping to see early arrests of alleged war criminals it wanted to bring to trial.

Though the prime obligation to seek out and hand over suspects lay with the warring sides, the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) clearly had the power under the Dayton agreement to make arrests, Chartier said.

IFOR also had the job of ensuring the free movement of all civilians in Bosnia, including tribunal investigators, Chartier said. He indicated that these officials would receive special protection, but declined to give details.

"We want to settle the details (of cooperation with IFOR) as early as possible so we can start working together quickly," Chartier said.

On a related issue, the tribunal spokesman said the trial of Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadic, the only suspect currently in the court's hands, was planned to start on March 18, much earlier than the original target date of May 6.

The defence lawyers had pledged to meet this date, Charter said, adding that it would be confirmed at a meeting between judges and lawyers on February 13.

Tadic, 40, is accused of crimes against humanity committed in 1992 in prison camps in northwest Bosnia, including beating inmates to death.

Serbia Refuses To Give Arms Details to OSCE

AU1701083396 Paris AFP in English
0226 GMT 17 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Jan 17 (AFP)—Crucial talks on disarmament in former Yugoslavia, adjourned for a week Tuesday [16 January] after Belgrade failed to supply details of its heavy weapons, should still meet the June 6 deadline laid down by the Dayton accords, the chairman of the talks said here.

Norwegian General Vigleik Eide said that by working hard "I still think it is possible" to finish in time, adding, "We will negotiate to reach an agreement until the last day."

He confirmed that the rump Yugoslavia, of Serbia and Montenegro, had not provided information on stocks of tanks and armoured vehicles, planes, helicopters and artillery of at least 75 mm calibre before the deadline of January 13.

Those details would have been used in an exchange of information planned for Tuesday with the other four delegations, representing the Bosnian Serbs, Moslem Croat Federation, Sarajevo government and Croatia.

Eide said the other four parties which had met the deadline had not appreciated the delay, but he had been assured that it was purely for technical reasons.

Diplomats said Belgrade was expected to provide the necessary details in the next two days, but they added that there was a political aspect. Serbia wanted to underline that it was still the main actor in the former Yugoslavia.

Under the Dayton peace accord on Bosnia, the talks, headed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are to lead to a treaty by June 6 on reducing armed forces and heavy weapons stocks in the region.

In the week before they resume on January 23, Eide will see each delegation and members of the contact group on former Yugoslavia (Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States).

A separate but parallel round of talks here centres on achieving a military detente among the former warring sides in Bosnia itself. It has already led to an exchange of information and accord on opening military liaison missions.

Istvan Gyarmati, the Hungarian diplomat chairing the negotiations, told AFP he was confident of finishing by the scheduled date of January 26 laid down by the Dayton accord.

However he said the Bosnian Serb delegation questioned the legitimacy of its Bosnian Government counterpart.

The Serb delegation says the Sarajevo government ceased to exist after the Dayton accord, while the OSCE and international community says it should stay in office until elections, Gyarmati said.

"It is one of the fundamental questions over the transition period resulting from the ambiguities of Dayton, and it cannot be resolved here," he added.

"If we have the text of an accord, we will find a formula to get round that obstacle."

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EU Countries Increasingly Dominate Imports

AU1601213696 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 16 Jan 96 p 17

[Report by "B.Gj.": "Albanians Prefer Western Goods"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first nine months of 1995, goods worth 42.332 billion leks were imported, of which the private sector accounted for 34 billion leks. Albanian merchants have turned their eyes toward the EU, from which 75.83 percent of imported goods came. Despite the high prices of EU goods compared with those from the countries of the East, merchants are continuing to trade successfully with the EU. Consumers are increasingly preferring goods of a higher quality than those of Eastern countries, as is shown by a breakdown of the sources of imported goods. OECD countries account for 80.84 percent of imports, and countries of the former Soviet Union only 0.98 percent. Other countries in transition account for 15.78 percent of imports, and only 2.40 percent come from other countries of the world. Divided into classes, 29.66 percent of imports are of food, drinks, and tobacco; 23.43 percent are machinery, appliances, and spare parts; 15 percent are textile products and shoes; and 10 percent are assorted minerals and fuel. Experts at the Food Directorate in the Agriculture Ministry say that the large-scale imports of food and drinks will begin to decline during 1996, as existing enterprises that are now being privatized are put into production, and as private Albanian businessmen start new food-processing factories. It is therefore predicted that the import of cheese, milk, eggs, honey, and fruit and vegetables will decline this year because of rising domestic production. However, specialists say that the main conditions for opening EU markets to Albanian goods remains high standards of quality and modern packaging.

PD National Council Prepares for Elections

AU1601102396 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 14 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Arian Cani: "Democratic Party National Council Held Yesterday—Shehi on the Elections: Not Just Anticommunism, But Programs, Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"To the polls, but not just with anticommunism," announced Dashamir Shehi, the Meksi government's number two, to the Democratic Party [PD] National Council yesterday. Shehi spoke about the need for alternatives of development and admitted that anticommunism is not enough. "Let us look for an economic program within the PD's political program," he suggested. President Berisha himself took part in the ruling party's extended meeting in the Palace of Congresses yesterday. Party General Secretary Tritan Shehu spoke about closer dialogue with people, strengthening the party's grass-roots structures, and figures that show a numerical increase in PD members. Prime Minister Meksi stressed the need for free elections and expressed confidence that the results of the 1996 elections will be respected. At this meeting with people of his party, the head of state spoke about "a new electoral pact and a more powerful contract with future voters." According to the president, this pact is no longer being signed in a country dominated by anarchy, chaos, extreme poverty, and mass unemployment. Berisha again attacked the Socialists and reminded them of these "Nights of St. Bartholomew." "The Socialist Party is today more conservative and more dogmatic than it was in the spring of 1992," the president said in connection with 23 March 1996, when the Socialists will hold their congress. "The date they have chosen is the date of the Albanians' historic victory over their party," Berisha said, referring to the PD victory four years ago. If "strengthening the party's working groups" is for Berisha one of the most important factors for winning the next election, "analyzing the program with people" will be the way to achieve this objective. Reminding the government again to prepare a plan for the next century, the head of state said, "The PD program will decide Albania's place, role, and vigor of development in these years." Aleksander Meksi said, "I fully trust that these elections will be free and that the PD will respect the results of the votes of the people." The prime minister called the campaigns waged in Albania during the last four years "free and honest," and defended his cabinet's four years of work. "We have been careful to preserve public order and to avoid any provocative or acciden[illegible]cidents," Meksi recalled yesterday.

Socialist Party's Meta Meets Italy's Fassino

AU1001214296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 10 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by P. Re.: "Meta Meets Fassino: 'This Is How We Will Cooperate'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Ilir Meta, the youngest deputy chairman of the Albanian Socialists, was received in Rome yesterday by Piero Fassino, the well-known deputy in charge of the foreign relations of the Democratic Party of the Left [PDS], the most powerful Italian left-wing party. Reports of the talks between Meta and Fassino have now reached Tirana through Italian sources, which claim that the two left-wing politicians talked mainly about relations between our two countries. Fassino reemphasized to Meta that the PDS consistently supports defining Albania as an Italian foreign policy priority. "With the Pelican Opera-

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tion," Fassino said yesterday, "Italy helped Albania to overcome a dramatic emergency situation. Italy must now help Tirana to construct its basic superstructure, to modernize agriculture, to channel new investment, and to create a new managerial class." According to Fassino, the PDS intends to ask the Italian Government soon for an explanation of the present state of relations between the countries on opposite shores of the Adriatic. The former communist Italian leader says that his party intends to propose three main points: an Albanian-Italian partnership program in the main fields of the economy and infrastructure, Italian support for Albania's steps toward association with the EU, and the creation of a special "task force" to achieve these objectives. The PDS leader visited Tirana only a short time ago, where he made contact with leaders of the main Albanian political parties.

PS Confirms Creation of Reformed Socialist Party

AU1001212896 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 10 Jan 95

[Report by Robert Like, including statements by PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi at a news conference in Tirana on 10 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Like] Another party is seeking to be added to the left spectrum of Albanian politics under the name Reformed Socialist Party. This has been confirmed at a news conference by the leaders of the PS [Socialist Party], the largest opposition party. According to PS Deputy Chairman Pellumbi, the PS has not been informed that some of its leaders are taking part in this new grouping, who have been recently been labelled by the press as the group of five. He denied that there were rifts in the bosom of the PS, although he stated that everyone was free to create the party that he wanted.

[Pellumbi] The PS is a serious political force with solid structures spread throughout the country and it will run as a compact unit at the next elections.

[Like] The next parliamentary elections and the priorities of this party for these elections were the focus of today's news conference.

According to the PS deputy chairmen, the year that has just begun may bring political, social, and economic changes in Albania. They again expressed their certainty of victory at the next elections. PS deputy chairman Pellumbi argued this conviction in [words indistinct] with a victory in the local government elections and the loss of the referendum on the constitution. Pellumbi even labelled the latter as a victory of the PS against the Democratic Party [PD], not as a victory of a group of parties.

The Socialist leaders submitted to journalists an almost complete draft of the PS electoral program, which, according to them, will be announced on 23-24 March, when the party congress is held. Mr. Pellumbi declared this about his party program:

[Pellumbi] There will be no turning back and reduction of the movement speed rates [as heard], but a normal and progressive development in avoiding the authoritarian, nepotist, centralist, and bureaucratic deformations of the PD government. There will be a continuation of Albania's integration into euro-atlantic structures.

[Like] The conference stressed that the Socialist Party is open for preelection and postelection alliances, mainly with leftist and centrist forces. They also offered various new alternatives, as they called them, regarding the economy, the national issue, emigration, and even ownership.

[Pellumbi] With a victory for the PS at the next elections, broader space will be created for Albanian democracy.

[Like] This is what the PS leaders pretended at the end of the news conference.

More on PS 'Splinter Group'

AU1101152996 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 11 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by "A.C.": "A New Party for the Socialists?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—A splinter group in the Socialist Party [PS]? PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi himself admitted, "We have heard of an application of this kind being filed." The leader of the largest opposition party implied that another socialist party will be born, which might be called the "Reformed Socialist Party" [Partia Socialiste e Reformuar]. Pellumbi and Dokle also put forward their electoral alternatives at a news conference yesterday. If it takes power, the party plans "an alliance before and after the elections with left-wing and centrist forces, a social policy, economic prosperity, and the approval of the constitution." Pellumbi said in reply to journalists' questions, "We have heard of an application being filed to create a new party, but every PS member is free to form as many parties as he wants, of whatever kind." The admission of this fact by Servet Pellumbi himself lends credibility to the rumors of an application made to the Justice Ministry for the creation of the Reformed Socialist Party, which the ministry has still not officially confirmed. The electoral program put forward by the Socialist leaders includes Albania's integration in the structures of NATO. Only a short time ago, the PS's attitude to Albania's military alliances was still unclear. The party had its reservations

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over Berisha's statements in favor of NATO, implying that it was also against the stationing of U.S. bases on Albanian territory. Pellumbi said yesterday that his party is open, both before and after the elections, to any alliance with other parties of the left and center, but did not mention their names. Attacks and accusations against the ruling party that have now become repetitive were again one of the main concerns of the Socialists yesterday. The senior PS leadership accused the Democratic Party of machinations against their party chairman Fatos Nano, spoke about the opposition laboring under "obstacles" and "police violence," protested the law on screening politicians, claimed that secret preparations are under way to change the electoral law, and spoke about "purges in the police and the administration."

Socialist Party Launches Electoral Campaign

AU1401211096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 12 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Emin Barci: "The Socialist Party Begins the Battle for Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party [PS] at all levels began its electoral campaign today. Servet Pellumbi in Elbasan, Namik Dokle in Korce, Luan Hajdaraga in Lezhe, and Gramoz Ruci in Fier will today start to analyze and explain the program with which the Socialists aim to win a majority in the next parliament. They will at the same time prepare for PS district meetings and aktivs, which should be completed together with the lists of candidates by the end of the first week in February.

The first meeting of the PS Electoral Committee yesterday made corrections and additions to the draft election manifesto and appointed the party's main leaders to present and explain the program to all levels of the party. The party manifesto was for the first time submitted to a meeting of the General Management Committee a few weeks ago. This meeting also elected the PS Electoral Commission with its chairman Fatos Nano. PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi said after yesterday's meeting, "We discussed the comments on the manifesto by the General Management Committee and the consultations we have conducted in the districts."

Two days ago, two Socialist deputy chairmen declared the seven principles of their manifesto at a news conference:

1) Free elections;

2) Alliances and coalitions both before and after the elections in order to achieve a two-thirds majority in parliament;

3) A professionally-based civil service;

4) No turning back, and maintaining the pace of the economy;

5) The country's involvement with NATO and friendship with Italy, Greece, the United States, etc.

6) The creation and development of mixed capitalism;

7) The creation of a class of medium-scale proprietors by encouraging small and medium-scale capitalism. "These theories have been discussed and decided. There may be room for improvement and for detail, but they represent our position," Pellumbi said.

Two of "the five," Xhevat Lloshi and Luan Shahollari, are members of the Electoral Commission. Dokle said that Lloshi made several very sensible suggestions about the manifesto's style of presentation. In order to make their program more convincing, the Socialists have chosen door-to-door canvassing. A few days ago, President Berisha recommended a similar approach to the Democratic Party [PD] leadership, but Dokle did not admit to any borrowing from Berisha, and said that "the Spanish Socialists chose this approach, as did the Americans." After the emergence of Berisha and the PD into the campaign with the Socialist term "social market economy," the Socialists have changed this phrase and have come out with the idea of "mixed capitalism." According to Dokle, this term means "pluralism in property, free initiative, and social solidarity."

The right wing charges the PS that if it comes to power it intends to nationalize what has been privatized. Dokle explains, "The term mixed capitalism puts private capital in first place. If state capital is preserved, it will behave in just the same way as its private partners according to the rules of the market economy."

Regarding the social character of the Socialist state, Deputy Chairman Dokle stressed, "We will provide subsidies to ensure that no Albanian child remains illiterate, no peasant is left without health care, and no pensioner has an income below subsistence level."

At a news conference a few days ago, Meksi came under the accusation that the Democrats stole the term "social market economy" from the Socialists, but Meksi replied, "Helmut Kohl's state has a social character, but Kohl and his party are not socialists, and, on the contrary, belong to the right." Dokle replied by saying that "Meksi should compare Kohl's program with that of the Social Democrat Lafontaine, whose party is demanding much larger social funds." He expressed pessimism over the PD achieving a welfare state, and declared, "If Berisha achieves a welfare state, we will admit him as a PS member."

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To Monitor Polls With Video

AU1601213496 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 16 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Zamir Alushi: "Videos in Polling Stations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fier—Videos in every polling station: This is the system that the Socialist Party [PS] in Fier will use to monitor irregularities that may occur during the elections. This has been reported by a reliable source within the PS Presidium. The source reports that the presidium is deciding on candidates to become deputies, councillors, and chairmen of municipalities and districts, but also the persons who will observe and provide security at the polling stations. "Bearing in mind the cost of such a system," the source continues, "the Socialists have asked for help from their supporters for funds to buy video cameras." Asked about this, a PS official in Fier did not deny it but refused to comment.

TV's Failure To Cover PR Events Protested

96P20208A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 10 Dec 95 p 2

[Statement by Neritan Alibali, spokesman for the Republican Party: "A News Block Has Been Placed on the Republican Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Republican Party states that Albanian Television is deliberately blocking reports on its political activities.*

To Uran Butka, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for the Media:

To Bardhyl Polio, director general of Radio-Television:

To Qemal Sakajeva, director of Television:

Our activities were not represented in the program, "Activities of the Political Parties," on 7 December 1995, even though the appropriate films had been made. In addition, the chairman of the Republican Party [PR], Sabri Godo, received the deputy foreign minister of Iran, Morteza Sarmandi, on 5 December. Although we had been promised a camera crew, no camera crew came to film the meeting and, although the PR press office sent the appropriate report, it was not transmitted on the Television news programs. The recent actions are not the only ones that Television has taken against the PR. The PR has protested such actions many times, both orally and in writing, but, unfortunately, the situation remains unchanged. Judging by the chronology of events, it has been proved that, although essential openings have been created for the left-wing forces in Albanian Television and other state media, a news barrier has been set up for the PR.

Speculating as to whether these actions come from a fear of the return of the former communists to power or whether they are a result of current official policy, the spokesman of the Albanian Republican Party is making a strong protest against the current attitude of the main institution of the state media and is strongly demanding that the PR be given the openness to which it is entitled on Albanian Television.

Although we are not convinced that our protest will be taken into consideration, we are obliged to take note of any action which might be undertaken to prevent reporting on our activities.

Neritan Alibali, PR Spokesman

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Videnov Receives U.S. Ambassador Montgomery

AU1601190096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 16 January, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov received U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery in connection with his final departure from the country. During the talks, the mutual satisfaction with the joint work was pointed out, as well as confidence in the future of bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral relations were highly assessed during the talk. Simultaneously, the need to activate bilateral economic contacts and the process of attracting foreign investments to Bulgaria was stressed.

Pirinski's EU, NATO, Bosnia Policies Criticized

AU1101091196 Sofia ZNAME in Bulgarian 8-14 Jan 96 p 6

[Commentary by Kalina Lyubomirova: "As Foreign Policy Is, So Is the Foreign Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The issue of Bulgaria's NATO membership is not on the agenda. This is what Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski said in drawing the balance of Bulgarian diplomacy in 1995. However, those words are also a forecast for 1996.

Mr. Pirinski described the official request to join the EU as Bulgaria's main achievement in the field of foreign policy in 1995, and remaining on the EU negative visa list as Bulgaria's main failure.

The boredom and awkwardness that our foreign minister projects reflects in Bulgaria's foreign policy. Mr. Pirinski turns Bulgaria's request to join the EU—a formal result of long preparations, which lasted for years and which is anything but a top achievement of our diplomacy—into a stellar success of our foreign policy. Our remaining on the EU negative list really is a failure, but it was not a bolt from the blue, but the result of many factors that the EU systematically noted during the years of updating the so-called black list.

However, the statement that Bulgaria's NATO membership is not on the agenda is remarkable for Mr. Pirinski, because it is one of the rare occasions on which he expressed himself in clear language, without any conditions and qualifications.

In this short sentence, the chief of the Bulgarian diplomacy expressed his party's message, namely, that under the leadership of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Bulgaria is saying no to NATO, while simultaneously trying to say yes to the EU. Now the official formulations of the Bulgarian foreign policy can freely contain phrases regarding our "striving toward the European structures," without including the adjective "Atlantic" in the same phrases. However, the brief phrase of out gray first diplomat is also the key to the real main failure of Bulgaria's diplomacy—the fact that Bulgaria alone has isolated itself vis-a-vis Europe and the world and became the only neighbor of former Yugoslavia who decided not to participate in guaranteeing the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This process, which formally began immediately after signing the peace agreement on 14 December in Paris, but really started months earlier, was assessed throughout the world as the most important event in 1995. It became possible after a combined involvement of the U.S. diplomacy and NATO's military power in the Bosnia war.

As long as the war was conducted, Bulgaria steadily followed its declared policy of total noninterference in the conflict—a policy that was motivated by our national interests. As soon as it became clear that the war was about to end, however, both neighboring and distant countries began to prepare the guaranteeing of the peace and the postwar reconstruction within the framework of NATO, the United Nations, and other international organizations. At that moment, the need for Bulgaria's total noninterference was eliminated.

The deployment in Bosnia of 60,000 troops from the 16 NATO member-states, and almost the same number of troops from countries that are not NATO members, must guarantee the application of the peace agreement. NATO envisages that its first peace-protecting operation will last for about one year. However, the operation is only an element of the common peace strategy, which also includes the postwar reconstruction of the regions that were affected by the war, and, in the long run, affiliating this part of Europe with the principles of democracy, market economy, and civilization. This strategy greatly resembles the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction after World War II.

Bulgaria is not participating in the implementation of this strategy, because this is what its rulers want.

Chinese Military Attache 'Beaten Up' in Sofia

AU1201145596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have already reported on the incident in Sofia involving a Chinese diplomat. We have just received further details from REUTER.

The Chinese military attache (?Zhan Tsichan) has been admitted to a hospital after being beaten up with a metal rod by an unknown attacker. The Chinese diplomat is in stable condition following an operation, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Pantaley Karasimeonov informed REUTER.

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According to well-informed sources, nothing was stolen in the incident, and the police are waiting for the diplomat to regain consciousness so they can question him. There were no witnesses to the incident, and the diplomat was found bleeding by chance passersby. REUTER adds that Asian diplomats and businessmen in Sofia run the risk of being attacked by skinheads.

BBC Recognition of 'Macedonian Language' Viewed

AU1201082996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 10 Jan 96 p 12

[Unattributed editorial: "Let Us Treat the Macedonian Language As the British Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The BBC is to begin broadcasting in the Macedonian language. We will listen with interest, because we do not need any translation. In addition, our statesmen, who continue to ponder the issue of what language they should sign agreements with their Skopje colleagues, are getting another chance. If the "official language" formula used by our southwestern neighbors, who are so close to us, is unacceptable, perhaps they could adopt a new formula: "The language in which the BBC broadcasts to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]."

The poor British! Someone should tell them that they are broadcasting in a language that doesn't exist! Why don't we pretend that we are also British, so that we could finally understand each other when talking with our neighbors? Then we will at least have more opportunities to quarrel with them about the "Macedonian language."

Intellectuals Support Zhelev for 2d Term

AU1601110996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Jan 96

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the presence of President Zhelev, some 50 Bulgarian intellectuals met to form the "Consensus for Bulgaria" Association. [Sdruzhenie Suglasie za Bulgariya] At the start of the meeting, Georgi Danailov declared: The forthcoming presidential elections are of fateful importance for Bulgaria. There is a possibility that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] may again be victorious. For this reason, we must rally around a candidate acceptable to the opposition who is able to win these presidential elections. There is no more suitable candidature than your own, Mr. President, Georgi Danailov told President Zhelev.

Academician Rumen Tsanev was the next to take the floor. He declared that it is high time for the voice of the Bulgarian intellectuals to be heard in the future government of Bulgaria. We want to show that other people apart from the politicians have their viewpoint on the issue of who should be Bulgaria's next pre[illegible]ent.

The intellectuals asked President Zhelev specific questions connected with his possible election to a second term as president. We will inform you of the head of state's replies in later transmissions.

BSP Factions' Attitudes to Videnov Cabinet Seen

AU1501160796 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 8-14 Jan 96 No 2, pp 11, 14

[Article by Karmelita Deneva: "Ministers Will Face Questioning at BSP Headquarters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 5 January, the Executive Bureau of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] spent long hours discussing how the left should handle the no-confidence vote in the cabinet proposed by the parliamentary opposition. It also became clear that in the coming week, the BSP Supreme Council and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group will hear what Zhan Videnov and his ministers have to say before they decide whether to seek ministerial resignations immediately or after the vote has been taken.

However, at this point, one can certainly assert that, during next week's questioning sessions at the BSP headquarters, the Socialist National Assembly deputies and Supreme Council members will demand clear answers about the work of the ministers and the behavior of certain advisers and officials. The Reds were especially infuriated by the statements made by Council of Ministers official Gyurova. The scandal that she created was an unexpected blow for the prime minister and cleared the ground for speculations by Andrey Lukanov in his duel with the BSP leader. In this connection, some people at the party headquarters are expressing serious doubts about the role played by Gyurova's direct superior, Krasimir Raydovski, who almost egged her on to make her statement to Radio Free Europe. Some deputies are asking themselves whether a grain crisis really exists or whether it has been artificially planned, because it was claimed that the flour mills were shutting down, yet now the millers announce that they have enough grain for three, four, or even six months.

The gathering at Pozitano Street [BSP headquarters] seems likely to be the place where the various BSP factions will inform each other about who wants what.

The so-called right wing in the BSP-OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] (Chavdar Kyuranov, Atanas Paparizov, and Georgi Pirinski), who in essence support

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Lukanov's ideas, will not allow any outspoken criticism of the prime minister. Moreover, Videnov has given jobs to quite a few of their fellows.

A member of the OSD leadership has informed 168 CHASA that, at a meeting of the Political Council of the Pinks [OSD] held a month ago, Pirinski even said he was worried and concerned by the actions of the cabinet, of which he himself is a member. Despite this, the Pinks do not believe that the present government represents a failure of Socialist rule in general, but has rather brought the intraparty conflicts to the surface.

"With our criticism we will do nothing to help Lilov, who has already launched his attack on the cabinet," Dimitur Yonchev said, "because he put these young lads in power, but now he wants to stay in the background and sacrifice them." The OSD will demand results only in combating crime, which may cause problems for the interior minister.

Aleksandur Lilov has repeatedly stated that new names are needed at the Interior, Economy, and Agriculture Ministries. In fact, the strategist [Lilov's sobriquet] is gaining more and more from Videnov's silence. More supporters are joining his camp, making criticisms of the executive and demanding new ministers.

It is possible that at the meeting due to take place within a few days, Lilov will win the support of the hall for the first time in two years.

The extreme left at the BSP headquarters—namely, the members of the Marxist Platform—are refraining at the moment from mentioning the names of the ministers they do not like. Mincho Minchev, the faction's leader, has said that the Marxist Platform will decide what to do after it has heard Videnov's report. "We will first hear what the chief actor—Zhan—has to say, especially how he defends his people. However, I fear that his silence will continue. This will be a bad thing, and it will clearly show that he is trying to escape responsibility." However, their claims against Ministers Nachev, Gechev, Tsochev, Chichibaba, and Vuchev are already known. The Executive Bureau is more cautious than any other party body when it comes to proposing new names.

The prime minister has two possible alternatives for handling this situation: either to continue to retain weak figures in his cabinet, as dictated by an intraparty and coalition compromise, or to make new appointments from the same team.

'Clear Position' Demanded on Bulgarians in Outlands

AU1601214296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD] demands Prime Minister Zhan Videnov to issue a clear position on the rights of the Bulgarians in the Western Outlands, in connection with the groundless Yugoslav claims regarding a Serb minority in Bulgaria.

This is pointed out in a declaration issued by the VMRO-SMD Executive Committee.

The VMRO-SMD demand is related to the statement made yesterday by the leader of the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, Radmilo Bogdanovic.

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Prime Minister on Czech-German Relations

LD1601213996 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 16 Jan 96

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Lucie Weissova; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Prime Minister, one of the things that could worry people is the reliability of our banking institutions. The sixth largest bank—Ekoagrobanka—started to have trouble last week. This time it was a bit different because it had been caused by a leak of information from the Czech National Bank. What would you say about this? Such indiscretion can liquidate any monetary institution.

[Klaus] I am sad because Ekoagrobanka has its problems like many other institutions in our country. What has actually happened did not have to happen. That is why the certain salvation measures are easier than in the worse cases.

I cannot prevent leakage of information; I cannot prevent what happens after the information leaks. I cannot prevent its getting, through the magnifying glass of the communication media, on the television news in the evening. I cannot prevent people hearing about bad affairs of this bank or another and lining up before the bank in the morning to take out their money. Nobody can do this, so it is a pity. I do not think it was necessary for this to happen. [passage omitted]

[Weissova] The last topic I want to talk to you about is Czech-German relations. The [Czech and German] foreign ministers did not agree on 12 January on the text of the joint declaration. You will now go to Germany. Will you discuss this problem there?

[Klaus] Well, first, I would like to say that once every year and a half I take part in a regular international Bertelsmann forum in which many world politicians take part. In other words, the topic of this forum is not bilateral Czech-German relations. Naturally I will be in Bonn. I have always wanted to meet the significant official on the German political scene, Wolfgang Schauble, the chairman of the parliamentary Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union faction, who will also take part in this conference. I assume that I will continue along the line of my July meeting with President Herzog, and I also assume that I will exchange a few words with another participant in this event, German Foreign Minister Kinkel. I repeat, the purpose of this international conference is the expansion of the EU, and Czech-German bilateral relations are not (? a priority).

[Weissova] When talking about the lack of agreement, do you not think that it escalates tension in Czech-German relations, that it can bring about various accusations of nationalism occurring in German media in connection with Gerd Albrecht?

[Klaus] I do not agree. It is futile to create expectations. I have known from the very beginning that Czech-German relations have their own problems. They have had them for thousands of years and will continue to have them for thousands of years.

The [Czech-German] declaration was a partial—I stress, a partial—attempt at making another little step forward and at putting down some of the issues on which both sides would agree. If we have the declaration, fine. If we do not manage to arrive at this declaration today, there is nothing we can do. We will try to arrive at it in a year or two. I do not view this as anything important. It is possible that those politicians who have linked their name to an effort aimed at achieving this declaration view this situation somewhat more intensely. However, in my view there is no drama or any dramatic finale in this development.

[Weissova] Thank you for the interview.

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Meciar Views Political State of Affairs

AU1601160396 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 15 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Eva Zelenayova: "Slovakia Is Clearly Establishing Itself as a Modern, Democratic State; Meeting of HZDS Republic Presidium"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Smrdaky—In his speech at the 13 January meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republic Presidium, HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar devoted primary attention to the movement's strategic tasks until 1998. He also emphasized and appreciated the speed of drafting the bill on a new territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic.

As usual, a report on the current political situation was presented by Meciar, who informed the HZDS Republic Presidium in detail on the strategic steps being prepared by the HZDS for the years 1996-97.

The need to take strategic steps for a two-year period also transpires from the fact that, following the sixth HZDS assembly scheduled for March 1996, the next, the seventh, HZDS assembly need not take place until spring 1998. That assembly should serve as preparation for the next parliamentary elections. It is therefore necessary to expand the HZDS membership base to 100,000 members, to complete in 1996 the territorial and administrative arrangement of the state and to adjust the political structures to the new conditions.

It is necessary, furthermore, to establish professional clubs and further expand their network for gradual integration until the elections. [sentence as published]

Voter Base Is Firm

Vladimir Meciar also dealt in detail with the possibilities of and the need for changes in the election law. He also asked whether it would be expedient to hold parliamentary elections concurrently with local elections. Speaking about the current political situation, he said: "Our voter base has not dissipated, but it is necessary to work to stabilize it further." He considers as alarming the church's attitude toward the HZDS, which, in his opinion, is coming to a head without any cause. He said that the president was destabilizing the situation at home and abroad and was incapable of changing his stances. Although the Slovak Republic is clearly establishing itself as a democratic state, the president of the Slovak Republic is constantly challenging precisely the Republic's democratic principles.

Coalition Is Open

According to Vladimir Meciar, the HZDS is open to the entry of further political entities into the coalition. He said that the split in the Democratic Union [DU] continues, that the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] is becoming increasingly militant, and that the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] is still incapable of becoming clear about what it wants. He also touched upon cooperation within the coalition, saying that the opposition would like to break it up, which is only its wish, however, just like the early elections, about which Jozef Moravcik [DU chairman] speaks. He also reacted to the views of those who call into question the HZDS's position on the political scene only because it has no links to international structures. He unequivocally rejected those views. He also said that the opposition's criticism of the monochromatic composition of OKO [parliamentary body for supervising the secret service] was unfounded because he had repeatedly asked the SDL to nominate one of its members [as OKO candidate], which has not happened, however. The status quo apparently suits them, Meciar said.

The liveliest discussion at the meeting of the HZDS Republic Presidium revolved around the bill on the territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic. The Interior Ministry is accepting proposals and comments on the bill until today.

From the Statement

The HZDS Republic Presidium adopted a statement in which it stresses that "the president confirmed, also in his New Year's address, that he is not interested in dialogue and is building his policy on confrontation and attacks on the ruling movement. The HZDS, therefore, considers statements by the president about his willingness to establish dialogue to be only empty rhetoric and not a serious offer of real cooperation." Furthermore, the HZDS Republic Presidium statement advocated a consistent improvement in state-church relations and appreciated the Slovak Republic's participation in the international East-West conference in Baltimore in the United States devoted to, among other issues, transformation processes in postcommunist countries.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 January on pages 1 and 2 carries a 400-word report by Nora Sliskova on the HZDS Republic Presidium meeting entitled "HZDS Was Fine-Tuning Shape of New Territorial and Administrative Arrangement." The report states: "The government should discuss the government-sponsored bill on territorial and administrative arrangement at the beginning of March. This was announced by HZDS Deputy Chairman Arpad Matejka in the course of

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Saturday's meeting of the HZDS Republic Presidium. According to Matejka, the proposal for the formation of eight territorial entities (the Bratislava, Trnava, Nitra, Trencin, Zilina, Banska Bystrica, Presov, and Kosice regions) is final. The HZDS disagrees with the so-called counties variant, proposed, in particular, by Hungarian parties and the KDH. It also rejects the claim that the aim of the government proposal is to disperse the Hungarian minority and create an ethnically pure territory." Asked by a PRAVDA correspondent when the bill on the protection of the Republic would be submitted to parliament, HZDS Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska reportedly replied that "this definitely is not a distant matter."]

Meciar Speaks at Army Conference

LD1601211896 Bratislava VTV Television in Slovak 1830 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Senior officials from the General Staff of the Slovak Army and members of subordinate troops and military institutions are taking part in a four-day meeting that started today in the Army House in Trencin to discuss preparations for a new training year. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar addressed the meeting.

Journalists were excluded from the meeting when the prime minister spoke, so they were expecting a news conference in the late afternoon with great excitement.

In his speech to the General Staff and officers of the Slovak Army, the prime minister said, among other things, that our effort to join NATO is Slovakia's internal affair, and no one is ordering us to do anything in this respect.

This makes the issue of Slovakia's political stability rather important, Vladimir Meciar said. So far, however, we are not giving the world a very good picture of Slovakia.

[Begin Meciar recording] Mutual confidence in the prevalence of democratic values in the Slovak Republic must be reinforced. I do not know any other country that would be rejecting so self-destructively everything positive that is created on its territory. Everywhere else people are realistic, they tell themselves: This is good, and this is bad. If things are not going well they should be criticized and written about, but it is wrong to throw doubt at everything that is most important, to say that we have no democracy, that there is no freedom in Slovakia, that people are not allowed to write what they want, that people cannot say what they think. It is not true. [end recording]

[Announcer] Vladimir Meciar also believes that it is necessary to ensure good social conditions for professional soldiers and to pass a law guaranteeing jobs for life in the civil service. He also thinks that it is important to think of raising wages and providing other benefits. He said that the government allotted 200 million Slovak korunas for the construction of apartments for soldiers.

The Slovak prime minister also spoke about the adoption of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. He said that the demands of the Slovak National Party are within the framework set by the government's policy statement. He said that their first demand is to amend the section of the criminal law on the protection of the Republic; Vladimir Meciar considers this acceptable. The next demand asks for the passage of a law on security in exceptional situations.

[Begin Meciar recording] The adoption of a law on the state of emergency that would stipulate rules for such a situation has also been envisaged by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak National Party has changed its attitude and will vote for a change [as heard]. [end recording]

Army: Nation Will Participate in Peace Operations

LD1601161796 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A four-day army command meeting opened in Trencin today. Participants include chief officials of the General Staff, commanders of units and equipment of the Army of the Slovak Republic. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is expected at the meeting in the afternoon. Editor Peter Toman interviewed Colonel-General Jozef Tuchyna, chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic, shortly before the meeting:

[Begin recording] [Toman] General, what should this four-day Army command meeting bring, above all?

[Tuchyna] I would like to say at the beginning that this is not an exceptional meeting. It is a regular meeting in accordance with my guidelines for training troops this training year. We regularly meet each year at the beginning of the new training year, to explain the most complicated questions that commanders and staff will be facing in the particular training year.

[Toman] How will this training year be exceptional?

[Tuchnya] We will continue with the transformation of the Army, and, naturally, we want to prepare our commanders, staff, and troops for participation in multinational forces, in possible peace operations. The aim of this meeting will be, above all, to explain the principles

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of the use of troops in peace operations and activity in solving crisis situations and granting humanitarian aid.

Another aim will be to get acquainted with the methodological processes used in NATO armies in planning and directing peace operations, and last, to analyze the development of criminality in the Army and to seek preventive measures for its reduction.

[Toman] You mentioned the joint peace operations. What reserves does our Army have in this context?

[Tuchnya] We are taking part in the peace operations. Our engineering battalion is one of the best units within the framework of fulfilling UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] tasks in Yugoslavia. But this year we want to introduce a rapid deployment battalion that will be destined to fulfill these tasks. We are preparing two flights of MiG-29's for involvement in these activities. But this is not all. All of the commanders must become acquainted with these activities. They must always be ready at any time to fulfill these tasks. And it is not only selected units that are involved; there must be a broad base for the fulfillment of these tasks. [passage omitted] [end recording]

SIS Said Surveilling Witnesses in Kovac Jr Case

AU1601214996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 15 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "pt": "Secret Witness, Oskar F.'s Friend, and SME Editor Under Surveillance of Slovak Information Service Members"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—While acquiring information about the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr., the SME editor who devotes himself to this case has been shadowed, also outside working hours, by a number of passenger cars—a red Seat Toledo [license plate] BLD 08-39; a blue Honda-Civic BHH 73-50; a red Ford Escort 68-22 [no letter combination given as published]; a red Opel Astra BLE 76-38; a green Mitsubishi Galant BLH 65-39; and a blue Mazda 323 BLH 55-23. Following a lengthy period of surveillance, we asked a police body for a screening [lustracia] of these cars, on the basis of which it was ascertained that some of them have never gone through the registration process and that most of them are registered to members of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] as private persons. It is worth noting that the green Mitsubishi Galant BLH 65-39 is registered to SIS member Jiri N., who had been charged by former investigator Peter Vacok with complicity in the criminal act of abducting the president's son abroad. As we have managed to ascertain, some of the cars mentioned above were also shadowing J. V., a secret witness in this case, as he was returning from the interrogation to which he had been summoned by investigator J. Ciz. All cars shadowing the SME editor were also shadowing R.R., a friend of Oskar F., the former SIS member who had confessed to having unconsciously participated in Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction. The Honda Civic BHH 73-50 and the Mazda 323 BLH 55-23 were even shadowing R.R. on the territory of neighboring Czech Republic.

SME Editor's Wife 'Threatened'

AU0901211196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "r": "Wife of SME Editor Being Threatened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In a telephone call on Thursday, 4 January, in the evening, an anonymous male was threatening the wife of the SME editor [Peter Toth] who is devoting himself to the case of the abduction abroad of the Slovak president's son. The unidentified caller demanded that she call her husband and tell him that, if he "does not stop writing against Meciar, Lexa, and the state," she and her child will have to bear the consequences. The SME editor's wife and her one-month-old son are currently staying at her parents' house in the Orava region. The threatening man introduced himself as "a friend." The same manner of introduction was used by the man who recently asked our editor for a meeting, to which he did not come, however, and on the way home from which our editor was assaulted by an unknown perpetrator. As we managed to ascertain, the SME editor had been shadowed, before this incident, by an organized group of people. His surveillance continues to this day, and the following cars are being used for it—a red Seat Toledo, license plate BLD 08-39, a red Ford Escort, license plate BLH 68-22, and others. There exists a warranted suspicion that behind the threatening telephone call is a person or group of people who have access to the Central Population Register or to transcripts of wiretapped telephone calls of the SME editor and members of his family.

SNS on Changed Attitude Toward Hungarian Treaty

AU1701072496 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "jur": "Slovak National Party Will Support Ratification of Slovak-Hungarian Treaty but Has a Number of Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—"On the basis of the domestic political situation in the Slovak Republic and international developments in Central Europe, the

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Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council has reassessed the SNS's attitude toward the ratification of the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic and is ready to consider a compromise solution that would confirm that the only possible alternative is the present government coalition, which the SNS regards as the sole entity capable of continuing work for the benefit of Slovak statehood and the Slovak nation. The SNS is ready to consider the above solution if its coalition partners accept the conditions approved by the SNS Central Council" states a resolution from a session of the SNS supreme body presented by SNS Chairman Jan Slota to journalists after its conclusion.

Only Jan Slota has been authorized by the SNS Central Council to interpret and comment on the resolution. "No one else from the SNS who would like to interpret the resolution is authorized to do so. The only reason is to prevent a misinterpretation of this resolution," he stressed. Of 49 members of the SNS Central Council, 44 voted for the resolution, four abstained, and one was against.

Replying to journalists' questions, Slota clarified the conditions that are mentioned in the resolution. He mentioned approval of the laws on the protection of the Republic and on the state of emergency and amendments to the law on local elections and to the school law. He was not willing, however, to specify in greater detail the implementation of these conditions. "An agreement on the sequence of steps will be reached within the framework of the coalition," he said. Asked about his idea on the amendment to the law on local elections, he said that the majority system had not acquitted itself well in local elections and that the SNS would be pushing for the proportional system.

Jan Slota also reacted to a number of current domestic political issues. In reaction to negative statements by Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], about the SNS, he said: "Peter Weiss has become a democrat and interpreter of democratic principles overnight. He has quickly forgotten about the crimes of the party that fed him for a fairly long time. He should occupy himself, first and foremost, with his own party and with himself." NARODNA OBRODA asked him about his assessment of the SDL's possible entry into the government coalition and whether the SNS would tolerate the SDL as a coalition partner. "The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has notified the SNS as its coalition partner that such talks are taking place, and the prime minister, too, has spoken about them. The coalition is not closed to anyone who is willing to contribute constructively to the building of Slovakia. Personally, however, I view these talks skeptically," he said. Replying to another question from NARODNA OBRODA about why the SNS's proposal for territorial and administrative division is not identical with the government proposal, Jan Slota replied that the SNS's proposal for three regions plus Bratislava had emerged from a meeting of the SNS Central Council two months ago and that this proposal was the most acceptable one. However, they have not closed the door to the possibility of holding talks and succeeding with this proposal in the coalition. Slota stressed that, regarding this proposal, the SNS had also reached a great deal of understanding with Kosice Mayor Rudolf Schuster.

KDH Proposes Amendment to Law on SIS

AU1201191196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "ns": "The KDH Wants To Amend the Law on the SIS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Deputies I. Simko and P. Hrusovsky yesterday submitted a draft amendment to the Laws on the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and Military Intelligence. This draft assumes that the parliamentary bodies established to control the operation of secret services (the so-called OKO and the control body for the operation of Military Intelligence) will be dismantled and entrusts the relevant National Council committee with parliamentary control over SIS and Military Intelligence. Specifically, it should be the Defense and Security Committee.

According to Simko, the draft amendment reconciles parliamentary control over two secret services with the finding of the Constitutional Court regarding the investigation commissions. Namely, this court recently declared that the National Council could exercise the control powers concerning other state bodies exclusively by means of such bodies, the establishment of which is in accordance with the Constitution, i.e., by means of parliamentary committees. The KDH believes that the adoption of this amendment would at the same time satisfy the requirement for plurality control of the secret services.

Ministry Confirms Legitimacy of New SPZ Leaders

AU1601160296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Jan 96 p 4

[Report by "job": "Registration of SPZ Statutes Confirmed New Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—On 8 January of this year, the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic registered the new statutes of the Party of Entrepreneurs

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and Tradesmen (SPZ), approved at the regular SPZ assembly in Nitra on 22 December 1995. This was announced by SPZ Chairman Ivan Sykora at his party's news conference yesterday. SPZ Deputy Chairman Jan Zoldak added that all of the discussions about who actually makes up the party leadership have been wound up because, according to Zoldak, registration of the statutes means recognition of the legal validity of the assembly and of the new party leadership. "Former SPZ Chairman Vladimir Randa and his former deputy chairmen have thus become rank-and-file citizens and do not have the right to appear in public as SPZ representatives," Jan Zoldak observed. The SPZ chairman told reporters that a complaint had been lodged against Vladimir Randa, who is suspected of fraud over his manipulation of party funds. Asked whether SPZ members would have to reregister, Ivan Sykora said that they would not because the party had not broken up and only personnel changes had taken place in it. Yesterday's news conference was also attended by 15 chairmen of SPZ district organizations.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 13 January on page 2 carries a 200-word report by "sp" on the SPZ briefing, which adds: "The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has been informed about the situation in the SPZ, and SPZ Chairman Ivan Sykora is expecting to meet with Vladimir Meciar. In the near future, the SPZ also intends to abolish its agreements with opposition parties on the community level. 'The HZDS is our only partner,' Ivan Sykora added."]

SDL Official Outlines Coalition Entry Terms

AU1101160396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Juraj Hrasko, chairman of the Slovak SDL (Party of the Democratic Left) Council of Sections for Practical Policy, by Julius Gembicky in Bratislava; date not given: "The Decision on the SDL's Entry Into the Government Is in the Hands of the HZDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Perhaps the most discussed domestic political issue of recent months, especially after P. Weiss's announcement that he will not stand for the post of chairman at the party's congress in April, is the possible entry of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] into the governing coalition. Whether this is a real possibility or just a hypothetical one was discussed, first and foremost, in our interview with the chairman of the SDL Council of Sections for Practical Policy—Juraj Hrasko.

[Gembicky] Let us not beat about the bush. Under which specific conditions would the SDL be willing to enter into government cooperation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]?

[Hrasko] You journalists are interesting people. You look for sensations everywhere. The most discussed issue in the SDL after its third congress was the restoration of the voters' confidence in our policy. That is, we still harbor the ambition to be more than a small party with 5.0-percent of voter support, to be a strong party that everyone takes seriously. Since, a couple of months ago, we were hovering in the popularity polls even at 7-8 percent, we had to ask ourselves whether our policy is intelligible. Why did those to whom we profess not vote for us in the last elections? The congress in Poprad set us the task of strengthening the left-wing nature of the SDL and of becoming the main force in uniting all of the left-wing parties in Slovakia—the governing Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], the opposition SDL and Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS], and the nonparliamentary Communist Party of Slovakia. We know that there are leftist thinking people within the broad-spectrum HZDS, not only among the politicians, but also among the members. In order to pull off this demanding unification task, we decided that it is necessary to convene a regular congress this year that should adopt the program theses for creating a society of democratic socialism and an action program for unifying the SDL in the next two to three years. So, convening the congress has nothing to do with considering the issues of our possible entry into the governing coalition.

[Gembicky] Does this perhaps mean that entry is not even being discussed theoretically in the SDL?

[Hrasko] I am not saying this. But, the conditions under which entry would be possible are a matter for political agreement. The views of the HZDS and SDL on the issues of transformation and the style of government policy are different. While their method of governing is oriented more toward minimizing the risks so that they do not lose their parliamentary majority and govern for four years, we would not want—even in the event of a coalition agreement—to dispense with our basic policy aims. We are not maximalists who would demand that the government and HZDS fulfill our program. But, we cannot go beyond its bounds, because we would lose our own features. We are aware that our possible entry would lead to a change in the status of the current government. Not only because it would gain the support of the 18 Common Choice deputies in parliament. In our opinion, this would bolster the government's self-confidence and alleviate the HZDS's fears that it could at some point get into the situation in which the movement found itself in March 1994. This would enable the new coalition government to govern

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more calmly. Our distinct requirement is that the method of government and decisionmaking and the filling of state posts proceed from the principles of expertise and not from party loyalty. We also had an opportunity in the former regime to satisfy ourselves that such political loyalty is more a loyalty born out of fear. That is, our fundamental condition is respect for pluralist views and also for the sound views of the opposition. And, in a nutshell, that is the fee that the HZDS would have to pay for the SDL's entry into the government.

[Gembicky] But, a willingness to form a coalition with the HZDS has also been conveyed clearly by the public statements of some SDL representatives. Moreover, reports have emerged—although not at the most senior and official level—from the HZDS and SDL lobbies about unofficial meetings or negotiations with V. Meciar. One of those being talked about in this connection is you. Where did you meet with V. Meciar and what were the limits or inducements for your entry into the governing coalition?

[Hrasko] You know that last spring, we held official talks with the HZDS, at which we agreed that certain common ground exists in our programs that would allow us to join a coalition government with the HZDS. We also pinpointed some obstacles standing in the way of this. At the above talks, the prime minister proposed that we meet from time to time to consult on issues, the solution to which goes beyond the time frame of one government term. We have met several times. The prime minister did not lure us [into a coalition] and there was no talk of buying us, although the reasons for our refusal to join the government were among the issues that we discussed.

The decision to join the European structures is a voluntary one, made without external pressure. But it requires not only the compatibility of the economic and legal systems, but also compatibility of political systems. Slovakia's present political scene is, absolutely, a nonstandard one, incompatible with the political systems in the states of the EU, of which we are an associate member. The right wing in the government coalition is represented by the nationalist Slovak National Party [SNS]. The center, represented by the HZDS, and the left, which the ZRS aspires to represent, are not standard liberal or social democratic parties. The opposition comprises the right-wing Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], the liberal Democratic Union [DU], and the left-wing SDL and SDSS. Who is close to whom, what kind of program affinities or differences are there? The remarkable thing is that, while not even one of the government parties has partners in political groupings in Europe, all the opposition parties are either regular members of such groupings or, such as the SDL, candidates for membership. The HZDS, which, too, will have to decide to transform itself into a political party one day, is very well aware of this. In my opinion, however, at least two political parties, rather than one, will emerge from the HZDS. Hence, the question is not whether the SDL wishes to join the government or not. When this issue is contemplated aloud, it is because of the vital interest of the Slovak Republic in having in the government an internationally established political force. It can be either the KDH, the DU, or the SDL. But that is a matter of specific political agreements, comparison of policy aims, and search for a compromise acceptable to both partners, neither of whom must lose his own face. Perhaps it is not too late to consider even the formation of a broad coalition government. However, that would require, first and foremost, political will of the HZDS, the most important political force in Slovakia.

[Gembicky] While, according to Peter Weiss [SDL chairman], a step as serious as entering Meciar's cabinet ought to be decided by the party congress, voices are to be heard to the effect that the original negative decision could be reversed even by the SDL Republic Council. Toward which of these views do you lean?

[Hrasko] The decision to join the government can be made by the same body that refused to join it in November 1994. It was the Republic Council that decided that the confrontational style of government, which started with the establishment of commissions of inquiry, with attempts to dismiss the president, and with mass purges among specialists in the state administration, was unacceptable to the SDL. Therefore, the decision on this issue need not be made by the party congress. As a matter of fact, Peter Weiss himself confirmed this on Radio Twist last Friday. My personal opinion regarding the SDL's entry into the government is identical with the resolution of SDL bodies, for which I had voted. However, the decision on the SDL's entry into the government is not in the hands of the SDL but, first and foremost, in the hands of the HZDS. I am of the opinion that it is necessary to negotiate and that entry into the government requires a correct political and programmatic agreement, which must be approved by both parties' competent bodies. Deceitful lobby promises that would mean loss of face not just for the weaker partner, but also for the stronger partner, are alien and unacceptable to me.

SDL Official on Party Issues, HZDS Cooperation

AU1501160696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Jan 96 p 3

[Interview with Juraj Hrasko, chairman of the Slovak SDL Council of Sections for Practical Policy, by Julius

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Gembicky in Bratislava; date not given: "Politics Is Not Only the Art of Compromise, It Also Involves Respect for the Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gembicky] Who will be the hot candidate for the post of party chairman vacated by Weiss? Will it be R. Fico? Would the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] perhaps be willing, under the guise of protecting Slovakia's nation-state interests, to support the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's call for the dismissal of President M. Kovac from his post or to shorten his term of office? What would your government do differently than V. Meciar's cabinet?

The answers to these interesting questions were left over in the notebook of our editor Julius Gembicky from yesterday's interview with Juraj Hrasko, chairman of the SDL Council of Sections for Practical Policy, and, therefore, we are bringing you them in an abridged form.

[Hrasko] 1. I have already received several recommendations at sessions of the SDL Republic Council that I stand for this post. Life has taught me to make decisions carefully, with a feeling of responsibility, and with the conviction that I am the best for the given post. I have not come to the conclusion that, of the possible candidates, I would really be the best. Therefore, I will not seek this post. There are more hot candidates. Each has his virtues; it is possible to have reservations against each one. It is not necessary to look for a 24-carat chairman. It is more necessary to have a leadership that is capable of action and that has its own conductor and an orchestra of equal musicians that plays in harmony.

2. In view of his youth, Robert Fico is undoubtedly a major political hope, not only for the SDL, but also for Slovak politics. He will be an excellent party chairman one day. I am keeping my fingers crossed that he continues working on himself, gathers experience, does not grow conceited, and that he also becomes prime minister.

3. If we say that politics is the art of compromise, then, on the other hand, it also involves respect for fundamental laws, namely, the Slovak Constitution. One anticonstitutional act could lead to others; therefore, we will not take any anticonstitutional step in the SDL. If, in the interest of calming down our domestic political situation, some people see the solution in the two of them having to go, then I am of the opinion that they should find the kind of advisers who would discern the mistakes they are making. But, would also be capable of seeing the virtues of the other. The best advisers are not those whose speeches sound nice. Mr. Meciar is, without a doubt, the most prominent political personality in Slovakia, so I do not think he should deal with petty issues.

4. What would we do differently? We would look the truth in the face. Slovakia does not have the best reputation in the world. This is due to our own mistakes, our stubbornness or our narrow-minded tendency to shut ourselves off. To quote the point of view of the CNN commentators, outside they see us as a state with two faces. On the one side, there are our macroeconomic successes, at which there is amazement, on the other our inscrutable and unpredictable political antics, of which there is harsh criticism. We do not have enough principles, which has also been manifested markedly in the views on the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. The prime minister did not sign this treaty on behalf of the HZDS, but on behalf of the government—that is, also on behalf of those who did not vote for him. If a member of the governing coalition disagrees with its conclusion, then, as anywhere else in the world, he should announce his resignation from the government as a sign of his disagreement. Only in our country is it different. It would also not go down well with us if we were to agree with our coalition partners in the policy statement on an orientation toward the European structures and, after a time, a coalition partner were to start demanding neutrality for Slovakia. Or, V. Meciar objects strongly to fascism, but he puts up with the glorification in the government of fascist leaders and war criminals by some of his coalition partners. Therefore, not political speculation, but political responsibility is forcing the SDL to consider whether it could help to eradicate the ambiguity of our perception in the world by taking part in the government.

Strategy of Opposition Parties Reviewed

96CH0011A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 3 Dec 95 p 3

[Article by Peter Schutz: "To the Bitter End—The Third Meciar Government Is Remaining Stable With the Help of the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In two weeks, it will be a year since the third Meciar government took power, much to the malicious joy of the current Slovak opposition. At that time, the opposition parties, suffering from heavy postelection shock, rejected all of Meciar's offers and completely ignored the fact that the potential government troika of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia], the Slovak National Party, and the Association of Slovak Workers represents a threat to the political and economic transformation of the country. According to notions prevailing at that time, this, the professionally weakest of the three Meciar government systems, and with two extreme deviations on its flanks also the most brittle, was expected to "tumble" after four to six months.

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But the forecasts failed completely. The worst of the Meciar power combinations looks more viable today than his previous cabinets. That is because the existing coalition is not a program-type coalition, nor an ideological one, nor a coalition within the meaning of a commercial agreement. Today, Slovakia is being administered by a coalition of individuals and party interests, the realization of which involves the misuse of all accessible instruments of state power. With slight exaggeration, it is possible to speak of a coalition of accomplices. And such coalitions tend to be the strongest.

The transformation of public television to state-run television, the selling off of state property to political vassals, the extortion of social organizations with the aid of budget instruments, the political "dressage" of the midlevel and lower-level state administrative apparatus, and so forth—all of these items point the way to the ultimate goal: control of the state "by democratic ways" while preserving the constitutional shell and the formal modalities of law. The second fundamental characteristic of the present coalition is its antireform focus. While the second Meciar government did, in fact, not touch the basic transformational provisions (and that is why today the economic macroindicators for Slovakia are still good), the present parliament has already adopted several disastrous laws, the consequences of which will be clearly negative.

Nevertheless, the total coalition war against President Kovac is "enjoying" the broadest of publicities and primary attention among the Western countries. In contrast to the less conspicuous steps taken by the Meciar coalition, it is precisely this ruinous duel that is perceived as being the cornerstone of Slovak democracy. This has a sort of logic: The centralizing and antireform countermovement cannot be expected to provide a rapid untangling, and neither of these movements has an immediate impact upon the stability of the state. On the contrary, many people are unable to visualize any further exacerbation of the confrontation between constitutional institutions without a sharp end.

However, this is an illusion. A solution that differs from the long and exhausting continuation of this nonsensical fight is not realistic for the time being. Meciar, who is driven by an unbreakable desire for satisfaction and revenge, is determined to hold Kovac to account. However, for the present, it does not look as though this will occur at any cost. The limit for him is "a solution within the framework of the Constitution," something he has repeatedly stressed. The difficulty lies in the fact that he will not be able to get at Kovac via the parliamentary route: The constitutional majority he would need in order to recall the president is a dream.

There are only two "constitutional" ways out from this troubled position. The first gains some ground in terms of topicalness as a result of the recent amendment of the law on the referendum. But most likely there will only be a threatening gesture: All public preference polls tend to indicate that this would be a risky enterprise with an open end. The second possibility is the resignation of the government with the goal of forcing premature elections (a different cabinet cannot originate in the current parliament). Here, the HZDS prospects would be better than in a referendum. But the problem involves the coalition partners, who, according to recent polls, are running more beneath rather than above the limit of electability. Luptak and Slota, for whom the president is not an object of irrational passion, thus have no reason to undertake such a gamble. So this variation is therefore still less likely than a people's plebiscite.

Faced with increasing compromise abroad and with the essentially complete loss of contact with the Visegrad Group, things look absurd in Slovakia today. The current status is untenable, but there is no sensible and, at the same time, constitutionally viable way out of this crisis. The opposition, which has already failed to master its role several times in the past, has its share of the blame for this situation. It is behaving precisely as irrationally as Vladimir Meciar. Apart from a portion of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] (which has its own purely selfish motives for it), the opposition perceives Meciar and his coalition exactly in the same manner that Meciar perceives it: not as a political opponent with whom it is necessary to deal, but as a life-and-death enemy, whom it is only possible to beat definitively and sweep away, because otherwise the enemy "would put an end to us." This superstition is based on a correct premise according to which Meciar is longing for absolute power, is not a democrat, and his words and promises cannot be believed. But this superstition leads to an incorrect conclusion, namely, that it is not possible to conduct any political exchange transactions, which are fully guaranteed by a system of contractual safeguards, with Meciar.

It is particularly the Christian Democrats who are elevating the question of the president to a position of an absolute principle and inviolable taboo. Naturally, there are some values and principles that cannot be bargained away. But the Slovak president and his office are definitely not among them. Briefly and clearly, Michal Kovac is the most valuable capital in the possession of the opposition, which should attempt to bring him into play. Meciar's longing for his head is so strong that the opposition could gain things in exchange for it that it does not even dream about—because it does not communicate with Meciar.

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However, the Slovak opposition recognizes differing priorities. Except for the "pragmatic" wing of the SDL, it has bet on another extreme. In the words of Jan Carnogursky, "Meciar should be permitted to finish governing unto exhaustion." The calculation that after three years the preferences for "iron Vladimir" will be heading south perhaps has something to it. However, the question is whether after such an amount of time Slovakia will still be a country that is striving for political and economic reform. The first year of the third Meciar government tends to indicate that the answer is likely to be no. That is why even the most recent opposition strategy ranges from being non-nation-building through being cynical.

Parties React to Proposal of Early Elections

AU1101145896

[FBIS Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers on 8 and 9 January publish reactions by parliamentary parties to Democratic Union [DU] Chairman Jozef Moravcik's proposal of early elections as "a possible way out of the present situation." The reactions show that opposition and coalition parties are unanimous in their rejection of Moravcik's idea.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 5 January on page 2, under the headline "Moravcik Regards Early Elections As a Possible Way Out of the Present Situation," carries a 500-word report by "isa" on a DU briefing held in Bratislava on 4 January. According to the report, Moravcik stressed that it is in Slovakia's "vital interest" to be in the first group of candidates for EU membership and warned that Slovakia could "waste this chance" because of the present government's policies. "The EU demarche and the European Parliament resolution were a clear signal of this," Moravcik is quoted as saying. The report continues: "Jozef Moravcik does not expect the government coalition to change its policies. He regards early elections, in which citizens could express their view on whether the present coalition lives up to their ideas of prointegration policies, as one of possible ways out. If the 90 deputies needed to shorten the electoral term are not found, Moravcik sees no reason not to appeal to citizens and not to deal with this issue in a referendum. 'Slovakia is getting to a historic junction and no party received in the last elections the mandate to implement policies that would thwart our chances of integration,' he added. According to Moravcik, public opinion polls suggest that the opposition, with its prointegration orientation, could obtain the majority." Another "way out," Moravcik said, could be "entry into the government coalition by the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], provided that it would be able to reverse the negative features of the coalition's methods of governing." Moravcik also said that the DU would oppose all moves directed against Slovakia's integration into the EU. In this context, he singled out the "law on the protection of the republic, the new bills on universities and foundations, and the idea to change the system of voting in the Constitutional Court."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 9 January on page 12, under the headline "Should There Be Early Elections?" publishes 500-word "excerpts" from a survey originally published in the 8 January issue of Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak. Representatives of several political parties were asked to respond to DU Chairman Moravcik's proposal of "early parliamentary elections, or change in the composition of the present government coalition, to prevent Bratislava from dropping out of the first group of candidates for EU membership following the EU intergovernmental conference." Robert Fico, leader of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) parliamentary club, replies: "Everything suggests that early elections would not change the balance of political forces. Another question is whether it is healthy to have two camps confronting each other in Slovakia, both of which are made up of diverse political groups. It is therefore worth considering whether it would not be better if natural camps took shape, formed not according to the style of their policy, but according to their orientation and political program."

Anna Malikova, deputy chairwoman of the Slovak National Party [SNS], believes that "early elections would not solve the situation." Instead, she sees a solution in "a more constructive opposition behavior."

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), does not think that Slovak voters ascribe such importance to the EU intergovernmental conference that they would be ready to go into early elections because of it. He says that "the KDH will start supporting the idea of early elections only when public opinion polls signal that their outcome would be substantially different from that in 1994."

Jan Langos, chairman of the Democratic Party, says that early elections will become a viable option only when the government loses Parliament's support and Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH], says that "early elections would not solve the situation because public opinion polls provide no guarantee that a different government would emerge from them." Bugar therefore regards Moravcik's proposal as "not the most fortunate one."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 9 January on page 2 carries a 200-word SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA report on a meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Political Board held

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in Bratislava on 8 January. In a statement approved at the meeting, the HZDS Political Board "declared that the DU chairman's statement about the need for early parliamentary elections is unacceptable to the HZDS. The HZDS cannot assess such statements otherwise but as an open endeavor to create political tension and destabilize the Slovak Republic." The HZDS Political Board also "voiced the conviction that such statements cannot change the successful development of the Slovak Republic, let alone the results achieved by the Slovak Republic in the three years of its existence."

On the same day, on pages 1 and 2, under the headline "Jozef Moravcik's Political Adventurism Without Opposition Parties' Support," Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak carries a 500-word roundup by Andrea Hlinkova of reactions by "representatives of some parliamentary parties" to Moravcik's proposal. HZDS Executive Secretary Gustav Krajci sees "no reason to hold early elections" and qualifies Moravcik's proposal as "political adventurism." SDL Chairman Peter Weiss says: "There exists neither the political will in Parliament to hold early elections, nor reasons to hold them. The government coalition commands a majority and has its own government program that it pledged to fulfill. If we want the president's five-year term to be respected, we must also get used to the four-year interval between parliamentary elections." MKDH Chairman Bela Bugar reiterates his disagreement with Moravcik's proposal because he thinks that early elections would not change the distribution of forces in Parliament and Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray believes that "the present government should administer the state until the end of the electoral term." Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) Chairman Jan Luptak refuses to comment on "the nonsense Moravcik is talking in public," saying that, instead of making publicity for Moravcik, politicians should be "working for Slovakia."

New Law on Civilian Service Discussed

AU1001144396

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 8 January on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,500-word interview with Colonel of General Staff Jan Dendes by Pavol Vitko entitled "Number of Applicants for Civilian Service Declined." The interview, the date and place of which are not given, deals with the application of the new law on civilian service, which the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved in September 1995, and with the declining number of draft objectors as a result of this new, "stricter" law.

Dendes says that the passage of a new law on civilian service was necessary because the previous law, passed in 1992, put persons performing civilian service at "undue advantage" against young men performing military service "in financial terms and in terms of accommodation or free time." Moreover, "civilian service was increasingly getting out of state agencies' control, which created conditions for the law's abuse. This resulted in an inordinate increase in the number of citizens applying for civilian service—from 1,114 young men, that is, about 3 percent of conscripts, in 1993, to 5,739 citizens, that is, some 12 percent of conscripts, who rejected active service in 1994. The proportion of university graduates among them was significantly growing. In 1994, 274 citizens refused to perform military service for reasons of conscience or religious denomination after graduating from university, one-third of whom were medical school graduates. This resulted in complications in replenishing army units with these specialists."

Dendes goes on to discuss the aims, main provisions, and impact of the new law on civilian service, which went into force on 4 October 1995, with the law's publication in the Legal Gazette: "The new law pursues two main goals—to limit the number of citizens who refuse to perform active service for speculative reasons and to tighten the conditions for civilian service to make them comparable, to the greatest possible extent, with the performance of basic military service. As for fundamental changes introduced by the new law, let me mention that the performance of civilian service is no longer administered by the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and the Family, but by the defense department. Moreover, civilian service is now possible also in facilities of the Army of the Slovak Republic. The duration of civilian service is no longer 1.5 times that of basic military service, but twice as long. If a citizen on civilian service rejects the free provision of food and housing, he no longer receives compensation in cash, as before. This is one of the reasons that, according to preliminary data from district military administrations, the number of applicants for civilian service dropped to approximately half the number of the equivalent period in 1994. There has also been an increase in the number of citizens who withdrew their application for civilian service and want to be drafted for military service." As Dendes explains, this is the case because the new "stricter" conditions apply also to those who had applied for civilian service before the new law became effective. According to the colonel, only 7,359 citizens have completed alternative civilian service since 1990, while 9,911 citizens are still waiting to perform it, due to lack of suitable jobs.

Moving to organizational provisions for the administration of civilian service by the defense department, Dendes says that district military administrations hired have 42 officers and 30 civilian employees to deal with their

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new responsibility and that the Ministry of Defense appropriated from its budget 85 million korunas [Sk] to finance "expenditure connected with civilian service" in 1996. He mentions that citizens on civilian service cost the Army of the Slovak Republic just as much as soldiers on basic training—Sk7,500 each per month.

Dendes goes on to discuss the practical application of the new law. He says that civilian service must be performed "in state or community organizations, or in army installations." Only if no job can be found in any of the above organizations, can civilian service be performed in "other organizations, such as shareholding companies." The justification of the demands of these organizations will be assessed by the relevant district military administration, which can also authorize performance of civilian service at the applicant's place of residence, Dendes says. The employer is reportedly obliged to provide accommodation "comparable with that of a soldier performing basic military service," three meals a day, free working clothes, and a monthly allowance equal to that of normal draftees, which is now Sk400. Working time must not exceed 42.5 hours per week and annual leave of 28 days per year must be granted. Draft objectors performing civilian service are also required to "carry out physical work regardless of education," Dendes says.

According to the colonel, in case of evasion of duties, unauthorized absence, or other transgressions, the district military administration can extend civilian service by two weeks, at the employer's proposal. The extension can be applied "repeatedly," but the extra service must not exceed six months on aggregate. The law also authorizes district military administrations to monitor employers' compliance with the law. They can fine employers Sk100,000 for "violation of duties" and up to Sk500,000 for "repeated violation."

According to Dendes, the new law also applies to reserve soldiers who refuse to participate in a military exercise. In this case they must perform civilian service, the length of which is double the projected duration of the exercise. The application to be exempted from military exercises must be filed by 31 January of the calender year, but no sooner than two years after the completion of basic military training. According to Dendes, 130 such applications have been filed in Slovakia since 1990.

In conclusion, Dendes concurs with the interviewer's assessment that "our law on civilian service is among the strictest in Europe," but he believes that "this strictness is fully warranted because it is necessary to limit the number of citizens refusing to perform military service for speculative reasons and to finally introduce order into the performance of civilian service."

Sk260 Billion of Property To Be Private by Jun

AU0501172996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Jan 96 p 13

[Interview with J. Kerekes, head of the Slovak Ministry for Administration and Privatization of National Property Office, by an unidentified NOVY CAS reporter; place and date not given: "260 Billion of Property Should Be in Private Hands"—reprinted from 3 January 1996 issue of Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "When should the second wave of privatization end?" NOVY CAS No. 2/1996 asked J. Kerekes, head of the Slovak Ministry for Administration and Privatization of National Property Office.

[Kerekes] The intention is to wind up the privatization process in the second wave by June 1996.

[NOVY CAS] Which percentage of property will be in private hands by then?

[Kerekes] It is possible to only make projections because, at this stage, it is impossible to determine this with precision. But it should be property worth approximately 260 billion Slovak korunas [Sk]. Roughly 70 to 80 percent of all property in Slovakia will thus get into the hands of private individuals and corporations.

[NOVY CAS] When parliament approved the law on exempting strategically important companies from privatization, there were sharp polemics over what purpose this law would serve and who would need it. What is it that makes strategically important a stud farm or a factory for prefabricated building blocks, which must not be privatized, according to this legal norm?

[Kerekes] The stud farm at Topolcianky is strategically important. The breed being raised there is extremely valuable, and Slovakia can take pride in it. If this stud farm were to be privatized, the risk would appear of this breed not being preserved. As for factories for prefabricated building blocks, take a look at Bratislava. How many prefabricated apartment blocks are there in the city? And it really is high time to start taking care of them. If we privatized factories for prefabricated building blocks, there would be no guarantee that these factories would stay what they are. [passage omitted]

[NOVY CAS] Do you come across cases of people coming to the ministry and asking you to sell them certain property for a lower price because they know some minister, for example?

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[Kerekes] It is true that businessmen come and lobby. It costs us a great deal of endeavor to put this lobbyism on a normal level [dat takyto lobbizmus do normalnej polohy] and to explain to them that anyone can privatize and without problems, but within the limits of the law!

Year-to-Year Inflation Announced at 7.2 Percent

AU1601161596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 12 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by "(vt)": "Inflation Is Lower in Slovakia Than in the Czech Lands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The year-to-year rate of inflation in Slovakia in 1995 was 7.2 percent. The aim of achieving a single-digit rate of inflation was set out in the monetary program of the National Bank of Slovakia [NBS] for last year; the NBS considered a rate of 8.0 percent to be achievable. Inflation of 7.9 percent was recorded in the Czech Republic last year. According to NBS Spokesman Jan Onda, the rate of inflation achieved was the result of not only the central bank's monetary policy but also the government's regulatory measures; for example, not increasing the costs of fuels and energy and also not raising tax rates. In 1994, inflation in Slovakia was 11.7 percent and in 1993 it was 25.1 percent. The aim of maintaining inflation at between 6.0 and 7.5 percent is set out in the monetary program for this year.

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Russia Requests Railroad Transit of IFOR Troops

AU1601163096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Jan 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Serbs Are Fleeing From Sarajevo—Release of Prisoners of War Delayed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Russia has requested railroad transit. Permission had already been given to the Russian IFOR [Implementation Force] unit to use Hungary's air space for aerial deliveries. According to the foreign affairs spokesman [Gabor Szentivanyi], the Polish, Danish, and Russian soldiers will only be passing through, which means that they will not be stationed on Hungarian territory. The aforementioned troops will begin the transit on 20 January, and it is expected to finish in the first week of February. [passage omitted]

Ministry Official Views National Minority Policy

AU1001080896 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 5 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Foreign Ministry political state secretary, by Bela Jodal; place and date not given: "Beyond Borders, Within the Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Foreign Ministry political state secretary, thinks that the present system of institutions dealing with the affairs of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders is adequate. We asked Istvan Szent-Ivanyi to express the government position after Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement in Slovakia, said that it would be worth considering the possibility for Budapest to set up a ministry in charge of national minorities and to declare the issue of ethnic Hungarians beyond our borders as an "internal issue."

[Szent-Ivanyi] We basically start from the premise that the minority issues are quite specific and I do not think we would fortunately contribute to a positive solution if we declared them as internal affairs. We must also take into consideration the sensitivity of other countries, and I fear that such a step would lead to an opposite effect from the one desired, namely, greater pressure and bigger suspicion toward the ethnic Hungarians. Therefore, I would refrain from taking such a step.

Of course, one should start from the premise that this is a very important and essential area of Hungarian foreign policy and of Hungary's national policy at all, because there are few countries in the world that have a considerable number of minorities living practically in every neighboring country. The Hungarian Constitution expresses this when it stipulates that it is the moral obligation of the Hungarian state to deal with the minorities. This is also included in the way we formulated the foreign policy priorities, and we regarded the issue of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders as one of our three parallel goals.

As for the idea of a separate ministry, I do not think that institutions can basically solve this problem. At present, the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders, led by State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi, coordinates these tasks. The fact that we are talking here about issues that belong to the jurisdiction of several ministries, and that these issues can be coordinated by an office that has a certain view over every ministry, is a clear argument in favor of the aforementioned solution. The prime minister's office is such a body. I think that the current position of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders is a good one.

Of course, one can claim that this opinion does not appear directly in the cabinet, because the government does not have a member that would represent this issue on a ministerial level. At the same time, we must also take into consideration that, if we set up such a ministry, the demand to also turn the National and Ethnic Minority Office into a ministry would be quite justified. However, the present government aimed at having a reduced number of ministries; in other words, it did not start from the premise that problems must be solved by setting up new ministries.

[Jodal] You mentioned the three pillars of the Hungarian foreign policy. According to our information, the opinion according to which we are forced to sacrifice our national minority policy in favor of the integration policy is becoming increasingly widespread, and this opinion was also mentioned at the level of government experts....

[Szent-Ivanyi] I do not agree with this. It is possible that an expert said this, but this was not the government view; this was probably his personal opinion. Our position is firm, namely, that the three goals are equal in importance and support each other. I can hardly imagine that Hungary's integration in Europe would harm either our policy toward our neighbors or the situation of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders; in a certain sense, our integration would increase these people's opportunities, because a successful Hungary with greater influence and a bigger system of contacts can do more for the ethnic Hungarians living in its neighborhood financially, morally, and politically alike.

Nor do I think that Hungary's success in facilitating neighborhood contacts or securing the rights of ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders would have a negative effect on our European integration. If Hungary settles the relations with its neighbors and if the ethnic

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Hungarians there can enjoy an increasing number of rights, this will definitely help our integration as well.

Thus, I do not see any contradiction among the three priorities or any government efforts aimed at sacrificing the ethnic Hungarian minorities living beyond our borders. It is possible, however, that the opportunities for action do not necessarily emerge simultaneously in the three areas.

Integration Efforts Overshadow Minority Issues

AU1001103496 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 6 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "Is the Third Pillar Secondary After All? — Devaluating Minority Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his interview given to us on 5 January, Foreign Ministry Political State Secretary Istvan Szent-Ivanyi said that he saw no sign of contradiction among the equal treatment of the three priorities of Hungarian foreign policy; nor did he see any government efforts to sacrifice the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders for the benefit of Hungary's integration policy. Szent-Ivanyi also added that the matter at hand is probably that opportunities for action do not necessarily appear simultaneously and parallel in the three areas.

According to information from reliable foreign affairs sources, however, things are slightly different. We learned that, at the end of last year, Hungarian foreign policy leaders came to the conclusion that dealing with the grievances of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders could have a detrimental effect on Hungary's integration chances. Therefore, a proposal emerged according to which the issue of ethnic Hungarian minorities should not be treated parallel with the European integration; instead, it should be subordinated to the issue of European integration. This decision was followed by deeds: a separate working group was set up in the Foreign Ministry to draw up the basic principles of the changed policy. Its task is to systematically work out the exclusion of efforts connected with the legal protection of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders from the government activity, and to focus on the region's economic integration instead. In view of all this, it is not even too surprising that, in his New Year speech, President Arpad Goncz, whom the social-liberal government regards as Hungary's best honorary diplomat, did not send any message to the Hungarians living beyond the borders. He demonstrated his disciplined adherence to the current foreign affairs expectations.

It seems, therefore, that it is becoming increasingly clear that the Horn cabinet's stand for the ethnic Hungarian minority living in the neighboring countries has become devalued: From now on, the cabinet will only treat this issue as a general human rights problem in international, or, using the older terminology of our region, in internationalist categories.

The reduced interest in Hungarians and their tradition by our Foreign Ministry can also be seen in personal zeal. We learned, for example, that the head of a department dealing with the neighboring countries recently drew the attention of the ministry heads that the celebrations of the 1,100th anniversary of Hungarian statehood will have a harmful effect on our neighborhood policy and, therefore, it would be preferable to forget about the whole anniversary.

Finance Minister Interviewed on 1996 Tasks, Plans

AU1001080696 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 4 Jan 96 pp 18-19

[Interview with Finance Minister Lajos Bokros by Tibor Krecz; place and date not given: "The Loneliness in Company Is Finished"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After making the budget law, Finance Minister Lajos Bokros expects that the resistance of the various lobbies against the reform of state administration can be broken in early 1996 with the involvement of renowned experts of the coalition parties and the cooperation of the other ministries. In his interview, Bokros mentions that he still does not consider it necessary to renew bank consolidation, but, in his view, this does not mean that the former obligations will not be met or that the Hungarian Credit Bank [MHB] will not be helped.

[Krecz] Do you agree with the observation that, after the experiences of recent years, the government party parliamentary groups accepted the 1996 state budget law without particular doubts as regards the final result?

[Bokros] I do not have direct parliamentary experience in voting for budgets in the past years. After the acceptance of the first budget in my function as finance minister, I can say that we had held the debates in the government, the Interest Coordination Council, and the parliamentary committees in time. The quality of the budget finalized by the parliamentary general assembly is also acceptable for me. From now on, the most important thing is to firmly adhere to this budget because we are in a fragile situation, in spite of the otherwise positive results of the stabilization process. We must not forget, either, that the strictness of the state budget is a requirement even when the marcoeconomic indicators are favorable. We have to accept that balanced economic growth is impossible with a larger deficit, larger domestic state debt, higher inflation, or higher current account deficit.

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[Krecz] Has the Finance Ministry prepared itself to submit, as a continuation of the reform of state administration, concrete proposals to the National Assembly in the spring of 1996 on, for example, changing the social security branches?

[Bokros] Partly we are prepared and partly we are not. Most of the concepts and calculations have already been made but we have not yet assembled the proposed norm texts. I cannot claim that we have fully prepared and worded all materials of the reform of state administration—this is not only the Finance Ministry's task. I am glad to be able to say that, for example, representatives of the Welfare Ministry convincingly showed their ideas to the IMF's delegation. We can also attribute the success of the framework agreement with the IMF to them.

[Krecz] According to this, the former situation in the government, which lasted for months, has now changed. In this the Finance Ministry kept initiating strategically important plans for changes and the various ministries remained silent.

[Bokros] It cannot at all be said that we cannot find partners at other ministries who are willing to cooperate. From this point of view, the already mentioned Welfare Ministry is the most active participant. I add that in the continuation of the reform of state administration, I expect the toughest battles between the economic branches and the interest representation organizations of employee groups affected by the reform, and the government, rather than within the government. For example, the ideas of the social insurance self-governments and the government are dramatically different on the reform. This debate will be decided by political power and will. It is unlikely to happen any other way because it cannot be expected of the social insurance self-governments to support a change which in some areas expands their rights and in others considerably reduces them. I expect similarly tough battles in changing the welfare provisions system, and in reorganizing public and higher education.

[Krecz] Predicting so many conflicts, one might consider retreating and preparing for the departure....

[Bokros] I am optimistic because I can see an increasing level of understanding in the two government party parliamentary groups regarding the need for the reforms. Quite often they do not object to the concrete proposal because they are generally against the reform of state administration but because they do not find the concrete idea satisfactory. I very often hear good decision alternatives. It would be a pleasure and comforting for me if I did not have to fight alone for changing the state administration. It will be a great help to me that we have asked renowned experts of the two government parties to participate in working out the reform proposals. One result of this might be that the parliamentary groups will identify more with the cause of the reform.

[Krecz] The treasury organization which ensures an even greater role to the Finance Ministry in directing the economy can operate from this year.

[Bokros] In my understanding the treasury is a neutral executive organization responsible for the budget spending. In this role, it is not its role to assert the aspects of economic expediency, this is a job for legislation and the budget organizations. The treasury disciplines: It is not possible to spend more than the amounts at its disposal.

[Krecz] On your entering this office, you firmly stated that the financial institutions could not expect further state assistance. Bank consolidation had been closed once and for all. Can this promise be kept nowadays?

[Bokros] It can, apart from the government's commitments in the cases of the Agrobank and the Mezobank. We cannot decline the responsibility for these. One year ago, the Bank Supervisory Organization said that the Agrobank was a good financial institution. In May, after the temporary closure, a decision was made on a 6.3-billion-forints consolidation. After all these, my opinion is that it would only be possible to get rid of this commitment through privatization, and merging the two banks is a precondition for this.

[Krecz] How can it be proved that, as a precondition for privatization, a consolidation support for the Trade Bank and the Hungarian Credit Bank will not be suggested again?

[Bokros] The new leaders of the Trade Bank have already stated that the institution would gain strength from internal resources, without any further consolidation. In my view, the merger with the IBUSZ Bank does a good service to this. From now on, this bank's network of branches will be almost as big as that of the National Savings Bank [OTP]. In the competition, it is of vital importance how quickly they can get hold of cheap resources from the population.

[Krecz] The MHB with its not at all easy portfolio is on the palette.

[Bokros] The MHB will need some help but not in the form of surplus consolidation [tobbletkonszolidacio]. If we manage to place the investment portfolio, which is in the books as noninterest baring assets, in a liquidating organization, and the MHB agrees to finance this then the state—with guarantee—can support this solution. The significance of this can be that it will not be

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necessary to keep as much target reserve after this portfolio as it would have to within the framework of the bank. This would be an indirect help. I am convinced that no other measure will be needed in the case of the MHB.

[Krecz] How does the state calculate with the now stronger Hungarian Investment and Development Bank [MBFB]? Has it been suggested that the state would finance some major investments through the MBFB, or it would appoint it as a mediating bank to handle the development resources coming in in the framework of interstate agreements?

[Bokros] The MBFB, Inc. will remain a development bank for a long time. The government will discuss the proposal on the bank in January. We are still considering a number of ideas. Privatization is a possibility, or we could split the financial institution into two. I would not like to enter into further assessment before the decision is made.

On Privatization Income Use

AU0901114296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Jan 96 p 10

[Article by Finance Minister Lajos Bokros: "Lighthouse in the Storm—The Finance Minister's 10 Points on the Use of Privatization Incomes"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] After reviewing the issue from all angles, it seems sufficient to summarize the conclusions point by point in an unimpassioned way, such as this:

1. The finance minister did not prepare any coups behind the government's back. For economists who know something about macroeconomics, the conclusion follows unequivocally and absolutely free from politics that spending all the extra privatization incomes on repaying the state debt is the optimal solution.

2. Direct spending of the privatization incomes, whatever kind of justification it is based on, is unacceptable because it increases domestic demand without setting an adequate amount of domestically produced goods and services against it; therefore, it necessarily increases imports and thus the current account deficit, which is at variance with the announced goals of economic stabilization, and it destroys the results already achieved.

3. Furthermore, spending the privatization incomes on consumption would use up assets and increase the budget deficit, without increasing economic growth. Although using the privatization incomes for accumulation would partially restore the former level of assets and could even accelerate economic growth, it would not do so to the extent that could be achieved through reducing the state debt, and the domestic and foreign balance would continue to deteriorate.

4. Today, there is no investment to surpass in efficiency the risk-free yield of state bonds, which is roughly 30 percent. As long as this is so, the value of society's assets can be maximized, mainly through reducing the state debt.

5. The reduction of the state debt lightens the current budget's interest burdens. Through this, the budget deficit and the state's need for credit can be reduced, which causes interest rates to drop and the inflation pressure to be eased. As a result of increasing real savings, company investments can increase without worsening the balance, and economic growth can gain speed.

6. Using the privatization incomes for repaying the state debts does not mean a wasting of the people's assets because this is the most successful replacement of the assets, as this ensures the biggest returns, and this is the only technique that ensures that every forint of income growth resulting from asset reduction through privatization will bring an increase of assets. The fact is, that even in the course of financing the investments that have the greatest yield of economic stimulation, some percentage of the incomes is diverted to consumption; therefore, they do not serve the restoration of the asset value. Therefore, compared to reducing the state debt, all other uses of the privatization incomes only differ in their degree of squandering.

7. Reducing the state debt is the optimal use of privatization incomes also from the viewpoint that this is the only truly socially neutral method that definitely refrains from favoring any of the social strata to the detriment of others. Every concrete investment favors particular social groups, some people inevitably do better from it than others, even if everyone benefits from it. Reducing the state debt is the only solution from which all members of society benefit equally.

8. In addition to the economic advantages of reducing the state debt, it undoubtedly has a serious political disadvantage, in that it does not allow the individual "dispensing while plundering" which is aimed at increasing popularity. This way it is no longer possible to put aside money from the privatization incomes to be used for reducing the state debt to please politically strong pressure groups (for example, a 20-billion forint fund for electricity industry workers); the persistent subsidizing, which is actually contrary to the privatization law, cannot be continued (for example, repaying the debt of the MAGYAR NEMZET); it is not possible to increase wages contrary to government decisions (for example in the electricity industry again); and it is impossible to

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finance structural changes through separate little budgets hidden from parliament, or to spend 300 million on setting up a single asset management organization.

9. As opposed to this, the use of the resources released as a result of the decreasing interest burden arising in the wake of repaying the state debt is not at all predestined. The National Assembly, the only authorized forum, can decide on its use when the time comes. It will in no way be the Finance Ministry, nor even the government that decides whether to allow a further reduction of the budget deficit or to launch additional developments equal to the amount of the reduced interest burden. Whichever way it [the National Assembly] decides, its decision will be clearly favorable both from an economic and social point of view, as opposed to the explicitly negative version, namely, the direct spending of the privatization incomes, which increases demand and worsens the balance.

10. Therefore, parliament made a correct decision on 19 December 1995 when it voted in favor of amendment motion No. 475, running under the names of Gyula Gaal and Laszlo Keller. This did not give any kind of overt power either to me or to Gyorgy Suranyi [chairman of the central bank]. It empowered us to make recommendations on the technical implementation of reducing the state debt, while keeping all decisionmaking and controlling rights to itself. This is how it should be in a free and democratic country.

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Izetbegovic Views SDA, Personal Influence

AU1701102696 Sarajevo DANI in Serbo-Croatian Jan 96 pp 6-9

[Interview with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by DANI editor in chief Senad Pecanin in Sarajevo on 1 January]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pecanin] Mr. President, one more year is behind us, and its end overlaps with the end of war and the beginning of peace. Are you content?

[Izetbegovic] Well, something like the majority of our citizens: I was most satisfied on the first day of peace, and then the enthusiasm started to wane, because the problems of war will be exchanged for new ones. The people will forget the shells relatively quickly, as if they were never there, because they will face new problems brought by peace: jobs, salaries, apartments, various injustices. Nevertheless, I am glad that people are not getting killed any longer.

1993 — Most Difficult Year

[Pecanin] In your opinion, which was the most difficult war year for you, and how would you describe your personal experience of other war years?

[Izetbegovic] Without doubt, that was 1993. We found ourselves encircled from all sides, practically squeezed by two dark pincers of chauvinism. We survived, contrary to any military logic, probably because there was nothing else to do but to continue fighting, regardless of the fact that a realistic way out was no longer to be seen.

[Pecanin] You have been in a position to make far-reaching, delicate decisions. What decisions were the most difficult for you and on what occasions did you make mistakes?

[Izetbegovic] For me, personally, the hardest decision to make was to agree to talk directly to Karadzic. That was toward the end of 1992, on the eve of the negotiations that were to result in the Vance-Owen plan. The request to do that was submitted to me, in the name of Europe, and I think of the United States, too, by Lord Owen. And, regarding mistakes, there have probably been many, but I have had no time to think about them and to make a list. If I do not manage to do that, someone else will.

[Pecanin] It seems that you gladly listen to other people's opinions, but that you make decisions on your own. Nevertheless, can you tell us whose advice you received most gladly when discussing military issues, and whose when discussing political ones?

[Izetbegovic] I think that more or less everyone likes to make decisions on one's own, and not everyone likes to hear somebody else's opinion. And, regarding advisers, when military issues are the point in question, there was only one man — General Delic. Regarding political issues, I usually summoned whole teams and talked at leisure with them, so as to get some new ideas. I think that you were also present at one of these meetings. Jocularly, I called them free advice.

I Did Not Ask Soldiers To Shout "Tekbir!"

[Pecanin] My exceptionally favorable impression of your public appearances in 1995 was spoiled by the recent military review of the units of the Third Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zenica. The soldiers who are not Muslims, members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, lined in front of you, deserved to be saluted by their Supreme Commander, did they not?

[Izetbegovic] Of course they deserved it, and we "saluted our homeland" together. Listen one more time to the tape recording of the review. You are one of the rare ones who were confused by the Third Corps review. I know that event passed off well with our people, because they understood the message.

[Pecanin] Are you aware that you have entirely taken over the communist form of politicization of the Army and the police? The minister of the police, as well as almost all the generals, are not only members, but also prominent officials of your party.

[Izetbegovic] There is some degree of politicization, but it is not a communist form. The difference is essential: This politicization has been spontaneous, and the communist politicization was imposed. I have not asked soldiers to shout "tekbir," or asked generals to join the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. You might not believe it, but that makes no difference. Take a walk through Bosnia and check it. For you, as a journalist, it is important to know the truth, regardless of whether you like it or not.

[Pecanin] Regarding nepotism in diplomacy, you outdo the communists. If you think I am wrong, I suggest you demand that the MIP [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] publish the lists of employees in diplomatic and consular offices. I am very interested in your comment.

[Izetbegovic] Instead of a comment, here are some figures: toward the end of December 1995, there were 377 employees in our diplomatic and consular offices; 236 on a permanent basis, and 141 part-time employees. Of that number, 18 or 5 percent, were related directly or by marriage to someone discharging an office in the

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state or party institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those are the figures from MIP. Very few or too many, make your own judgment. You did not ask me, but just for your information: None of my close or distant relatives holds any office abroad.

The Fewer Chetniks, the Fewer Problems

[Pecanin] When will the part of the Dayton agreement referring to Sarajevo be implemented?

[Izetbegovic] Karadzic's Serbs, both here in Bosnia and abroad, have been trying to postpone it. We will oppose that. But one thing is sure: The Dayton agreement will be implemented, and I can see no force on earth that can prevent that.

[Pecanin] Do you agree with the thesis: "The fewer Serbs in the Federation, the fewer the problems?"

[Izetbegovic] I agree with the thesis: The fewer Chetniks among the Serbs in Bosnia, the fewer problems.

[Pecanin] Is there going to be an amnesty for so-called "common" Serb soldiers, that is, for common Chetniks?

[Izetbegovic] I have not thought about it, but I do not believe that can be discussed at all until the authority of the Federation is established in the region of Sarajevo.

[Pecanin] Is President Tudjman exerting any pressure to give up the prosecution of Croatian war criminals?

[Izetbegovic] I have heard that Tudjman is angry, but I have not heard that he has exerted any pressure. After all, it is the Hague Tribunal's job to prosecute war criminals.

All of Them Are Close to Me

[Pecanin] I think that, to a large number of fighters and patriots, and if you like, also to the people from Sandzak, You owe an explanation of the case and treatment of General Halilovic.

[Izetbegovic] Halilovic had the second most important position in the Army. He was not satisfied with that and he withdrew. I still think that Delic, both as a soldier and a personality, has an advantage before Halilovic. And the war, thank God, created a large number of very skillful and courageous commanders.

[Pecanin] Will you be running as a candidate in the next elections?

[Izetbegovic] That depends on developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pecanin] The turmoil within the party you lead has never been greater than now, ever since Zulfikarpasic left it. Do you agree with my impression that there is a struggle going on for the position of your first assistant or, possibly, of your successor?

[Izetbegovic] I do not agree, but there is also nothing strange in the waves on the sea.

[Pecanin] According to the assessment of your minister Karic on the existence of factions within the Party, it seems that the faction headed by Bicakcic, Omersoftic, Ganic, Alispahic... enjoys your favor. Are they closer to you than the others?

[Izetbegovic] All of those who are working sincerely on behalf of Bosnia and the Bosniak people are close to me.

I Am Not Bosnian Kim Il-Sung

[Pecanin] Last year, Haris Silajdzic neither congratulated you on Bairam, nor did he answer your invitation to the reception on the occasion of Bairam. Since then, has anything changed in your relationship, and would you sleep well if you knew that he was to become your successor?

[Izetbegovic] You are poorly informed, because we exchanged good wishes for Bairam. And I will probably not be the one to choose my successor. The people and developments will make that choice.

[Pecanin] Nijaz Durakovic has been publicly saying that on one occasion in Geneva you asked him for his opinion on your idea for your son Bakir to succeed you. Is that idea still current?

[Izetbegovic] I never asked Durakovic anything like that, nor have I asked anybody else. I neither believe that any serious person sees in me some kind of Bosnian Kim Il-Sung, nor do I think that I have given any cause for such an idea. After all, I would not say that my son had any political ambition. He is, thank God, a good engineer, and I think both of us are happy about that.

[Box, p 9]

Alija Izetbegovic — International Man of the Year

At the very moment before this edition of DANI was concluded, a piece of news arrived saying that EL MUNDO, distinguished Madrid daily, has chosen Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as international man of the year.

EL MUNDO, after EL PAIS, has the largest circulation and is the most influential paper in Spain, and its choice of international man of the year has already become traditional and respectable. In an explanation of the decision, EL MUNDO emphasizes that "at the same time, this pays homage to the Bosnian people."

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DANI also congratulates President Izetbegovic on the occasion of this recognition.

Mostar Administrator Believes Conflict Possible

AU1701144696 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with EU Mostar Administrator Hans Koschnick by Jozo Pavkovic and Gorden Kenzovic in Mostar on 13 January: "I Will Not Run Away From Gunfire"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Eyes are again focused on Mostar. Once again this town on the Neretva has drawn attention because of the incidents and tension that threaten to undermine the overall peace process, which is why domestic and foreign politicians are making a major effort to normalize the situation. We have learned in an interview with EU Administrator Hans Koschnick that Klaus Kinkel [German foreign minister], Mate Granic [Croatian foreign minister], and Muhamed Sacirbegovic [Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister] will visit the town tomorrow for this purpose. They will discuss the current situation in Mostar and ways of overcoming it. As is usual following each incident, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak arrived in Mostar first, this time bearing concrete proposals. He offered Croatian assistance in the restoration of law and order, which would, among other things, be reflected in the engagement of Croatian policemen. Koschnick is satisfied with the efforts of the Croatian leadership and their desire to rebuild Mostar in peace and with respect for both peoples.

Problems Are Not in Zagreb

[Koschnick] I am always happy when Croatian officials come to help find solutions for Mostar's problems. That is precisely why I would like to stress that I have personally persuaded foreign reporters, especially lately, that the problems in Mostar do not originate in Zagreb. They are not convinced that this is the case. I have witnessed how President Tudjman and Minister Susak sincerely support the project of the federation. In all our meetings they emphasized that the rapid establishment of the federation was in Croatia's interests. Therefore, I will never accept the accusations to the effect that some extremist Herzegovinians are pursuing policy in Mostar according to instructions from Zagreb. One more thing. Do not forget that the people in Herzegovina fought for greater Croatia, that is, against greater Serbia. After Dayton some are perhaps indignant and now want to create incidents. However, these problems are not masterminded in Zagreb.

[VECERNJI LIST] You are already three quarters of the way through your appointed term. The incidents over the past few days have put everything back at the beginning. Do you perhaps feel that you have wasted your time in Mostar?

[Koschnick] I was frustrated that after 18 months of the EU administration everything has truly been set back to the beginning. The Croatian-Muslim conflicts ended in March 1994. Many people on both sides were involved in them. The present incidents thus show how explosive the future situation could be. We are trying to defuse it. We do not want the sporadic shooting to escalate into civil war. We must find new ways of bringing people together. Not like in the past, in the communist times, but to live together in a civilized manner. Therefore, not in justice and friendship, but definitely in a tolerant atmosphere.

Mostar Is Not an Island

[VECERNJI LIST] The situation in Mostar now resembles that at the time of the Croatian-Muslim conflict. Are you afraid the conflict might repeat itself?

[Koschnick] Yes. I always say that this is not merely a problem of Mostar. The situation was similar in central Bosnia. Just as I have asked for Tudjman's help here, I also asked for Izetbegovic's help in Bugojno. We must look at the overall interests of both peoples in the federation, because Mostar is not an island. If there is tolerance throughout the territory of the federation, there will not be problems between the Croats and Muslims in Mostar.

[VECERNJI LIST] Just as in Mostar, clashes have occurred in other towns of Bosnia. Today, however, life in Gornji Vakuf, for example, a town divided between Croats and Muslims, is infinitely more tolerable than life in Mostar. The EU did not enter Gornji Vakuf. Don't you think that in the great desire to unify the town this is counterproductive.

[Koschnick] The Herzegovina Croats would like Mostar to be their center. On the other hand, however, the Bosniaks say that this is only possible in a unified town. Gornji Vakuf does not have such problems and there are no political calculations involved there. We must not forget that the Croatian and the Bosniak leadership signed peace in Washington. Afterward, agreements on Mostar were signed and I was told to go there and unify the town. They promised to secure sufficient European funds for this project. Europe has paid a lot, more than 200 million German marks for both parts of the town. I was ordered to put the agreement in practice. So, why do you blame me for this?!

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They All Want More

[VECERNJI LIST] Well, the residents of Mostar also have objections to this European money. The Croats criticize you for investing considerably more in the eastern side?

[Koschnick] Perhaps this is true. The eastern side suffered more. I have to take care of the people who were living in bunkers and cellars. When I started this job President Zubak said to me: You, naturally, can do more for the eastern side but do not forget that we are the victims of the war, too. I agree with this. There are no differences regarding the reconstruction of schools, kindergartens, public transportation.... There is only one difference, namely, in the reconstruction of family homes.

[VECERNJI LIST] There is another difference, involving you, that is disputed. The Mostar residents in the western part of town tend to claim that you favor the Muslims?

[Koschnick] When I was mayor of Bremen, for some 20 years, one part of town claimed how biased I was toward the other and vice versa. There is no mayor in this world who does not have similar problems. Naturally, the Croats believe that they should get money and so do the Muslims. For that reason both sides find me objectionable.

Maps

[VECERNJI LIST] The maps in Mostar have now become the biggest stumbling block. How will you solve them?

[Koschnick] Yes, you are right. I am trying to find a consensus. It is the only way I see to resolve this big problem.

[VECERNJI LIST] This job should be completed by 31 January this year. Afterward you have the right to issue a decree. As opposed to the Croats, the Muslims expect this?

[Koschnick] The Croatian side has implored me not to do this. The Bosnian side demands that I find a joint answer. Both sides know that I have the formal right to pass a decree. However, even if I do this following our departure on 23 July this year the situation would remain unstable and unresolved. I do not want this.

[VECERNJI LIST] Will Mostar, nevertheless, remain a divided town after your departure, a town in whose Bulevar the NATO forces will separate east from west?

[Koschnick] I did not ask for IFOR to come to Mostar at all. I only asked for a Spanish unit to help us here, especially in the Bulevar. I said: The Croatian and the Bosniak police have abandoned this location. The WEU [West European Union] police force is not strong enough to provide security. We do not have sufficient armored personnel carriers. IFOR's soldiers are not policemen who have assumed our duties but are well-armed witnesses if things turn nasty. Over the next few days, the WEU police will obtain armored personnel carriers. Then there will be no need for IFOR. Law and order is a matter for civilian organizations. NATO is here to prevent war between the Serbs and the federation. That is why I was careful not to approach IFOR in this role. [passage omitted]

[Box 1, p 7]

Guarantees of Both Sides

[VECERNJI LIST] After the incidents, you said that if the situation does not improve you will leave Mostar. Are you staying, Mr. Koschnick?

[Koschnick] No, I said that I will leave if one or the other side does not accept that they must live in a unified town. I am not running away from gunfire. I will leave if the Croats and Muslims say: We will not live together in the federation. That is, if one does not have guarantees that the federation will survive, why should the EU remain in Mostar?

Reunification 'De Facto' Postponed

AU1701161096 Paris AFP in English 1458 GMT 17 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 17 (AFP) — The January 20 deadline for the reunification of Mostar has been "de facto" postponed, a spokesman for the city's EU administrator said Wednesday.

The Saturday deadline "has already been de facto put back," Dragan Gasic, said, adding however that freedom of movement within the divided city must be absolutely guaranteed by January 28 at the latest.

This date was set last Sunday during a visit to Mostar by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who announced a two-week "moratorium" during which EU administrator Hans Koschnick would be designated as an "arbitrator."

Asked to elaborate on Koschnick's new role, the spokesman said he would henceforth be able to "issue decrees with teeth."

Gasic urged European countries and Mostar's opposing Croat and Moslem communities to "give (Koschnick) the executive means necessary to implement the decrees and have them respected by the two sides."

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When the divided city was placed under EU administration in July 1994, the administrator was given no coercive power over Mostar's citizens and was mandated only to make suggestions or offer assistance.

Under the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia signed last month, the city's two police forces were to unite by Saturday as the first stage of Mostar's total reunification.

Agreement Reached Between Croats, Muslims in Usora

LD1301183296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Now we return to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina — more precisely in Usora — where there have been incidents and tension in the past few days. Today the situation is calming down. Boro Jelic reports:

[Jelic] At a meeting of military representatives of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place in Tesanj today, agreement was reached on the withdrawal of all military formations and the civil and special police from the area of the Croat villages of Ularice and Alibegovci, along with the forces of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which forcefully took up positions yesterday, 12 January.

The meeting, which prevented the further deterioration of the situation, was mediated by the Implementation Force [IFOR], headed by Colonel Jan Jensen, and attended on behalf of the HVO by Major General Filip Filipovic, Brigadier Drago Dragicevic, commander of the 110th Homeguard Regiment, Ante Bajic, and their aides; and on the Army side by Brigade General Sakib Mahmuljin, Colonel Sulejman Leko, commander of the 373d Brigade, Ibro Hozic, and their aides.

The agreement of the military representatives comes into force immediately, and is valid until 18 January together with the recommendation of political representatives of the Croat and Bosniak people that more serious attention be paid to the poor political and military climate throughout the Usora region.

Before touring the region where the agreement reached was put into effect immediately, Brigadier Drago Dragicevic, commander of the Vitez operational zone, told journalists that the HVO was surprised by what he described as direct actions by the army, while Brigade General Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressed that he had not ordered the movements of forces.

Bildt on 'Crucial' Transfer From Sarajevo Serbs

LD0601213796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2107 GMT 6 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 6 (TANJUG) — High representative for Bosnia Carl Bildt said Saturday that the transfer of Sarajevo's Serb districts under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation was crucial to the success of the entire Bosnia peace mission.

International news agencies quoted Bildt as saying at a news conference in Sarajevo that, 'it is very obvious that implementation here in Sarajevo is difficult, critical and crucial to the entire peace process.'

Under the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina signed in Paris on December 14, the Serb districts of Ilidza, Vogosca and Grbavica are to be placed under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation.

Bildt said he had held intensive talks with local Serb representatives in Sarajevo, and said the majority of the Serb population feared for the future. He criticised the Sarajevo Moslem government for not making more of an effort to allay those worries.

'Some of the statements coming out of this side (Bosnian Moslem) have not been designed to alleviate those fears,' he said.

Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic has repeatedly threatened to put on trial all Serbs in Sarajevo who took part in the fighting.

In late December, Izetbegovic warned the Serbs that they had better not stay in the districts long enough to see Moslems take over control there.

There are about 120,000 Serbs in Sarajevo's Serb districts who voted in a referendum in early December against placing the districts under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation.

Bildt also said a joint civilian commission had been set up with representatives from both side (the Republika Srpska and the Moslem-Croat Federation), independent members and the NATO peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to discuss all issues relating to the transfer of authority in the Serb districts.

He reiterated that he had so far received only a small amount of money he needed to finance his office, and said a U.N. police task force would not arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina for several months.

He said so far only 600 police had been pledged to the force from the U.N. member-countries, while a 1,700-strong U.N. police force was needed to train local police forces and monitor their behaviour.

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SDP: Drop Term 'Serb Sarajevo'

AU1701131296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 17 Jan 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on a SDP news conference in Sarajevo on 17 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gradimir Gojer, vice president of the Social Democratic Party [SDP], has appealed to Sarajevo citizens, particularly those of Serb nationality who live in areas under the aggressor's control, not to fall victim to criminal propaganda and warmongering, as this will lead to fresh suffering.

Instead of the knife offered by the butchers and murderers, Gojer said in his address to citizens in the occupied parts of Sarajevo, the SDP calls on you to build a cosmopolitan Sarajevo with the other citizens in which [words indistinct] their interests.

Gojer used this occasion to demand that Carl Bildt eliminate the term Serb Sarajevo from his vocabulary, because it is in contradiction with his proclaimed stance on Sarajevo, which he calls an integral city.

The SDP sharply opposes the idea of a mixed police force, because 1992 has already shown that this will inevitably lead to fresh conflicts. Gradimir Gojer pointed out the futility of further negotiations with the authorities in the occupied parts of Sarajevo. The Dayton agreement has been signed and there can be no more giving in or extending deadlines. This was stated at today's SDP news conference.

Krajisnik, IFOR's Smith Agree on Sarajevo Road

LD0801182796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1605 GMT 8 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 January (SRNA) — The president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic [RS], Momcilo Krajisnik, reached an agreement in Pale today with IFOR [Implementation Force] commander Leighton Smith under which the Kiseljak to Sarajevo road via Ilidza should be open to normal traffic.

"Any abuses of the road for smuggling and other illegitimate activities, we shall try to tackle with the help from IFOR," Krajisnik said and went on to add that during the talks mention was also made of some developments which were hindering the implementation of the peace agreement.

He noted an incident yesterday when an IFOR plane was hit and promised full investigation by the RS investigative bodies in order to establish if the shots had come from the territory under Serb control.

In his talks with Admiral Smith, Speaker Krajisnik again reiterated the Serb side's concern over the international community's inclination to ignore the problem of Serb Sarajevo.

"The Serbs are seeking a political solution and although they wish to remain in their city, they will not accept Muslim authority," Krajisnik said and went on to note that for three and a half years, the international community had been protecting the Muslims of Sarajevo but that now, when the Serbs needed protection "there is no address to send demands to."

"We are keen to see a political solution reached and the international community has enough time to go for that option," the president of the RS assembly said, and went on to draw attention to a request sent to high representative Carl Bildt for a clear statement on whether Serbs would be allowed to stay in Serb Sarajevo or whether they would have to leave.

IFOR commander Leighton Smith, promised that if the Serbs decided to leave Sarajevo, the international forces would ensure that they would still be allowed to transfer their property even after the agreement had expired.

According to Smith, his powers when it comes to extending the Dayton accord deadlines are limited "since these are political and not military issues".

However, "if a decision cannot be implemented due to the reasons of either time or some other nature", Smith can extend the deadlines in consultation with his aides.

According to Smith, "the deadline for the Muslims to enter the Serb parts of the city can also be extended". Still, he said, "the time has not come yet for us to consider this issue".

Muratovic Criticizes IFOR Actions

AU1701090096 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jan 96 pp 5-6

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina minister for relations with the UN, by Zehrudin Isakovic and Nedzad Latic; place and date not given: "We Are Going To Burn Everything Down and Move the Serb Population to Lukavica, Where the New Serb Sarajevo Will Be!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [LJILJAN] At precisely the moment while our interview was going on, the latest news arrived about the release of a group of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, who, despite IFOR [Implementation Force] guarantees, were quite simply kidnapped by Serb terrorists at Ilidza. Could you please recapitulate this case for LJILJAN? Some IFOR officials are

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claiming that the abduction of those citizens is not under their jurisdiction, and it is the mixed international police force that is supposed to deal with such a case.

[Muratovic] According to the contract, that is, Annex 1A, clause 6D [of the Dayton accord], it is clearly specified that they are to ensure freedom of movement, and not only out of and into Sarajevo, but throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Besides, practically the entire world expects them to deblock Sarajevo unconditionally, that is, to make it safe to go in and out of it. Even during the NATO air strikes, if you remember, an agreement was reached in Belgrade between NATO and the Serbs to declare the road via Ilidza free for traffic, which means that nobody would halt vehicles. This means that there cannot be, or rather must not be, any Serb checkpoints on that road. Thus, there are two grounds for saying that this road is supposed to be definitely open. Even more important than that is what the IFOR representatives said, and publicly announced to the citizens, that the road was free for traffic. Unfortunately, it happened that Serbs made use of that to maintain a constant tension and state of conflict in Sarajevo and its surroundings. That is why they abducted these people. Through their spokesmen or even through some irresponsible individuals, IFOR officials have said that they are not obliged to secure the road and are not a police force. It is true that they are not police. But I am also sure that nobody in the world believes that any international police force armed solely with handguns is able to secure the road, as long as the Pale Serb authorities keep it under their control. In brief, we are asking IFOR to declare the road either unsafe, in which case we will not allow our citizens to use the Ilidza road and will use the road via the airport, or to declare it safe, but make it really safe and to assume responsibility for every single citizen who might happen to be endangered on this road. That is the sole basis on which we can base our relations with them at all.

[LJILJAN] You have talked to Mr. Leighton Smith on several occasions. You have probably demanded from him what you are explaining to us now. What are his views in this regard?

[Muratovic] I have only talked to Smith twice since he arrived in Sarajevo, both times in the presence of President Izetbegovic. We had another meeting as well, in Paris. Smith became angry with us, so to speak, because of our reaction to his statement that he would reconsider extending the deadline set for the transfer of authority to our government in the regions from which the Serbs have to withdraw. Then he also became angry because we made all that public through the media. However, I think that our media reacted in a way that greatly helped our citizens' expeditious release. The most powerful means of pressure today is the media. We synchronized the media actions quite well and, had there not been such actions, it is doubtful when, or even if, these people would have been released, although not all of them have been released yet. Smith, however, thinks that reactions by our media had an obstructive effect on the IFOR mission, which is absolutely not true. Through the media and personal contacts we prepared our public opinion for an atmosphere in which IFOR is seen almost as a savior; that is to say, we did everything to make their stay here easier through a peaceful, friendly atmosphere. People welcomed them with flowers and we really do give them credit for all that they have done to part the warring factions. I must say, frankly, that they did the job unexpectedly quickly. However, in my opinion, they also made an omission by not securing the free movement of citizens, which resulted in this tragic event. Moreover, IFOR's reaction was rather slow when we turned to them for help in resolving the case. We did not turn to the media immediately. We tried to solve the problem silently, without any public clamor. It was only when they began telling us that it was not their duty that we took measures that led to success. [passage omitted]

[LJILJAN] Do you believe that, with regard to his statements and actions, Mr. Smith exceeded his authority?

[Muratovic] No, because he did not promise to extend the deadline. However, viewed politically, it was very unwise to suggest to the Serbs that there was any possibility of extending the deadline. They immediately made a major issue out of it. They began telling the local population: "Do not worry, the deadline will be prolonged and the Muslim authorities will never come here because we shall endlessly prolong it!" That means that this statement by Smith had dreadful political consequences and it was for that reason that we reacted as promptly and adamantly as we did. [passage omitted]

[LJILJAN] Do you have any information about the building of a new, Serb Sarajevo in the region of Lukavica, which Momcilo Krajisnik publicly mentioned on one occasion?

[Muratovic] There is such a plan, designed by Krajisnik himself. However, the Serbs demand that the international community finance that project. It is an idiotic idea — does he really think that the international community would ever finance ethnic cleansing? Krajisnik says: "We shall burn down everything and move the population to our city." Do they really imagine that the international community would give money for new houses, after the old ones have been burned down by the Serbs themselves? Krajisnik is constantly repeating that they, when they eventually leave, will destroy everything. They are even proud to announce that they

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will take everything with them, down to the last traffic sign!

[LJILJAN] Is it true that they are digging up their graves and taking their dead with them?

[Muratovic] That is sheer propaganda. What they are really taking with them are the bodies of Serbs and Montenegrins who were killed on the Sarajevo front, who were natives of the so-called FRY.

[LJILJAN] Do you perhaps have any more information about the possible new city in Lukavica?

[Muratovic] I know that in Serbia a campaign is being launched for every city to take on a commitment to build a part of that future city for Serbs. [passage omitted]

IFOR's Walker Discouraged Over Reunified Sarajevo

AU0801181096 Paris AFP in English
1729 GMT 8 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 8 (AFP) — General Sir Michael Walker, ground commander of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) serving in Bosnia, said on Monday he was "discouraged" at the prospects of preserving Sarajevo's multi-ethnic status.

"I am rather discouraged by what I see, because what we are looking for is multi-ethnicity in the city which the parties signed up for," he said, after a tour of a large factory complex in the Serb-held suburb of Vogosca.

"But clearly what we have seen this afternoon is indicating that there is not a great deal of government support to try and bring that about. It's a very worrying factor for all of us."

Walker had just been inside the vast ammunitions factory which was being systematically dismantled by Serb workers in the suburb to the north of the city.

As workers armed with metal cutting equipment tore through steel girders supporting the roof, others organised the lifting of heavy arms making machines from the floor.

Rusting shell casings and other ammunition debris lay scattered around the vast warehouse.

Vogosca is one of several Serb held areas ringing the city that under Bosnia's Dayton peace accord are due to revert to government control in mid-March.

Serb leaders in all these areas and many ordinary people have vowed to leave their homes rather than stay to live under the Moslem-led government with whom they waged a bitter 44-month war.

With the deadline for the handover approaching rapidly, Walker said: "There is a huge sense of urgency. It is a very short period of time and what it really means is that we have to get together and do as much as we can as fast as we can."

Though he highlighted the limits of his powers as a strictly military commander, Walker added: "What we are keen to contribute to is to provide individuals with the choice of whether they go or stay, not that they should be faced with the political decisions."

IFOR Officials Meet Over Transfer of Authority

AU1701124696 Paris AFP in English
1206 GMT 17 Jan 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 17 (AFP) — IFOR officials on Wednesday [17 January] met Bosnian Government and Serb officers ahead of Friday's crucial deadline to evacuate frontline positions around Sarajevo, amid continued fears the pullback could spark a mass Serb exodus from the Bosnian capital.

The meeting came as Bosnian officials prepared to issue a statement over the fate of thousands of people missing from the fallen Srebrenica enclave, amid newspaper reports that 800 Bosnians were being held in Serbian detention camps.

All prisoners of war were due to be released by Friday under the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia but a planned exchange of 900 prisoners Monday and Tuesday foundered over the issue. [passage omitted]

Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) officials said that under Dayton, all forces must leave the former frontline areas by midnight (2300 GMT) Friday, adding Bosnian Serb troops must abandon positions in Serb-held parts of the city due to revert to the Moslem-Croat federation.

An IFOR spokesman in Zagreb, Major Michael Jensen, said "every party is withdrawing its forces" along the 1,000 kilometre (600 mile) confrontation line, "and it looks very promising at the moment."

Some 40 key points around the capital were vacated earlier this month on schedule but French IFOR troops were preparing to verify further withdrawals by both rival forces in the city, spokesman Captain Frederic Solano said in Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

IFOR spokesman Brigadier Andrew Cumming said IFOR would provide a security blanket to Serb civilians from Friday until at least March 19. [passage omitted]

In London, THE GUARDIAN newspaper quoted Bosnian refugees evacuated from Serbian detention

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camps as saying some 800 refugees who fled the fallen enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica were imprisoned last August in camps under Serbian police authority.

The Red Cross in Belgrade has for several weeks been negotiating to have prisoners held at the secret camps at Sljivovica and Mitrovo Polje released and given sanctuary in third countries "by the end of January," the paper reported.

A Bosnian Foreign Ministry official in Sarajevo meantime insisted there would be no releases until the fate of some 3,000 people was resolved.

Mirza Hajric said "these are not missing people, they were registered and we must know what happened to them," he said.

Krajisnik Appeals to Serbs To Remain in Sarajevo

LD1301164396 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The Bosnian Serb Assembly speaker, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Serb Sarajevo Mayor Professor Vojislav Maksimovic held talks on the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement for the Sarajevo area with Antoine Pedauye, the newly-appointed UN coordinator for the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS], in Pale today. Vesna Cakic reports:

[Cakic] Speaker Krajisnik and Serb Sarajevo Mayor Maksimovic used today's meeting with Pedauye as an opportunity to voice anxieties and insecurities felt by the Serb Sarajevo citizens to the international community. Krajisnik thanked the United Nations for its understanding and willingness to cooperate in efforts to resolve controversial issues in the Dayton agreement. He concluded that today's meeting with the UN coordinator for the RS was very constructive. We believe that the international community's passive attitude is very dangerous and that omissions can lead to an even more serious situation, speaker Krajisnik said, and added:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] It is not true that the movement of the people [from Serb Sarajevo] is a part of the freedom of movement. This is in fact ethnic cleansing, which is being carried out through omissions by responsible factors.

This is not criticism of Pedauye. He has done everything for his part, but it is addressed to those who do not want to do anything and who are now searching for some compromise-prone Serbs, some malleable Serbs, who are telling them what they want to hear. We appeal to the Serbs that they must not leave their ancestral homes, that they should not leave their ancestral homes. We have a political struggle and we will fight for our city and no one can take this city away from us, unless we give it up or sell it.

We do not have the right to do that because of our dead, our children, our roots. No one has the right to do that.

All those who are leaving and taking their property today are doing this unnecessarily because IFOR [Implementation Force] and everyone else has given us assurances that we can do that at any time of the day or night, that is, before 90 days or after 90 days. In this way we are just causing panic and helping our enemies, who are already rejoicing and saying that the Serbs want to leave the area. [end recording]

[Announcer] Pedauye briefed speaker Krajisnik about the UN intention to open a bureau in the RS with Pale and Banja Luka offices, because the work of the Ilidza office proved to be useful. [passage omitted]

[Cakic] Let us add finally that Pedauye asked speaker Krajisnik to intervene so that citizens from the Muslim part of Sarajevo, who have been detained in the Serb part of the city because they used to disturb Serb civilians by urging them to leave, were released. Krajisnik promised that five Muslims would be released after an investigation.

Further on Position of Serbs

LD1601231896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2226 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Jan [dateline as received] — Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic, said today that the international community is glossing over the fact that the Serb people are abandoning their homes in Serb Sarajevo, and is making unconvincing appeals to the Serbs to stay.

"These appeals are neither sincere nor are they accompanied by appropriate measures and firm guarantees," Krajisnik told Radio Obrenovac. This statement was carried by the Bosnian Serb news agency, SRNA.

According to Krajisnik, ethnic cleansing is under way in peace time in the Sarajevo area, and unfortunately the international community is doing nothing about it.

Buha Urges World Arbitration Over Sarajevo Issue

LD1601201496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2001 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan. 16 (TANJUG) — Republika Srpska Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha demanded on Tuesday that High Commissioner for Bosnia Carl Bildt refer the issue of Sarajevo's Serb

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districts to world arbitration if the situation there does not calm within a fortnight.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted Buha as telling leaders of the Republika Srpska, Bosnian Serb state, in a meeting in Pale late Monday that the Dayton peace accord allowed for the status quo until new elections were held in September.

Buha said, "the status quo implies the current borders among the Sarajevo districts as well as current municipal authorities, police included."

"Bildt has been asked to confirm the correctness of such interpretation of the Dayton accord," he said.

"If he cannot do it, we demand an international arbitration that would have a final say as regards the status of Serb Sarajevo," he said.

Bildt was requested to act in a similar manner as Hans Koschnick, E.U. administrator in Mostar, a town in Herzegovina divided between Croats and Moslems, which is to be referred to international arbitration if the situation there does not stabilise within two weeks.

Buha said, "the situations in Mostar and Sarajevo are identical and we therefore do not see why the same standards should not be applied."

Sarajevo's Serb districts where about 120,000 Serbs live have up to this point been part of the Republika Srpska. Under the Dayton peace accord, the districts are to be given to the Moslem-Croat Federation.

Plavsic Demands Local Self-Management for Serbs

AU0501214596 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The deputy president of the Serb Republic, Biljana Plavsic, pointed out today that the international community will be directly responsible for the mass exodus and ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 Sarajevo Serbs unless it finds the appropriate guarantees for their personal safety and the safety of their property.

Creating more refugees is contrary to the spirit of the Dayton agreement, remarked Plavsic in her statement to SRNA, establishing that the Serbs would remain in Serb Sarajevo if the international community opts for the right variant that will guarantee them general safety and freedom. According to her, the most logical variant would be for the Sarajevo Serbs to have local self-management in the parts of the city where they live, which would resemble the Mostar model.

Plavsic concluded that, in any other case, IFOR [Implementation Force] will have to protect the freedom and the property of the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo if the international community is not (?prepared) to prevent another mass exodus of the Serb people.

Sarajevo Serbs Reject Milosevic Request To Stay

AU1301172696 Paris AFP in English 1659 GMT 13 Jan 96

[Report by Natasa Kuljic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 13 (AFP) — Scornful Serbs vowed Saturday [13 January] to press ahead with a mass exodus from Sarajevo, despite Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's plea for them to stay put when the entire city reverts to Bosnian control.

"The fact that 'papa' (Milosevic) asks us to stay is the best sign that we should leave," said Ceca, a student from Grbavica, a Serb-held suburb of Sarajevo, who was visiting Pale on Saturday.

"I heard that our schools were going to be transfered. Obviously I am going to move, either to Serbia or Bijeljina," a town in northeast Bosnia, near the Serbian border.

On Friday, Milosevic issued an appeal to the rebel Serbs of Sarajevo to stay in their homes and put faith the Dayton peace accords.

Serb officials in Ilidza and other rebel-held suburbs of the Bosnian capital have threatened to fight or to stage a mass exodus rather than live under Bosnian government authority, due to take effect on March 19.

Milosevic — former patron of the rebel Serbs in their campaign to establish an ethnically "pure" Bosnian Serb statelet — is widely seen by Bosnian Serbs as having betrayed them for signing the Dayton peace accords.

Over the last few days, death notices announcing Milosevic's "political demise" have popped up around Grbavica.

The black-bordered notices, like those traditionally pinned to walls to mark a death, announce the "sadness" of Sarajevo's Serb population at the loss of "our Satan."

The Serbian leader is under heavy pressure from the international community to prevent a mass Serb exodus from Sarajevo, as this could jeopardize the peace accords.

In Belgrade on Friday, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said after a meeting with Milosevic that he was counting on the Serbian leader to reassure the Sarajevo Serbs of their security after the handover.

Ranko, a young soldier also from Grbavica, was outraged by Milosevic's remarks: "You may laugh. I have

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already moved. May he (Milosevic) die, that accursed communist."

Buco, a Serb policeman from the Sarajevo suburb of Lukavica, currently stationed in Pale, restricted his criticism of Milosevic to "idiocy."

Mitra, mother of a Grbavica soldier who "spent three and a half years in the Bosnian Serb army," said she feared her son would fall victim to Bosnian reprisals after the handover.

"I have already sent my son to Serbia so that he can pursue his studies," she said. "It would never occur to me to have confidence in Alija (Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president) and wait for his leniency."

"For myself, I am staying, as I don't know where to go," she said.

Serb leaders in Pale have been seeking an extension of the deadline.

On Wednesday, the speaker of the Serb assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, warned that 100,000 Serbs could flood out of the Sarajevo suburbs because of the "very poor security guarantees" provided by the international community.

The Serb population of the Sarajevo suburbs in not known precisely, but is estimated at between 50,000 and 80,000 people.

Milosevic 'Death Notices' Circulate

AU1301163096 Paris AFP in English 1355 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Grbavica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 13 (AFP) — Death notices announcing the "political demise" of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic have appeared all around this Serb-controlled Sarajevo suburb in the last few days.

The black-bordered notices, like those traditionally pinned to walls here to mark a death, announce the "sadness" of Sarajevo's Serb population at the loss of "our Satan".

They carry a photograph of Milosevic with a Communist star symbol and accuse him of the loss of thousands of human lives.

The initials of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party (SPS) were among the signatories of the notice, but the logo was translated instead as "Serbia's Party of Pall-Bearers".

Milosevic is widely seen among Serbs as having betrayed them for signing the Dayton peace accords which, among other things, calls for the the Bosnian capital to be reunited under the rule of the Moslem-led government.

Karadzic Comments on Sarajevo Serbs' Position

LD0801213996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2044 GMT 8 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Jan (SRNA) — Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic [RS], told SRNA this evening that at their meeting the RS state leadership and representatives of intellectuals of Serb Sarajevo had reached a high degree of accord on two key points of vital importance for the town's future.

According to President Karadzic, the intellectuals agreed that the people should stay in Serb Sarajevo for as long as Serb authorities were there.

"The Serbs do not want to leave Serb Sarajevo, but neither do they want to live under Muslim authorities," the RS president added.

"The second point we agreed on concerns the urgent need to expand the town by building facilities that will have to stay behind in the Muslim part of Sarajevo," President Karadzic said, and went on to note that plans existed to build a university and hospital center, a theatre, and other institutions.

The RS president said that "the citizens of Serb Sarajevo can rest assured that no one will force them to stay in the town and accept Muslim authorities."

"On the contrary, we shall ask for them to be allowed stay but under their own authorities," Karadzic said.

Unless the international community secures a favorable solution for Serb Sarajevo, it will be held responsible for the possible consequences and the state will move out the population and property in an organized way.

"People should not spend their money and leave without knowing where to go. The state will take care of them. If we cannot maintain our authorities in Serb Sarajevo, we shall be given enough time to lead the Serbs onto Serb territory," President Karadzic said.

Urges Serbs To 'Press On'

AU0601163596 Paris AFP in English 1621 GMT 6 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 6 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb leaders sounded a defiant note Saturday [6 January], repeating objections to the Bosnia peace accord and appealing to their people to press on with the struggle to create a Greater Serbia.

In a lengthy message to all Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic urged his people not to give up the quest for ethnic unity and insisted that the Serb bid for secession from Bosnia had not been in vain.

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"The Serb republic (in Bosnia) has been created and recognised," Karadzic said in the message, carried by the Serbs' SRNA news agency, timed to coincide with Orthodox Christmas which falls on Sunday.

The Dayton peace agreement divides Bosnia into a Moslem-Croat federation and a Serb entity linked by a weak central government.

"The Serb republic is not as large as it might have been," the Serb leader said in his message, which was to be broadcast by Bosnian Serb television later Saturday.

"But it is large enough to welcome all Serbs (in Bosnia) and all Serbs lost in the world," he added in an appeal for national unity.

Karadzic's number two, parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik, meanwhile repeated Serb concerns with the peace agreement signed last month, particularly the clause providing for the reintegration of Serb-held parts of Sarajevo into a unified Bosnian capital.

"We are not interested in an extension of the deadline for implementing" the peace accord, Krajisnik said, stressing that the Serbs wanted political guarantees rather than just more time to assimilate their territories into Sarajevo.

According to the Dayton peace plan, Serb-held areas of Sarajevo are to be integrated into the Bosnian-Croat Federation by March 20. The Serbs have asked that the deadline be pushed back, but ultimately are demanding autonomy in those areas.

"It is very hypocritical on the part of the international community to to invite the Serbs to stay in Sarajevo without initiating anything politically," Krajisnik said.

Karadzic's message also appeared to challenge directly the Bosnian peace deal in its call for a single, unified, Serb state.

The agreement, while recognising the existence of a Serb entity in Bosnia, prevents the Bosnian Serbs from seceding from Bosnia- Herzegovina and assimilating their territory with neighbouring Serbia.

Karadzic also indirectly attacked moves by his erstwhile patron, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, to undermine his pan-Serbian quest.

Milosevic, whose own Greater Serbian nationalism arguably triggered the 43-month Bosnian conflict by encouraging the Bosnian Serbs to launch their own secession struggle, later disowned the pan-Serbian cause and ultimately agreed the peace deal on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

"We just needed a bit of will and determination to unify and liberate all Serb territories," Karadzic said, denouncing the "disloyalty" and "treason" within the Serb people which had shattered his dream.

"Because of this, we have left future generations lots of incomplete work," he said, calling on his fellow Serbs to "restore Serb national dignity."

And in an ominous rejoinder, Karadzic said he hoped the Bosnian Serbs would one day recapture through "a long and persistent political struggle," territories lost under the peace agreement.

'Endless' Serb Convoys Leaving Sarajevo Suburbs

AU1101195596 Paris AFP in English 1910 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 11 (AFP) — Most Serbs in suburbs of the Bosnian capital due to revert to government control have moved out their valuables ahead of a deadline for transferring the areas, a senior UN official said Thursday [11 January].

"The situation remains tense in Serb-held Sarajevo where the population is extensively involved in the transfer of household goods. Approximately 80 percent have already transferred their most valuable possessions. Endless convoys are passing through villages bringing a funeral atmosphere to the area," said Antonio Peduaye, interim UN coordinator for Bosnia.

Rebel Serbs who laid siege to government-held parts of the city for three and a half years have vowed to leave areas of the capital they hold rather than live under Bosnian Government authority.

In the Dayton peace accord, signed by all sides in the conflict last month, all but a fraction of Serb-held Sarajevo is to revert to the mainly Moslem Sarajevo authorities by March 19.

Attempts by international mediators to reassure the Serbs living in the areas that they can stay without fear have so far failed. On Thursday, Robert Gallucci, the American envoy assigned to follow the implementation of civil aspects of the U.S.-brokered Dayton accord, met with Serb officials in Grbavica, a Serb-held suburb.

However, according to Bosnian Serb-controlled Pale radio, there was "no progress" on a Serb demand that the deadline for the transfer be delayed. On Wednesday, a senior Bosnian Serb figure, Momcilo Krajisnik, warned of "new clashes in the Sarajevo area" if the transfer was not delayed.

Peduaye declined to comment on the threat but said any departure of the Serbs would not "really effect" the peace process. "It would be another step in the homogeneity of the country. We cannot force people to stay, they are entitled to go," he said.

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Bosnia's brutal war has been characterised, particularly in Serb and Croat-held areas, by the forced expulsions of whichever ethnic group does not belong to that in power creating mono-ethnic blocks throughout Bosnia.

Though the UN peacekeeping force no longer has a mandate in Bosnia, the world body has retained responsibility for an international police task force (IPTF) and some political functions, with Peduaye currently at the helm.

Slated to have some 1,720 members, the IPTF force currently has around 100 police officers with "another 40" due in in the coming weeks, the UN coordinator said.

NATO Chief Asks Serb Leaders To Call Off Exodus

AU1201171396 Paris AFP in English
1657 GMT 12 Jan 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 12 (AFP) — NATO's chief Javier Solana called on the Bosnian Serb leadership Friday to drop its threat to order a mass exodus of rebel Serbs from suburbs around Sarajevo due to revert to government control.

In what Solana described as a "very frank" conversation NATO's Secretary General told Bosnian Serb assembly president, Momcilo Krajisnik, Friday that deadlines for the handover cannot be changed and that the Serbs should be told to stay.

"The Dayton agreement is here to be complied with and nobody is going to change it. It is time to stop this destructive attitude and start a constructive attitude. It is very sad for us that the Serbs in Sarajevo are not clearly told to stay," Solana told reporters.

Under Bosnia's US-brokered peace accord signed last month, several deadlines have been set in the process of transferring Serb held parts of Sarajevo to the mainly Moslem government.

The commander of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith, added his voice to the pleas for calm from the international community.

"We did plead with Krajisnik this morning to try and get his people not to do that because all they are doing is adding more emotional fuel to the fire which is building in this city," Smith said. "We want to try and calm that now and we want responsible leadership come on line."

Solana made his comments during his first visit to the Bosnian capital as Secretary General after holding talks with Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian Croat leaders and Krajisnik. He was joined at the meetings by Smith and the alliance's supreme commander in Europe, General George Joulwan.

The first of the crucial deadlines is January 19, when all Bosnian Serb armed forces must pull out of the transfer areas. Later, on March 19 all these areas formally come under Bosnian government authority. With one week to go to the first dealine, UN and aid officials have reported that Serbs in these areas have already moved out their belongings and valuables.

Though there are no signs yet of a mass exodus tensions are running high with some people torching empty homes in an apparently random act of vandalism.

However, both Solana and Smith said there was nothing IFOR troops deployed in the city could do to stop this type of incident. "I can't stop a man from burning his own house down. People are expecting more from us than we can provide. We have a limited number of people and a very large country and I only half of them in country now," Smith said.

Around one half of the expected 60,000 troops making up the NATO force are in Bosnia at the moment. However, NATO commanders have been at pains to stress that their soldiers are "not a police force."

Diplomats suggested Krajisnik himself had softened his stance on the mass exodus earlier Friday, but the assembly president was quoted by Bosnian Serb radio as saying that the call for the Serbs "to stay in Sarajevo is not sufficient. Nothing has been promised to us."

Diplomats and IFOR are fearful that a mass exodus and the possiblity of further armed conflict, such as that already seen in the southern Bosnian town of Mostar in recent weeks would inflict a heavy blow to the peace accord.

This week has already seen one serious incident in Sarajevo with an anti-tank missile being fired at a city tram killing one woman. Krajisnik has warned that clashes in the capital could flare up. "If they (Serbs) start armed resistance we will not have a peace agreement," Smith warned.

Solana flew on later to Belgrade where he went into talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on various aspects of the implementation of the Bosnia accord.

On Thursday he was in Zagreb for talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

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Serbs Order Destruction of Sarajevo Facilities

LD1401183596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Karadzic's Pale-based authorities have ordered the destruction of telecommunication and other infrastructure equipment and plants in the temporarily-occupied area of the city of Sarajevo, BH press has learned from well-informed sources.

In this connection, the agency has learned that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will ask Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, to warn the Serbs not to destroy those facilities. The international community will be called on to suspend its aid for the economic reconstruction of Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina if they continue to destroy economic and other facilities.

The Serb Pale authorities keep requesting equal treatment in the use of funds for economic reconstruction, while simultaneously destroying economic facilities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbs To Stay in Sarajevo Pending Solution

LD1601120596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1116 GMTG 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 16 Jan (SRNA) — Last night in Pale, the headquarters for the implementation of the Dayton agreement in Serb Sarajevo adopted a platform regarding the resumption of negotiations on finding a more favorable solution for the status of the Serb Republic's capital.

A Serb Sarajevo delegation will today hand over the text of the platform to Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, and to his deputy, Michael Steiner. The platform calls for a confirmation of the interpretation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement for Sarajevo according to which Serb authorities and existing municipal borders will remain in the Serb part of the city until the elections are held and new authorities set up.

Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic and head of the headquarters for the implementation of the peace agreement in Sarajevo, warned that the Muslims are avoiding talks on resolving the problem.

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, attended the meeting last night and pointed to the need to put an end to the illusion about the success of the efforts so far by the international mediators to resolve the problem of Serb Sarajevo. Karadzic is of the opinion that they and Muslim representatives are using the talks for personal affirmation.

Representatives of Serb Sarajevo municipalities submitted reports on the situation in the area.

The meeting overnight decided that the population of Serb Sarajevo should stay in the city and thus put pressure on the international community to come up with the right solution to the problem. [passage omitted]

HDZ Official on Unequal Treatment of Croats

AU1701090396 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 p 5

[Interview with Ante Zelic, deputy chairman of the Sarajevo branch of the Croatian Democratic Community, by Miroslav Pavicevic in Sarajevo; date not given: "Croat Doctors Are Removed by — Clerks!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Outvoted Croats

[Pavicevic] What do you think best reflects the Bosniaks' work against the interests of Croats in Sarajevo?

[Zelic] Last month, shortly after the signing of the Dayton accord and the Paris treaty, a pressure was put on Croats to agree to Sarajevo's organization as a canton, while what was proposed as the basis of its cantonal organization does not give anything to the Croats, except a decorative role for the authorities in the city, so they could show abroad that they are equal representatives of all the people. At a meeting of the Commission for City Planning our three representatives were outvoted, and their proposals for the city's reconstruction were not even considered.

Even now the Croats are not participating with the authorities, nor are they asked for an opinion on anything. For all vital Croat interests only one party makes decisions, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], so that our position in Sarajevo depends solely on the altruistic mood of the party's officials. This has been recognized by ombudsmen as well. They have established that in Sarajevo, of all Bosnia-Herzegovina, human rights are violated the most regarding housing, jobs, and other questions. [passage omitted]

Two Percent Participation in Bodies of Authority

[Zelic continues] As for the policy on cadre, since the signing of the Washington agreement the Croats in Sarajevo have lost 43 official positions, that is, they have simply been removed. This refers to positions with ministries and municipal authorities, as well as with companies, where 15 Croat directors have been removed. In that way the Croats' participation in bodies of authority is 2 percent, and in the economy 1.5 percent, even though there are over 7 percent of us living here.

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[Pavicevic] If we consider that more than 250,000 Bosniaks and between 20,000 and 30,000 Croats live in Sarajevo, we can logically deduce that Bosniaks have among themselves more qualified cadre than the 7 percent of Croats can provide....

[Zelic] That is a story for little kids. The Croats in Sarajevo have an association of intellectuals attracting more than 150 professors and doctors. Is it really about qualifications when a common clerk like Edin Bukvic is appointed director general of Energoinvest company, instead of Professor Doctor Bozidar Matic, who is being asked to head a department at a university in America? Or, that Nedjeljko Bilic is removed from the position of director general of the Postal Service, while he is the one working out new programs for the new director? [passage omitted]

What Will Serbs Say?

[Pavicevic] What is happening with the project of Croat municipality in Sarajevo?

[Zelic] We do not want any Croat municipality. We are not insisting on its being called Croat. We just want to have a municipality where Croats will have a majority. That would be Stup district, but I point out that it would not have this Croat denominator.

However, we have discussed this proposal with nobody as yet, nor is it possible to discuss it in this way, when they are pursuing majorization. If this is happening to Croats, what can we say to Serbs, who are also supposed to come to this city?

[Pavicevic] However, Bosniak politicians often point out that Croats do live in Sarajevo, and they are allowed to perform all national, religious, and cultural manifestations, while in Capljina, for instance, there are no Bosniaks at all, and let alone that they can perform some manifestations of their own....

[Zelic] In Capljina there are no Bosniaks, that is true, but there are also no Croats in Bugojno and Vares. Those are little, provincial towns, where, unfortunately, effects of war are most felt. On the other hand, Sarajevo is the capital of the Federation and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in it there has always existed a multinational, multicultural, and multireligious tradition, and Sarajevo cannot be compared with Stolac, Capljina, or Bugojno, because in those places a war was being waged in which Croats and Bosniaks were exterminating each other. In Sarajevo no such war between Croats and Bosniaks occurred, and it is senseless to use in the capital of the Federation a formula applicable to Stolac or Bugojno. We, the Croats living here, just want equal treatment, and I also consider that the Serbs living in the temporarily occupied parts of the city must be given a chance to participate with the authorities in Sarajevo on an equal basis. This, of course, does not apply to those who have disgraced themselves and stained their hands with blood. [passage omitted]

Planned POW Exchange Falls Through 9 Jan

AU0901165796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Jan 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on a news conference by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Amor Musovic, chairman of the State Committee for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, in Sarajevo on 9 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic explained at a news conference today the situation and problems connected with the exchange of all POW's, adding that the Serb side, in contravention of the Dayton agreement and other international legal provisions, had not presented the information on the prisoners.

Every prisoner can thus be [word indistinct] unless proper lists are provided, Minister Sacirbegovic said. If these people are not alive [word indistinct] international law, explanations must be provided as to why [words indistinct].

Amor Masovic, chairman of the State Committee for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, presented an astonishing report: The Serb side claims to be holding only 123 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Government's list, on the other hand, has 24,742 people captured or missing during the aggression, including, this summer alone, about 8,000 people from Srebrenica. Of these some 3,000 are listed as captured and 5,000 as missing.

The Serb side is demanding the release of 725 people.

Explaining the reasons why the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation refused to sign up to the plan for the release of all prisoners yesterday, Masovic said that the ICRC had made a list without consulting the Bosnian side, which they were obliged to do under the Dayton agreement. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation yesterday demanded exact lists of people to be released, the release of the 3,000 captured Srebrenica people if they are still alive and, if not, that the information on that be made available — and a solution to the issue of those Srebrenica and Zepa people currently in Serbia. The ICRC did not agree to this, thus the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation was not in a position to sign the plan at the airport yesterday.

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Details on Failed POW Exchange

AU0901180096 Paris AFP in English 1719 GMT 9 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 9 (AFP) — The Bosnian Government said here Tuesday [9 January] it refused to sign a plan on exchanging prisoners of war (POWs) because the Bosnian Serbs had submitted a list of only 123 names, while thousands of Bosnian citizens remain missing.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic told a press conference, "We noticed that many of the people we know are missing were totally left out from the list submitted by the Serbs, and we don't know what their fate is.

"For this reason, we are not willing to move ahead with any resolution of this problem until all those that are known to have been taken by the Serb side are accounted for," Sacirbegovic said.

The three Bosnian warring factions — Moslems, Serbs and Croats — met Monday under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to agree the final exchange of POWs, which is to be completed by January 20 under the Dayton peace accord.

Amor Masovic, head of the Bosnian State Exchange Commission, said the commission was "astonished by the (Serbs') list," which included just 123 names of a total 24,742 Bosnian citizens captured since the beginning of the war in 1992.

That amounts to only "0.5 percent of our requirements," Masovic said.

Masovic said that 8,000 of the POWs the Bosnian side wants released from Serb detention have been imprisoned since summer 1995.

These include 3,000 civilians from Srebrenica "that we positively know were arrested, and the other 5,000 have the status of missing since we do not know if they are still alive."

The two former Moslem eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa fell to the Serbs in July 1995.

Sacirbegovic said the government was not willing "to let these names just drop off the list as if somehow they dropped off the end of the earth."

If the missing are not accounted for, "it means that every last prisoner can be killed, executed, murdered and taken off the list and the ICRC would assume they no longer deserve to be liberated because they are no longer on the current list," Sacirbegovic said.

He said some of those excluded from the list had previously figured on other lists, compiled not only by the government and the ICRC but other international agencies and the United Nations.

Masovic said the Bosnian side was ready to sign the agreement Tuesday but had set three conditions that were rejected by the ICRC.

The Serbs would have to provide an exact list of the people to be freed, release the 3,000 Srebrenica civilians or admit that they are not alive, and solve the problem of citizens from Srebrenica and Zepa who are in detention in Serbia.

Masovic charged that the ICRC made the release plan without consulting the government, adding that its list of Serbs to be released from government prisons even contained the names of Serbs who had been sentenced for murders in 1989, three years before the war broke out in Bosnia.

The Serbs have asked for the release of 725 POWs, including 400 who are in Bosnian Government prisons.

Serb-Muslim POW Exchange Takes Place 10 Jan

LD1001192696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1756 GMT 10 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 Jan (Tanjug) — The exchange of POW's between the Serb Republic and Muslim armies was conducted today at the IFOR [Implementation Force] checkpoint in Koprivna, 5.5 km north of Sanski Most.

The Serb and Muslim sides each exchanged 34 POW's from the time of the Muslim-Croat offensive against western parts of the Serb Republic last autumn.

The exchange has been postponed for the past 15 days and it is the first to take place between Serb and Muslim POW's this year.

The Serb and Muslim armies today also agreed on future activities concerning POW exchanges.

Serbs Blame Opponents for Failed 15 Jan Exchange

AU1601124996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 15 Jan 96

[Report by Dragan Stegic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lieutenant General Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, met with U.S. General William Nash, IFOR commander for the northeastern sector, today in Banja Luka. Behind closed doors, they talked about the implementation of the Dayton agreement on the ground, but they focused

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on the realization of the first stage, which should be completed by 19 January. [passage omitted]

Although today's meeting dealt mostly with military aspects of the peace agreement, which, says Lt. Gen. Talic, the Serb side is implementing even faster than planned, the exchange of prisoners was another topic they broached.

[Begin Talic recording] The main problem is the fact that the Muslim side did not implement the provisions of the Dayton agreement, i.e. did not report prisoners held in their prisons, nor did it allow the International Committee of Red Cross to register those prisoners. I asked Gen. Nash to use his influence to help us with that. [end recording]

Though scheduled and announced, a major exchange of war prisoners did not take place this afternoon in Bocac, a village in the Banja Luka region that is still held by the Croatian Army, perhaps due to the fact that the Croatian side simply did not recognize the existence of more than 700 captured and missing Serb soldiers.

[Begin recording] [Lieutenant Colonel Nedjeljko Savic, president of the 1st Krajina Corps exchange commission] The Croatian side was supposed to get soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Croatia whom we captured here. Croatia has never recognized us, i.e. a large number of our men are in prisons in the Republic of Croatia.

[Stegic] Does that mean that they were not registered by the ICRC representatives?

[Savic] Right, the fact that they were not exchanged means that the soldiers that were taken from the territory of our republic to Croatian prisons have not been registered. [end recording]

Even ICRC or IFOR representatives who indirectly accused the Serb side for the failed prisoner exchange in Bocac before a large crowd of foreign journalists, did not explain what happened to Serb soldiers who are held in prisons throughout Croatia.

Radio Blames HVO for Failure

AU1601195696 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The exchange of prisoners of war between the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Army of the Serb Republic, which was scheduled for today at Bocac near Banja Luka did not take place because the HVO set the condition that members of the Croatian Army should also be released. At the same time, the HVO of Herzeg-Bosnia offered to release only the Serbs who had been captured by the HVO, but not those who are in prisons in the Republic of Croatia.

The Croat side thus tried to get around the Dayton Accord. The families of the Serb prisoners are extremely frustrated with the behavior of the Serb side. At today's meeting in the Hall of the Army of the Serb Republic in Banja Luka, they presented their firm demand that the imprisoned members of the Army of the Serb Republic be identified and registered, and that all the Serb prisoners who are in the prisons of the HVO, the Croatian Army, or the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should be released.

Further on Stalled Exchange

AU1501205996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Jan 96

[Report by Branislav Bozic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The announced exchanges of a large number of prisoners of war between Serbs and Croats in Bocac near Banja Luka and between Serbs and Muslims in Koprivna near Sanski Most have not taken place. Our correspondent Branislav Bozic reports:

[Bozic] It appears that the International Committee of the Red Cross is not able to find a way to realize the exchange of prisoners according to the all for all formula. The problem with the Muslim side is that they have not yet signed the agreement on the exchange, making it dependent on some new conditions. They do not want to provide any information on 460 Serb fighters missing on their side.

The Croat side has signed the agreement and is offering to exchange 214 Serb fighters. The 430 members of the Army of the Serb Republic who are on their side remain a total unknown. According to the Serb military sources in Banja Luka, a large number of captured Serb soldiers sliders is not in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all, but have been taken to Croatia. In this way, they want to outmaneuver the Dayton agreements and probably introduce a new twist with the prisoners of war.

The International Committee of the Red Cross will be in charge of the exchange of prisoners of war until 20 January. This job will then be taken over by IFOR [Implementation Force]. New rules will probably be introduced in the game.

IFOR Commander U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith and U.S. General William Nash, commander of the North-east Sector, today visited Banja Luka. Admiral Smith held talks with Gen. Zivorad Ninkovic, commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Army of the Serb Republic. After the talks, he said that he expects Banja

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Luka airport to be opened soon for the needs of IFOR and civilian traffic.

Gen. Nash met Gen. Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps. After the talks he said that the military part of the agreement is being implemented even faster than planned, stressing that cooperation with all three sides is exceptionally correct.

Muslim-Croat Side Fails To Provide POW Lists

LD1501125796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1249 GMT 15 Jan 96

[By Jovan Babic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Jan 15 (TANJUG) — Under a peace accord for Bosnia-Herzegovina, concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris late last year, all parties to the conflict pledged to exchange lists of prisoners and missing persons by January 4, but the Muslim-Croat side has failed to do so.

In keeping with the peace agreement, all three sides should close all camps and prisons and release all prisoners by January 10.

Two problems have emerged in the implementation of the provision.

In contravention of the agreement, the Muslim side has stated that it would release Serb prisoners on condition that it receives information on the fate of missing Muslims.

The Muslim side wants simultaneously to 'collect' all its 'outstandings', although the agreement makes a clear distinction between prisoners of war and 'missing' civilians.

Muslims are thus obstructing the implementation of the agreement although they are fully aware that many of their 'missing' persons are deserters who have 'vanished into thin air' to foreign countries.

The Serb side has said that it has reliable information that many of its prisoners of war are detained in prisons in neighbouring Croatia.

Such a thing is possible because Croatia's regular Army and the Croat Defence Council (HVO), the Bosnian Croat army, jointly fought in Bosnia.

Serb sources said that Muslims had moved some of the Bosnian Serb prisoners to Croatia.

Full access to military prisons in Croatia is still denied to representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Furthermore, Croatia is not obliged to release Serb prisoners of war from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Official Says Serbs Holding 'Some 4,500 People'

AU1501143596 Paris AFP in English 1317 GMT 15 Jan 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 15 (AFP) — The release of hundreds of Bosnian prisoners of war due to start Monday [15 January] was marred by wrangles over thousands of missing Moslems.

Under a plan to release some 900 prisoners drawn up by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) all three sides were to free the people they hold. However, a senior Bosnian Government official said Monday that all their prisoners would be freed only once "the Serbs release all of our people".

Under Bosnia's Dayton peace accord, all PoWs held by the three former warring factions in the country are due to be released by January 19. The Bosnian Government, however, refused to sign up to the ICRC plan that was accepted by the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats.

Amor Masovic, head of the Bosnian Government exchange commission, accused the Serbs of still holding some 4,500 people, a number far above the estimated 200 PoWs the rebel Serbs have told the ICRC are in Serb jails.

"If all the Bosnian prisoners, be they registered or not, are released, we will gladly release all the Serb prisoners that we are holding," Masovic told AFP. However, he added, there was no intention to free on Monday any of the Serbs being held.

Masovic said those unaccounted for were the hundreds seen taken away by Serb forces who overran the former UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. It is widely thought that Serb forces murdered several thousand inhabitants of the UN protected zones when they fell in July last year.

Masovic however said: "We are absolutely sure that 1,500 of them are alive and in Serb prisons as of this morning. For the other 2,000 we strongly assume that they are alive."

Elsewhere in Bosnia, though, the release was apparently under way. In Mostar, southern Bosnia, at a Croat prison some 212 people were put onto four buses at the crack of dawn to be taken to a crossing point in central Bosnia.

"This is the last group of prisoners held by HVO (Bosnian Croat milita). They are being released in accordance with the Dayton agreement," said chief of HVO exchanges, Berislav Puzic.

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The PoWs were being ferried to Bocac, a former frontline crossing point near the Croat held town of Mrkonjic Grad where the largest release was expected to happen.

Elsewhere in Bosnia, signs of returning normality were reported in Banja Luka, the largest Bosnian Serb-held town in the north of the country. Since the beginning of the war in 1992, the Serb-held Banja Luka region has witnessed some of the worst atrocities against non-Serbs. Many thousands were expelled from their homes, kept in detention camps and murdered. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in Sarajevo, UN civilian police began joint patrols with Bosnian Serb police units in areas of the city under their control. The initiative is part of international attempts to calm fears in the Serb-held suburbs due to revert to government control in the coming weeks.

The police are the first group of the International Police Task Force intended to help monitor police activities in the capital as a confidence building measure.

Serb Official Says Croatia Holding RS POW's

LD1601200696 Belgade TANJUG in English 1948 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Jan 16 (TANJUG) — Chairman of the Government Commission of the Bosnian Serb state of Republika Srpska (R.S.) on Exchanges of Prisoners Dragan Bulajic said Tuesday that more than 200 members of the R.S. army were held in jails in Croatia.

Croatia had admitted to its keeping in jails no more than 26 members of the R.S. army taken prisoner by its army in combats in the R.S. western parts during August and September, 1995, Bulajic explained.

Bulajic supposed that Croatia was not releasing the prisoners because it had not signed the exchange agreement.

R.S. representatives in their talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would try to obtain firmer promises for the release of these prisoners from Croatian jails, said Bulajic.

Bulajic stressed that the R.S. army would not free the members of the regular Croatian Army (HV) so long as Zagreb authorities were keeping Serb soldiers.

The HV, assisted by forces of Croats and Muslims from the BiH, occupied last September large parts of the west R.S. territory.

Said Bulajic, "The Dayton agreement is precise and it regulates the release of all prisoners of war who are in jails after conflicts in the BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), while the military commissions of the Croatian and Serb sides signed — on January 8, with ICRC guarantees — an obligation to unilaterally set free the prisoners."

The Muslim authorities in the BiH, which had not signed this agreement, were now placing before the Serb side "the demands concerning some 24,000 missing persons." Bulajic assessed that these demands had nothing to do with problems related to prisoners [words indistinct]. Bulajic added that he hoped all the three sides would fulfil their obligations by January 19, the Dayton agreement deadline for the release of POWs.

Sacirbegovic on POW Exchange, Missing Bosniaks

AU1601152496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic has stated today that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government is prepared to release all Serb prisoners of war, provided that the Pale leadership provides information on missing Bosniaks.

We are not demanding the impossible, but something that is easy to accomplish, something that is primarily moral, Sacirbegovic said, adding that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government did not want to keep Serb prisoners.

Sacirbegovic is on his way to Sarajevo after a two-day conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina's elections. He said that the problem of prisoners was a topic of discussion with a U.S. envoy from the State Department, Robert Galucci. I think that a large number of officials from the international community do not agree with our views, the Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister said.

Radomir Lukic, deputy foreign minister of the Serb entity, has expressed disappointment that the POW exchange failed. He has also expressed the hope that the government of the Serb entity will cooperate in future plans.

According to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's information, 24,000 Bosniaks are listed as missing. Many of them are probably dead. Sacirbegovic said that the International Committee of the Red Cross was not being realistic, as it had taken the academic point of view that there were two lists and that only those whose names were on these lists should be released. We take the view that the Dayton agreement must be complied with fully. This means that all military and civilian prisoners must be released, Sacirbegovic said, adding that it is a fact that Karadzic's Serbs are still holding a large number of people in forced labor camps. The United States and the international community know very well that these camps exist.

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Links Exchange to Mass Grave Access

AU1701144896 Paris AFP in English 1422 GMT 17 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 17 (AFP) — Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic offered Wednesday [17 January] to break the impasse on the release of prisoners of war if access to two mass grave sites is guaranteed.

The release of all prisoners of war held by Bosnia's three warring factions that are due to be freed by Friday has been held up by wrangles over allegations that thousands have been left off prisoner lists.

"We are prepared to move forward with all the elements of the prisoner release program if IFOR assures the freedom of movement and access to ... the suspected mass grave sites near Ljubija and Srebrenica within three days of the prisoner release," Sacirbegovic said.

Recent media reports have suggested that thousands of corpses are being disposed of in a disused mine in Serb-held northwest Bosnia to cover up evidence of mass killings carried out by the Serbs during the ethnic cleansing campaign of non-Serbs. Other mass grave sites are widely believed to exist in Srebrenica, the former UN safe area overrun by Serb forces last summer.

The minister said that at least 1,000 were still being held by the Serbs in "forced labour camps" while up to another 1,000 are in Bosnian Serb prisons. "All combatants and civilians, including those in forced labour camps must be released as called for by the Dayton peace agreement," he added.

The commander of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR), Admiral Leighton Smith, said Tuesday that a failure to release all PoWs by the January 19 deadline would be a violation of the Dayton peace agreement.

Sacirbegovic declined to say if the Bosnian Government would continue to insist on its condition for the release of prisoners beyond the deadline. "We want full compliance. That's what we are shooting for. We are not in non-compliance. It is up to those that say we are to justify that position," he said.

Explosives Plant Director Says Market Essential

AU1601165896 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 95 pp 8-9

[Interview with Milan Sucic, director of the Vitezit military industrial plant in Vitez, by Josko Dadic and Damir Dukic; place and date not given: "Vitezit Is Left Alone to Itself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before the war the Vitezit company was the pride of the special-purpose, military industry. One of the biggest plants of that kind in the Balkans, it used to employ 2,500 workers and was the main producer of explosives in the former state, both of that for military and that for economic needs. Today the factories in Vitez employ around 750 workers, and production, despite all difficulties, has been maintained. This, as well as the future of Vitezit and of the special-purpose industry, were the topics of our conversation with the director of the company Milan Sucic from Drnis, who worked in Vitez even before the war.

[Sucic] The Vitezit company possesses enormous capacities. As for the part intended for military production, we could produce 1,700 metric tons of two-base [dvobazni] gunpowder, and around 1,000 metric tons of cannon gunpowder a year. However, we worked with full capacities only in 1987, when we exported a lot into Iraq, as well as to one Swiss company. We also have one entirely new factory for the production of composite fuel, made on the basis of bitumen [smola] and ammonium perborate [amonij-perborat]. That is considered to be a new generation fuel in the world as well, and is used in all guided missiles, even in space shuttle launches. That factory of ours has never actually been put into operation, and its annual capacity is 250 metric tons.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] On the basis of that information, it is hard to conclude what quantities we are talking about. Were all 250 metric tons intended for Orkans?

[Sucic] Well, for example, that quantity of fuel is sufficient for 60,000 pieces of Strela 2M or for 10,000 missiles of 122mm caliber for multiple rocket launchers with a range of 35 km. The technology of that factory was a world achievement, because there are not many plants in the world that press gunpowder for calibers over 200mm. And this was intended for Orkans of a caliber over 250mm, so that the equipment and the machinery were strictly special-purpose. So the truth is that the entire factory was bought for Orkans. At that time the two-base fuel was important because of the state treaty with Iraq, because Orkans had been developed together with them.

Orkan

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] In earlier days the Orkan was said to be a big technological accomplishment. Do you believe that practice has proved the opposite, that in fact it is rather a failure?

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[Sucic] I was never enthusiastic about the Orkan because I believed it was a resource without sense. Orkan was probably interesting to Iraq, with regard to their conditions and way of fighting, with long front lines in the desert. However, in this war Orkan proved to be a purely terrorist weapon for attacks on cities, meaning on civilian objects.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Can Orkan now be modified, made more precise and more perfect so that this new factory can start working?

[Sucic] Orkan is an unguided, ballistic, and a rather imprecise missile. However, if a "clever head" were put on that missile, that could already be worth something, because its reach is 50 km. If it were constructed with composite fuel, its reach would be over 60 km. The Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] intended to include a guiding system in that rocket within the production for Iraq as time went on, but that never happened. Work on that started in 1990, first samples were made, but all that stopped because the JNA had no more money.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Does that mean that such a modern factory remains nothing but dead capital? Is it doomed to go to ruin?

[Sucic] As I said, that factory has never been fully functional. We made a certain quantity of Strelas, and we also manufactured a guided rocket that was supposed to be a substitute for an identical U.S. air-to-surface missile. However, that was stopped because of a guiding system that the former JNA never completed. So we gave that missile up with time, because its development had already gone on for 10 years, so that it had meanwhile grown out of date.

Import

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Is it at all possible to restore production for military requirements in Vitezit to what it was before the war? Have there been any talks about cooperation within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that sense, about cooperation with plants in Muslim hands.

[Sucic] You see, Pretis [in Vogosca], Vitez [Vitezit plant], Bugojno [Slavko Rodic plant], and Gorazde could produce entire rocket and mortar systems together. That is essentially how it was. Now it has all disintegrated. However, had people been wise, linking Bratstvo from Novi Travnik, Vitezit and Bugojno, a quality military industry could have been accomplished. But I do[illegible] that it is possible to form the sort of military industry we had here before. It is only possible, with additional investments, to reduce the scope of production and to reduce the assortment of products in the next two or three years.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What would that reduction effect; what, according to you, should remain in function?

[Sucic] Vitezit has works that can produce five metric tons of cannon gunpowder in a day. Now that is practically without any work, because it does not pay to activate this part for small quantities. It uses top world technology that the Czechs took and further developed from the Russians. If in future this plant were to function for military needs, I believe that it would only pay to start up those operations. The other part requires a large number of people and huge costs, which is hard to maintain financially. If there is no daily need for the production of two metric tons, it does not pay to work. For example, we now produce 500 kilos a day, which is absurd, because those 500 kilos cost $50 instead of $10.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] To what degree can Vitezit compete against imports?

[Sucic] Because of our prices we have always been competitive on the world market, and we can achieve that again, on condition that significant quantities are concerned.

NATO and Russians

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What are prices like on the world market?

[Sucic] I will give you an example here. We used to sell a kilo of cannon gunpowder for $7 or $8, and the Chinese sold it for $5. Yet, both Iranians and Iraqis bought our gunpowder, because they knew it was of better quality. In Spain they took $60 to $70 for fuel that we can offer for $15 to $16. Of course, various calculations were involved, because the Spanish plant at the same time had arrangements with Serbs and Muslims as well....

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] How are deals negotiated nowadays? For it is known that earlier it was done by the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense], i.e. the former state. How does this function now?

[Sucic] In fact that system does not exist as yet, and that is the biggest problem. Earlier this plant was represented on the world market by UNIS [Sarajevo-based company] with the approval of the federal direction. Now there is no such thing any longer, and there is no organized agency, neither in Croatia nor here. The plant is left to itself.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Despite the fact that you do not have a secured export market, you have managed to maintain production levels?

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[Sucic] Yes, in the last six months we have put the entire production capacity into operation. And we have spent a lot of money. And the question now is whether that will pay. If we are not able to place at least a minimum quantity on the market.... Still, I hope that in Croatia the policy will prevail that they must partly rely on their own production, and I believe that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will produce something for itself as well.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Maybe the problem is in the fact that the eastern system of production in Croatia and in the federation will no longer be appropriate, with regard to the proclaimed turning to the NATO systems?

[Sucic] No, no: Russian weapons, which are of good quality and very, very simple must by no means be underestimated. Therefore I believe that Croatia should take over a part of the production of the former JNA, which can be done without difficulty. For it is entirely understandable that it does not pay to develop expensive guided rocket systems because that is exceptionally expensive and takes a long time, and the entire necessary arsenal can be bought for less money than we would spend on developing those weapons.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What in that case should the Croatian military industry be based on?

[Sucic] Well, on products that are used in big amounts, on artillery — that should be produced. This is not the time to produce a Strela 10 or Stinger. Those are resources that require a strong industry, a financially powerful state, and a huge market. Here we produce 122mm ammunition for howitzers, 128mm for multiple rocket launchers, and 120mm mortar shells, and for defense one needs nothing else. Apart from that, one needs some aviation and a few powerful anti-aircraft systems, and that is it.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] All right, but Vitezit also produces explosives for other purposes as well. What about that aspect of production?

[Sucic] True, together with explosives for economic purposes we also used to produce military detonating fuse, which hardly differs from the civilian type. In Vitezit we can produce 15-20 kilos of that fuse a day. Those are capacities for products intended for the mining and building markets. We also have the capacity to produce annually 15,000 metric tons of various sorts of explosive. And in my opinion that is where the future of Vitezit lies. But, one has to react fast there because our technology is already getting out of date.

One Million German Marks

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Does that also imply money for the acquisition of new technology?

[Sucic] We can satisfy the needs and the criteria even without that. We now expect the market to expand as reconstruction starts, and that is why I insisted on the constant updating of those operations for the production of economic explosives, and particularly on updating nitration operations. It is precisely that part of our plant that places Vitezit in the leading position in such production on the entire Balkan territory. A small number of countries in Europe has such factories for nitration — these are France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, England, and Russia, and to a small degree Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, as much as Russians allowed them. And here, in Vitez, we have three factories for nitration. And only one of them, for a good capacity of five metric tons of nitroglycerine for economic explosives, should work only one hour a day.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What sort of investments would Vitezit need in that case?

[Sucic] At the moment we do not really need investments, because we have made the plant completely capable of production. What we need most is working capital, so as to be able to work normally.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] You said that the system of negotiation and representation through the state does not function any longer. Yet have you been given any promises, has anybody shown that the state cares about Vitezit?

[Sucic] They are behind us only declaratively, but concretely, in reality, nobody has offered us any money until now. And the only thing we need is a fair loan, not usurious ones with a 5-percent monthly interest rate. Somebody has to stand behind us. Because, we pay 6,000 German marks just for the transportation of one cistern of acid from Hungary, and the total value of the goods is only 13,000 German marks. So how can that pay? And we are forced to do that in order to appear on the market. True, it is the Croatian defense ministry that did that for us, it is a sort of advance payment for them, but that amount will be calculated once we deliver the goods.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What amount would satisfy Vitezit at the moment?

[Sucic] Let us say that 1 million German marks is the minimum that we need to buy raw materials for a one-month production cycle. And the outstanding debts that have to be paid to us at the moment amount to around 1 million German marks as well.

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[Box, p 9]

The Mayor of Vitez, Franjo Rajkovic, About Vitezit: "Outstanding Debts Should Be Cashed"

[Rajkovic] Vitezit means very much to this municipality, for two main reasons: It employs many people, or rather it employed many people before the war, and it is very interesting in what it produces. That is why we often say that without Vitezit there is no Vitez, because for us it is, first of all, an important economic subject.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] How can financial support for Vitezit be secured?

[Rajkovic] When we talk about the status of Vitezit and the role of the federation, we have to say the following: Vitezit is in the hands of Croats, and we have fought fiercely to defend that. Further, I believe that we are the ones who should organize production in Vitezit. By all means, the government of the Croat Republic [HR] of Herzeg-Bosnia should also take part in solving the status of Vitezit. We will not make any important moves without the compliance of the government of the HR of Herzeg-Bosnia, and that of the Republic of Croatia.

When it comes to financial support, it would be important to cash those outstanding debts that customers had toward Vitezit before and over the course of the war. That would mean very much.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What is the municipality of Vitez undertaking at the moment?

[Rajkovic] First of all, we are trying to find a way to secure payment for those who are working there today. Then, we are trying to cash the outstanding debts of a later date from some institutions, in the first place the ministry of defense. We are also looking for a means of knowing when and what will be paid in future. As for possible support from banks, it is quite understandable that banks have no guarantees that the investment will be profitable and the money paid back on time. I wish to point out that momentarily there are no misunderstandings about interests and relationships in governing Vitezit both by the HR Herzeg-Bosnia and by us here, but we wish to make things more concrete so as to start production completely. We wish to take a step forward.

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UN Computers With Human Rights Data Stolen

AU1701082996 Paris AFP in English 0114 GMT 17 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Jan 16 (AFP)—Computers that may contain sensitive information on Croatian human rights abuses were stolen from a United Nations office in Zagreb, UN spokesperson Sylvana Foa said Tuesday [16 January].

The theft occurred overnight Friday in two small buildings that house UN human rights monitors who were gathering information on possible abuses that took place when the Croatian army retook the Serb enclave of Krajina in August.

Two desk-top computers, two portable computers, two photocopiers and two telephones were stolen, said Foa.

The two portable computers could contain transcripts of recent interviews with Serb civilians who discussed "looting, burning of houses, evictions" at the hands of Croatian soldiers, said Foa.

She added that the theft may have been carried out by UN personnel as a pass was required to enter the complex.

Commentary Views Granic Belgrade Visit, Prevlaka

AU1701090296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 p 5

[Commentary by Ivkica Bacic: "Unsatiated Serb Appetites"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is this a time-out intended to bridge the gap that has come about after the mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY, having been announced in Dayton and buried in Paris, because of Serb-Montenegrin claims to Prevlaka? Or is it just a testing of ground, which, in view of last year's one-month socializing at the U.S. military base, could beseen more as a deadlock, rather than a step forward in Zagreb's and Belgrade's getting closer to each other? Or is it simply a move which Croatian and Serbian officials were mildly pushed to do by the United States (the Zagreb talks between Granic [Croatian Foreign Minister] and Jovanovic [Serbian Foreign Minister] in November 1994 were organized by former peace mediators, Owen and Stoltenberg, remember?), whose President Clinton is paying a short visit to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina later this week?

This very triangle is the point of intersection of early reactions to the visit of Granic, Croatian foreign minister, to Belgrade, where he was hosted by the FRY's Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, and where he also met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Official statements from one and the other side do not reveal much. The desire for full normalization of relations is being stressed, support for the Dayton accord is being expressed, as well as for implementation of the Zagreb-Erdut agreement, more expeditious handling of probate of will left by the deceased SFRY is being announced, and it is being particularly insisted on resolving painful issues regarding missing and imprisoned persons. And of course, much of the time is being spent discussing traffic, telecommunications, oil pipelines, and other issues which contribute to the two states' rapprochement.

However, one should not be so naive as to draw any visionary conclusions from the fact that journalists need to use tongs to extract any sort of information from the mouths of participants in the Belgrade talks about the mutual recognition, disputed Prevlaka issue, or the Croatian Danube basin, which is to say, about topics that are real, exclusively Serb-made stumbling blocks on the road to what is called normalization of relations. True, those tongs are more applicable to the members of the Croatian delegation, since the Serbian side, particularly on the eve of Granic's arrival, quite clearly stated its attitude. In that sense, the statement made by Milutinovic's deputy Radoslav Bulajic and the report on the talks aired by the Belgrade television are significant.

Bulajic said that in state relations between the two countries, not yet officially established, there were disputed questions originating from the Dayton accords! According to Bulajic, disputed are the entire implementation of the Zagreb-Erdut agreement and the Prevlaka issue, that is, tripartite exchange of territory in Dubrovnik's hinterland! This does not smell like what Karadzic's Serbs are doing in Sarajevo to undermine the Dayton-Paris peace accord. This simply stinks—like Krajisnik's overt threats that isolated terrorist actions by dissatisfied Serbs against Sarajevo and Sarajevans will be happening as long as the world is disregarding their demand to postpone (until as late as September) their relinquishing the whole of Sarajevo to the Sarajevo government.

Did Bulajic thereby make it clear to Croatia that the FRY will not recognize it unless Zagreb presents it with Prevlaka? Or, perhaps, that Belgrade will not withdraw from the Croatian Danube basin unless Zagreb gives up a part of the Croatian Adriatic coast? And, what is actually hiding behind the diplomatic phrase heard on the Serbian state television, that the Serbian side insists on observation of agreed principles and a realistic compromise for both countries—regarding Prevlaka?

Ivan Simonovic, aide to our foreign minister, has confirmed what is already known, which is that Granic did not go to Belgrade solely to reopen road communica-

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tions. After all, after the basic framework agreement reached in Dayton, Ohio, there are experts from both sides who are in charge of that sort of job. Which is to say, the Croats have paid a return visit to discuss the mutual recognition in the first place, about which, according to Simonovic, no precise deadlines have been set, and also to discuss Prevlaka, "where we have firmly stuck to our stance that it is part of Croatia," as he put it. "But," Simonovic points out, explaining the coincidence that our Ambassador to the United Nations Mario Nobilo announced on Monday [8 January] that Croatia agrees to keeping military observers at Prevlaka even after 15 January, "with this we have shown once more our good will, and we are ready to discuss demilitarization of a broader region around Prevlaka."

If we add to this unambiguous proof of Croatian goodwill to normalize relations with Serbia and Montenegro the recent amnesty of several hundred Serbs captured during and after Operation Storm, the fact is becoming even more obvious that no similar moves made by the other side have yet occurred. But what regularly occurs, even in official circles, are claims laid to Croatian territory, which is evidenced by Bulajic's statement. After all, Serbia's stubborn refusal to recognize the Croatian internationally recognized borders cannot be viewed in a different way. It is, contrary to Croatian signs of good will, a sign of unsatiated appetite for our land. This cannot be concealed, not even by this diplomatic attempt to represent the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations solely as a matter of high state politics.

Daily: Belgrade Orders Refugees Into E. Slavonia

AU1601163396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by B. Vrbosic: "Another 5,000 Serbs To Arrive in Baranja"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Osijek—Rebel Serbs have not been idle in the last few days while waiting for the UN Security Council to pass the Resolution on the Reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem. On the contrary, they have stepped up efforts to hinder or at least rechannel the peace process in the direction of their desired goal. On Thursday [11 January], the so-called Beli Manastir municipality executive council, headed by Vaso Zigic, established that some 5,000 Serbs need to be urgently settled in Baranja, and that the process could begin the following day.

The settling of the "Srem-Baranja region" was also addressed by members of its newly established "executive council" headed by Boro Drzaic. There can be no doubt that this policy is being dictated from Belgrade, which in this way gets rid of the "Krajisniks [people from the Krajina]." This is confirmed by the fact that recently pardoned Croatian Serbs were clearly told that there was no room for them in Serbia and that they have to move to that "region."

Just how the rebel Serbs are "preparing" for peaceful reintegration is illustrated by Drzaic's announcement that all Serbs who have moved to the occupied part of eastern Croatia can get all the necessary personal documents, irrespective of the fact that there are many specific cases. Since in the past few months the Bosnian Serbs have also increasingly started moving to eastern Croatia, it is clear that they too are probably being granted "legitimacy." Namely, these activities conducted by the rebel Serbs show how they plan to implemented Point 7 of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem ("All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the area and live there in safety. All persons who either left or moved to the area and who were earlier permanent residents of Croatia have the right to live in the area.").

UN Administrator Jacques Paul Klein will be met in the occupied part of Croatia by at least several thousand more Serbs with "proper personal documents" than there were on 12 November 1995, when the Basic Agreement was signed. This will, of course, further complicate the return of real refugees because, for example, Baranja has been settled by almost as many Serbs as there were Croats and Hungarians prior to expulsion and a further 5,000 Serbs will only complicate Klein's mission. To this we need to add that in the past two months, 154 Croats have been expelled from Baranja, while 782 people were expelled in 1995.

After four months, on Thursday the representatives of the rebel Serbs met again with British Ambassador Gavin W. Hewitt. "Watermelon merchant" Milan Milanovic, who can for a few more days sport the title of so-called chief of the negotiating team, told Hewitt that he had comments on two points of the draft resolution. Since he is not too "strong on words," he only said: "We did not agree on the International War Crimes Tribunal and demilitarization. That would be all." This, namely, refers to the proposal that the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES] troops should cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal; many of the rebel Serbs know that they will find themselves listed on the court's warrants and that demilitarization needs to be completed within 30 days of the deployment of 5,000 UN troops. The local journalists' main concern was whether UNTAES would have the right to use force or whether it would remain as ineffectual as it had been previously.

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Released Krajina Serbs Accuse Croats of Torture

LD1201130896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1156 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 12 (TANJUG)—The Serbs who were incarcerated in prisons in Split, Zadar and Karlovac, after Croatia's August aggression on the western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina, were exposed to various forms of torture.

Testimonies to that effect were given by Serbs from a group of 104 who arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Thursday. They were amnestied, together with 246 prisoners, by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman just before new year.

Predrag Markelic, 24, from the village of Knin, said that the Croatian Army arrested him and nine of his companions, on August 6, at the time of the aggression on the former U.N.-protected sectors south and north.

"Five of my friends were killed right away by the Croats, and we were taken to the Knin Barracks where we were beaten all the time they kept us there for 37 days," he said.

Markelic said that during the five months spent in investigative custody in prisons in Zadar and Split, the Croats tortured him and forced Serbs by different means to confess their alleged guilt.

"They tortured us in different ways which are unspeakable, and even used electricity in order to extract confessions, but we did not confess anything. One old man, over 70 years old, who was taken away from his home, was accused of rape," Markelic told reporters and relatives gathered around him.

He said that there were still 48 of his companions in the prison where he was incarcerated in Split, one of the eight or nine prisons there, and put the total number of Serbs incarcerated during the August aggression at around 700. His estimate was confirmed by a number of Krajina Serbs.

Mladic from the surroundings of Knin, who like most others did not wish to say his name because "many of my compatriots are still in prisons in Split, and I have relatives in Croatia on whom the Croatian authorities could take revenge," said that those who were on the list of the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) were relatively better off.

Janko Kozic from Petrinja said that in the prison in Zagreb, where he was confined since August last year, there were still around 300 Serbs. Kozic was amnestied together with 47 other people, some of them older than 70. They were accused of "armed revolt against the state."

Milan Grahovac, 57, from the village of Latin nearby Ogulin, said that he was arrested together with six of his villagers during the August offensive of the Croatian Army and taken to Sisak, where he was subjected to bloody beatings during four days and nights.

He was then transferred to Zagreb, to the prison of Remetinac where the beatings stopped.

Grahovac was sentenced last month to four years of prison, but was transferred after the amnesty to Gasince (eastern Croatia).

There the Croats, after a visit by ICRC officials, allowed even journalists to talk with the imprisoned Serbs. But, those who told journalists that they had been tortured were later beaten, Grahovac said.

Of a total of 350 people, brought in on January 2 from different Croatian prisons to the reception center in Gasince near Osijek, 38 decided to stay on in Croatia, and 312 said they wanted to go to Yugoslavia and be reunited with their families.

The ICRC organized Thursday the transfer of the first group of amnestied Serbs to Belgrade, and the remaining 208 persons are expected to arrive in Yugoslavia tomorrow.

Serb Official Discusses Srem Baranja Situation

AU1601173996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the decision of the UN Security Council [UNSC], Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the Srem-Baranja Region Council, said that the number of soldiers can both be greater or smaller, but what is important is that they have a composition and equipment to enable them to prevent an attempt by Croatia at any time, irrespective of whether it is an aggression or a provocation.

[Begin Dokmanovic recording] What is important is that the international community forces Croatia, above all with political means, to refrain from starting any more military actions on these territories.

Regarding the establishment of the administration, as far as it can be seen from the resolution, all our demands have been accepted, that is, the text of the basic agreement was accepted and the resolution agrees [biti u kontekstu] with what had been signed.

We are going to respect this agreement and are not asking for anything more than what has been written in the agreement. However, we are not going to agree to anything less than what is written there and are not going to allow anything that does not fit into the basic

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agreement to be implemented here without our consent, and we have also very clearly let the international community know that.

Regarding the name that the administration, that is, the mission, was given, and in which eastern Slavonia is mentioned, this is a game that has unfortunately been accepted by the international community and that Croatia has presented very skillfully to the international public. It is known that Slavonia has never been on the Danube River, that Srem and Baranja are on the Danube River, and that this is an attempt to virtually erase two geographic names, that is, Baranja and Srem.

However, this is less important now. We are still functioning as the Srem-Baranja Region. Our institutions that we have established remain, that is, the Regional Council, the Regional Executive Council, the municipal assemblies, and their executive councils. It has been established by the agreement that the administration should control the way we work and the way we implement the generally known and accepted principles of international law, including the respect for human rights.

In any case, it is most important for us that the resolution has at no point disagreed with or included something not in compliance with the signed agreement.

I hope that the international community, that is, the administration that is going to be here, will behave in conformity with the resolution and, considering that the agreement obligates both sides, Croatian and Serbian, in these two years, that is, one plus one year, we shall see how the sides will behave and how they will respect individual stipulations of the agreement. The decision on the future of the region will certainly be made at the end of the term on the basis of the respect for and the implementation of the agreement. [end recording]

Zagreb Mayor-Elect Discusses Election Process

AU1001191896 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with Goran Granic, unconfirmed mayor of Zagreb and prefect of Zagreb County, by Anita Malenica; place and date not given: "It is Tudjman's Turn, But We Have Our Aces!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Goran Granic is the newly elected Zagreb mayor and prefect of Zagreb County. He succeeded in being elected at the second attempt. However, since according to the law the prefect and mayor of Zagreb has to be confirmed by the president of the Republic of Croatia, we still need to wait another fortnight. On the other hand, according to the Zagreb City Council, Goran Granic was appointed mayor on Tuesday, 2 January 1996. However, there are certain political obstacles to his taking up the post. Here is what Mayor Granic had to say about the situation:

[Granic] As far as my taking over the post of mayor and prefect in Zagreb is concerned, I will act pursuant to the law and the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which I am obliged to observe. In talks with former Mayor Branko Miksa I have learned that views differ regarding when I am to take over as mayor because of the political controversy surrounding my election. There is only one course of action for me to follow: I have agreed with Miksa that I will request consultations with the prime minister and cabinet ministers so that we can hear an adequate interpretation of the law. The Zagreb City Council has passed a decision to make the appointment effective on the day of the decision, that is, 2 January 1996; therefore, I should have taken over on Wednesday, but there are problems and I do not wish to do anything by force.

[Malenica] It took a month and two attempts for you to become Zagreb mayor and it still needs President Tudjman's confirmation?

[Granic] Correct. I became mayor on the second attempt and I do not know whether more, perhaps a third or fourth attempt, will be needed. The process is now progressing according to the legal procedure; I am not dwelling on it because everyone will make a decision within the framework of his responsibility.

The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] Cannot Stand the Opposition

[Malenica] Do you believe that the president will confirm you as prefect and mayor of Zagreb, since for the past month the HDZ has been dissatisfied that you were the mayoral candidate?

[Granic] The fact that I was a candidate for mayor has nothing to do with it. The atmosphere of animosity created by the HDZ would have been directed at anyone from the opposition. At the Zagreb City Council session on 2 January, Tomac was declared a non-Croat, a petty Croat, and a servant of the past regime. This, I have to admit, is somewhat strange, because if anyone has personnel from the former regime within their ranks, it is the HDZ. The circumstances are such that they fell upon me, but I do not believe that it is the individual, but rather the principle that the mayor cannot be anyone from the opposition and must be an HDZ man. True, a day before the City Council session, the HDZ proposed that the candidate should be an individual who is not affiliated with any party, whom, incidentally, they did not even consult on the issue.

[Malenica] Is there any truth to HDZ statements that the opposition was uncooperative and that it did not want

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to cooperate with the HDZ on the issue of constituting the city administration in Zagreb?

[Granic] We wanted to help the HDZ the whole time. Our proposal was to sign an interparty agreement on not taking over councillors [nepreuzimanju vijecnika], that is, we did not want to turn an immoral occurrence into a social value. [sentence as published] We wanted to stay within the framework of election results, the way the Zagreb citizens wanted. We also offered the HDZ to form a coalition with us in the executive authority in Zagreb and to make this applicable throughout the Republic of Croatia. We could not offer more than that because we do not have the moral right! We are obliged to do so by the election results and the citizens who supported us the whole time. We could not let the HDZ have executive power in Zagreb because we do not have the right!

[Malenica] Similar situations have occurred in many European states. One party held power at the state level, but the capital was in the hands of the opposition. Do you believe that the HDZ will accept the will of the voters in Zagreb or will they again try for an annulment? What exactly is it that the Croatian president has against the opposition nominating the mayor?

[Granic] In a normal state, and I hope that, if we are not one now, we shall soon become one, the rules of the game between the state, local administration and self-management, and the prime minister and the state, are governed by laws and, if everyone does his job, they are responsible for their work and its consequences. The most important thing is that everyone should observe the Constitution and the laws and work within the framework of his authority.

The President's Risk

[Malenica] Do you believe that we shall have new elections in Zagreb if the president refuses to confirm your appointment and decides to appoint an administrator for the city which the Council will refuse to confirm?

[Granic] These are all realistic possibilities, but what will actually happen is in doubt. It is President Tudjman's turn, but we have our arguments and future moves planned. We have tried as much as possible to adhere to the institutions of the political system, constitutional and legal possibilities, taking care that the situation does not affect the functioning of the city. Even today, we still want the situation to remain under control. We shall make moves that will be to the citizens' advantage.

[Malenica] In your opinion, what is the main reason for the immense fear of the opposition having power in Zagreb? The president has announced that he cannot allow the opposition to have power in the capital. In addition to issues of a political nature, could this have something to do with the fact that the opposition would get an insight into the finances of the city administration?

[Granic] It would be unfair of me to pass judgment on this issue at the moment. I do not wish to do this! It is hard to say whether this is a psychological problem in the HDZ or whether they have trouble facing the fact that one system of rule is collapsing, or whether this is irrational and capricious. President Tudjman is taking a great risk. I hope that he is aware that the HDZ must change its working methods and adhere to democratic rules if we wish to enter the circle of democratic states.

[Malenica] Does this mean that the opposition, by insisting on its right to nominate the mayor and Zagreb City Council chairman, is de facto insisting on introducing wider democracy in Croatia?

[Granic] Democracy is a process and not something that depends on one man. All citizens participate in this process; moreover, the process also includes political culture and tolerance, and honest rules of the game. No one is denying that the HDZ has the greatest number of councillors on the Council in terms of individuals. They nominated their candidates, but they did not succeed. They have exercised their democratic right and we have exercised ours.

That is why I believe that our perseverance and insistence on observing the law contributes to the creation of a democratic Croatia. The only complaint that I have is that I have been exposed to strange propaganda that is closer to Stalin's times than ours. It is strange first to be denounced as an enemy and then asked to cooperate. I received messages that I should first relinquish the post of mayor and that all charges would be dropped and I would be well taken care of.

[Malenica] Is it interesting that you were acceptable as the deputy prime minister in the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia, yet you could not make it as mayor despite the fact that when you were appointed deputy prime minister in the Sabor your alleged activities on "destroying the HDZ and the state" were already known?

[Granic] The HDZ leadership has known about my so-called anti-HDZ activities for over two years. The plan of which they accused me is my stance on the HDZ dating back to the time when I was concerned about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and did not see a way out; I do not believe that certain things can be changed without a change in the balance of political power. At the time I realized that only a new parliamentary majority could correct the policy conducted by Croatia, which would

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lead to a catastrophe. Fortunately for all of us, the war with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina stopped and an agreement was signed. I was relieved after all that. [passage omitted]

Majority Opposes Tudjman Decision on City Mayor

AU1501112996

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zagreb GLOBUS carries on pages 4 and 5 of its 12 January edition a poll conducted among 400 "Zagreb citizens" under the title: "The Croatian Democratic Community's Greatest Electoral Swindle is Approaching: The Opposition Will Have To Strictly Control Every Poll Station in Zagreb If It Wishes To Prevent the Rigging of Results." The poll shows that "the majority of citizens do not support President Tudjman's policy on the election of the mayor of Zagreb."

The results are as follows:

Do you approve of the Croatian Government's suggestion to President Tudjman not to confirm Goran Granic's appointment as mayor of Zagreb?

	Percent
Yes	28
No	59.1
Do not know	12.9

Do you support appointment by the government of an administrator for Zagreb?

	Percent
Yes	25.7
No	60.9
Do not know	13.4

Do you agree with Dr. Mate Granic's decision to vote against his brother?

	Percent
Yes	25.1
No	58.3
Do not know	16.6

Who would you vote for in elections?

	Percent
HDZ	27.7
Coalition	51.7
HSP	3.4
Do not know	17.2

National Bank President Views Financial Market

AU1601181896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 96 pp 12-13

[Interview with Pero Jurkovic, president of the Croatian National Bank, by Deana Knezevic; place and date not given: "Kuna Will Remain Stable in 1996 Too"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. Pero Jurkovic, the president of the Croatian National Bank, still claims that there is no choice between economic growth and stability. It is a fact that two years after the national currency was stabilized, his house is still from time to time a target of criticism since it has not reached the desired development of economy in the meantime. Monetary policy cannot initiate permanent development on its own, it can neither stop nor postpone the process of war, the governor said in an interview for VECERNJI LIST, in which he answered questions about new measures taken by monetary authorities, about the control function of the Croatian National Bank, and prospects for the kuna in 1996.

[Knezevic] Why has the regulation been revoked that a part of the hard-currency savings in Croatia have to be deposited in foreign banks?

(Jurkovic) There are two regulations: one about the obligation of banks to redeposit a certain percentage of hard-currency savings abroad, and the other about the maintenance of a certain proportion between short-term hard-currency claims and short-term hard-currency debts. These two regulations are complementary. Their purpose is to enable the banks to remain solvent in hard currencies as well as to perform regular services with citizen' hard-currency deposits. It is understandable that these "compulsory hard-currency reserves" reduce the loan potential of banks and make financial mediation more expensive (they raise the interest rate), but the reserves must be kept in order to achieve the basic aim I have mentioned. This measure, as well as the obligation of our banks to export capital at low rates, is often criticized, since they have to borrow the money deposited in foreign banks later on at higher interest rates. This is true to a certain degree but, as I said,

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also inevitable if we want to avoid insolvency in banks, in other words, we want them to regularly meet their hard-currency liabilities. It must be added that banks with deposits abroad have some options they would otherwise not have regarding obtaining new loans, confirmation of letters of credit, and so on. In other words, these deposits are in most cases not big losses for banks. The question of which is the optimum sum that should be redeposited remains open, however. This depends on circumstances such as the general situation in the economy and banking, the amount of hard-currency reserves of the country, and so on. Having estimated that these circumstances are better now than at the time when this regulation was adopted and that the level of hard-currency reserves has increased, the Croatian National Bank adopted in the latest meeting of its Council the decision to revoke the obligation to redeposit hard currencies for time accounts exceeding two years. The percentage of the relation between short-term claims and short-term hard-currency debts has been reduced from 55 to 53 percent. This will raise the credit rating of banks and reduce the costs of their mediation in financial transactions. Apart from that, it will stimulate banks to encourage longer time accounts. Even if all other circumstances had allowed it, it would not have been possible to release a higher percentage of the aforementioned amounts because of their possible effects on the macro economy, on the growth of aggregates of capital and the growth of demand. [passage omitted]

[Knezevic] The trend to depreciate the kuna seems to have been interrupted. How can this be explained, and to what extent is this a result of measures taken regarding the sterilization of the money mass?

[Jurkovic] The kuna has essentially been very stable during the last two years. Although the exchange rate is not frozen, it has oscillated only between 3.58 and 3.72 kuna to the German mark during the aforementioned period. Regarding a minor depreciation that began in May 1995, which was felt at the end of August and through September, it was first of all a result of speculation about an alleged forthcoming devaluation. We did not want to interrupt the exchange-rate development that resulted from the supply and demand on the hard-currency market, but we wanted to avoid sharp jumps resulting from the aforementioned speculations. It was enough for the central bank to make small interventions on the hard-currency market and to pursue a somewhat harder monetary policy, and these oscillations were calmed. If we had been confronted with a deep imbalance and strong disturbances on the hard-currency market, we would not have been able to remove them with our measures.

[Knezevic] The trade balance deficit is still rising, however. The central bank has carried out an inquiry about it and obtained interesting information on the reasons for that deficit....

[Jurkovic] The trade balance deficit is something completely normal for a country like ours, a country in transition and reconstruction. Apart from that, our country has a surplus in the sub-balance of invisible exports and transfers, so that it can bear that deficit. Therefore the balance of current transactions accounts in the balance of payments is much more relevant. The 1995 deficit in the current transactions account will be somewhat higher than $1 billion, in contrast to two years ago, when a surplus of around $100 million was achieved. This will primarily be a result of the trade balance deficit and the especially rapid growth of imports and the failure to reach the usual surplus in the sub-balance of services and transfers. Counting on a stronger revival of economic activities and initiation of the investment cycle already in 1995, which was not achieved for well-known reasons, our importers imported more than was possible, so to speak.

At the same time, there was no tourism, so that there was no hard-currency inflow, which had been expected to reach $500 million. [passage omitted]

[Knezevic] Will the central bank rely to a greater degree on foreign loans and the support of the International Monetary Fund?

[Jurkovic] The National Bank of Croatia will not incur debts abroad, apart from taking the regular installments to which it is entitled according to agreements made with the International Monetary Fund. The National Bank of Croatia could make debts only with the aim of filling up its hard-currency reserves, and this is not necessary, since its reserves are big enough. [passage omitted]

[Knezevic] What do you think about the increasing number of new banks that have been founded in Croatia?

[Jurkovic] We inherited a very narrow and a very shallow financial market. It consisted practically only of banks, social funds, and several insurance companies. Banks did not function in the normal sense of the word, either. They were institutions for the performance of financial services for the redistribution of accumulation, which was directed by debtors, and not creditors, they were under the strong influence of the state and almost all of them made transactions with a very bad balance. By establishing the market economy, the problem of banking industry development was raised too. Old banks were engaged in transactions inherited from the past,

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and they could not respond to new requirements. This means that room was created for establishing new, primarily private, banks. Because of a very scarce supply of capital and the incapability of "inherited," socially-owned banks to meet the requirements, banking became a very lucrative business. Under the "umbrella" of an expensive financial mediation offered by inert and inefficient banks, the number of banks doubled within a very short period of time. [passage omitted]

[Knezevic] Old banks entered privatization burdened with foreign debts and controversial claims. Although there are many new banks, interest rates have not fallen....

[Jurkovic] Yes, that is what I was talking about. We must know that the concentration in the Croatian banking is very high. Two big banks alone have more than 50 percent of all the assets the banking sector has, and six of them have even more than 70 percent. Under these circumstances elements of monopolistic behavior are almost inevitable. Apart from that, these banks do not have enough assets, they are burdened with a surplus of employees and other elements of inefficient business, so that it can hardly be imagined that they could offer their mediating services at lower rates. On the other hand, newly established banks are not burdened with problems from the past and they profit from the situation: They make big profits, because they require the same money for their mediation as the "old" banks. In other words, in a situation in which the banking sector is dominated by several big banks with predominantly bad assets, and which are, so to say, "impeded" by their old clients—mostly big and inefficient companies ready to take any loan, with the bank bearing an especially high risk that the loan will never be paid back, in other words the creditor is absolutely unprotected—we cannot speak about real competition, and interests can hardly be lower than they are. And the present interest rates are really prohibitive.

[Knezevic] How is the Regulation on Restriction of Loans for Bank Owners being implemented? How many banks have directly violated that regulation, and how have they been punished?

[Jurkovic] According to present regulations, the stockholders who have more than 10 percent of stocks in a bank may be granted a loan only if this is unanimously decided by the bank management, with the previous consent of its supervising committee. In 1994 these loans were granted by 27 banks to a total amount of 673 million kuna. Checks made so far have shown that everything was lawful. In order to restrict this practice, the government has adopted a regulation that makes it possible for such stockholders to obtain a loan to an amount of not more than 5 percent of the capital resources of the bank. The total amount of all these loans must not exceed 30 percent of the capital resources of the bank. According to present knowledge, this regulation has not been violated as yet.

[Knezevic] What kind of monetary policy can be expected in 1996?

[Jurkovic] I can say that the policy of the stable currency will be applied, which means that it is expected that prices will rise at approximately the same rate as in industrial countries, which are our most important trade partners. The exchange rate will be stable, but not frozen; it could oscillate within narrow limits of plus or minus several percent compared to the present level.

Monetary policy will inhibit any kind of inflationary financing from the primary issue. Through its more flexible adaptation to legitimate demand for money it will at the same time open possibilities for the expected quick economic growth. I would like to repeat that growth will not rely on inflationary financing but on better possibilities for more commodities and-money transactions. It is expected that the GNP will considerably rise—in the real not only in the nominal sense—and that the currency will remain stable, so that the growth of aggregates of capital could approach the 1995 level. It is predicted that more foreign capital will flow into the country, so that its possible effects on the exchange rate will have to be neutralized with normal sterilization methods—with an increase in imports and a more flexible exchange rate. Whether monetary policy will be restrictive or not will depend on how expansive fiscal policy will be, that is on whether the latter will remain within the limits of the planned budget deficit.

[Box, p 12]

New Banks With "Old" Capital?

[Knezevic] Is it true that newly established banks, with some exceptions, have been established with the capital of the old?

[Jurkovic] I do not think so. There are seven sub-banks established by their main banks, but there are many more that have been established by other persons. It can, however, happen that capital stock partially stems from the "old" banks' capital. We do not have reliable evidence that this practice is dominant.

[Box, p 12]

A New Arrangement With the IMF

[Knezevic] What is the nature of the new three-year arrangement with the IMF, and which obligations will

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result from it for the National Bank of Croatia and which for the government and the Croatian Parliament?

[Jurkovic] This arrangement is first of all aimed at the structural reforms we want to carry out in the next three years. Admittedly, some global, macro economic criteria will remain that will have to be met by the government, that is its institutions and the National Bank; as for example those that refer to the growth of the aggregates of capital, the allowed budget deficit and the way in which it will be financed, the control of salaries in the public sector, and similar. The program counts on structural changes and development under the conditions of the stability already achieved, which we do not want to put at risk.

When I speak about structural changes, I mean restructuring and reorganization of a certain number of companies, mostly those that generate losses, and banks. I also refer to the restructuring of budget spending, the acceleration of privatization, the reform of social insurance and the whole social security system, the promotion of the job market, the reform of the customs protection system and the foreign trade regime, the improvement of legal protection, development of financial institutions, financial markets, and instruments as well as the strengthening of financial discipline, and a better protection of creditors in this context, changes in payment transactions and so on.

[Box, p 13]

Foreign Banks in Croatia

[Knezevic] What is the present influence of foreign banks on the Croatian banking system, and are both sides interested in their being better represented on the Croatian market?

[Jurkovic] It can be claimed that the influence of foreign banks has more or less been indirect up to now. It must be pointed out, however, that the conditions under which our companies and banks make business with foreign banks are increasingly favorable. Deposits for the opening of "credit lines," the confirmation of letters of credit, issuing of guarantees etc. are either smaller or are not required at all. This is naturally a consequence of the general improvement of the Croatian image in the world, which it has acquired on the basis of its recent achievements, and it has achieved very much in both the political and economic sense. Regarding the interest for opening foreign banks—including branch offices and sub banks or subsidiaries—it can be said that it is growing. Apart from the Raiffeisenbank from Vienna, which has already opened a branch office in Zagreb, there is already an application from a reputable French bank, the Societe General. The IFC [International Finance Corporation] with a group of banks gathered around Cassa di Risparmio from Trieste, the Deutsche Bank from Frankfurt, the Creditanstalt from Vienna etc. have already announced their arrival. We are interested in their arrival so as to strengthen bank competition and attract foreign capital.

Details of Croatia's First Submarine Reported

LD1601214396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatia's first submarine, the Velebit, was launched at a Split shipyard today. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The submarine Velebit is 21 meters long and 2.7 meters wide and can submerge up to 120 meters. The crew numbers six to 10, and the two engines give it a maximum speed of eight knots. Velebit is an important step in the modernization and combat readiness of the Croatian Navy. This is an important and huge success for the Split shipbuilders, who today announced construction of a new series of these and other vessels for our navy.

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Gligorov, Slovenia's Kucan Discuss Cooperation

AU1701073396 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Report by S.J. and D.C. on news conference by President Kiro Gligorov and Slovene President Milan Kucan in Skopje on 16 January: "Common Wish—EU Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, arrived in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] on a one-day working visit. During his stay in Skopje, the Slovene president met and held long discussions with his host, President Kiro Gligorov, during which they exchanged opinions on questions and problems of common interest to the two countries. The discussions of the two presidents were also attended by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and the ambassadors of the two countries, Jozica Puhar and Dimitar Mircev.

"This is a very important meeting, a meeting of friends with whom we waged a joint struggle for the independence of Slovenia and Macedonia," President Gligorov pointed out at the news conference at which both presidents informed correspondents about the contents of their talks, emphasizing that there are good and friendly relations between Macedonia and Slovenia, and that trade between the two states is far more developed compared to the other countries.

In assessing his visit as friendly, Kucan told the correspondents that this is not just because of his friendship with Gligorov, but also friendship with Macedonia, and that this friendship must be permanently fostered, revitalized, and developed.

"Slovenia is in fourth place on the list of countries with which we have a developed exchange," said Gligorov. "In this regard, we have signed a number of joint agreements for cooperation, and it is obvious that there is the need to sign new contracts, on which we will hold further discussions.

"The second matter is our joint European orientation, the wish of both countries to one day find themselves together in the EU, when the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. It is certain that this will be much easier for Slovenia than for us," Gligorov said, "because it does not have to face the obstacles that we have faced, but also because, on the domestic level, they can do a lot more in the sphere of privatization and in the development of the market economy, and thus create solid currency reserves in their state. However, I sincerely hope that we will meet there together one day.

"Regarding this, we can say that we have made a step further in our mutual relations, although we had been facing numerous difficulties in the accomplishment of the agreement on tax-free exchange between our two countries. This is a big step. We are less developed than Slovenia, and how to deal with competition is really a serious problem for us. Nevertheless, this is a fact, and I believe that, with a gradual implementation of this contract until the year 2000, we will gradually decrease the taxes and we will reach a real tax-free exchange between the two countries.

"Beside the Europeanization of the Balkans, on which, I hope, we have identical or similar views, we also have good cooperation on the international plan. Whenever it is possible that we can adjust the stances of the two countries to contribute to more efficient activity on the international scene. I think that this should be continued, particularly regarding questions as the succession to the former Yugoslavia from a political and legal point of view," the Macedonian president emphasized. "We cannot be classed as secessionists, and we will make all efforts for the implementation of the principle that was accepted by the Badinter Commission and the United Nations, which is that Yugoslavia was broken up as a state and that all the republics that have been treated as states in their postwar constitutions are its successors. This also includes Yugoslavia, and we do not object to its succession, but we only object to its unique succession—and I believe that we have this right."

Continuing, Gligorov said that he had informed President Kucan about his meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, the contents of those discussions, and the existing differences, during which there had also been talks about Macedonia's relations with Bulgaria, Albania, about the Interim Accord with Greece, and about the current discussions for solving the remaining differences concerning the name. "We concluded," Gligorov said, "that we have similar or identical intentions on a global plan, and I think that this makes a solid base for the further promotion of relations with Slovenia. With the exception of that short episode in which the Yugoslav Army was forced to go out on the Slovenian border and be defeated, Slovenia and Macedonia have stayed out of the war, and this is a great achievement and knowledge that indicates that these two countries have a different attitude toward the problems."

"Macedonia," Kucan said in his statement for the correspondents, "is presently seventh on the list of Slovenia's foreign trade partners, which speaks about the quality and level of the cooperation. We discussed the problem of the [trade] imbalance, and in regarding this, we raised questions on avoiding double taxation and the protection of investments, and, understandably,

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we also discussed the establishment of our international relations with an agreement on free trade. Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek will pay an official visit to Macedonia, and we believe that many questions in our relations will be solved soon."

"Our discussions," the Slovene president pointed out, "were focused on four issues. First, the problem of the organization of life in the region of South-East Europe. Namely, with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, a new situation has been created that makes possible the ending of the war and the construction of a lasting peace on these sensitive territories. Macedonia and Slovenia, which are at the edge of the region that has been struck by war, have an interest in the normalization of the situation, and in the establishment of relations that will not lag behind the relations with other states in their quality and intensity and will be based on an equal footing and justice."

According to Kucan, they also held discussions on security and defense and, in this context, on the admission of the two countries to the European collective defense systems, as well as on EU integration. Kucan said, "Macedonia's association with a number of international institutions and organizations last autumn was received with pleasure in Slovenia." The ultimate goal is the same for all the states, and we believe that, in spite of the differences, common efforts can help with the solution of all the problems. "Slovenia's stance," Kucan added, "is that the crisis in the Balkans, which has destabilized Europe so often in the past, can only be resolved by opening up a European perspective for all nations and states that are here or that have been created with the break up of Yugoslavia." As far as the succession is concerned, Kucan said that Slovenia's view is that Yugoslavia was broken up and that all the states created since are its equal successors.

Yesterday, President Gligorov organized a lunch in honor of the high-ranking guest from Slovenia, which was also attended by Macedonian Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski.

Kucan on Relations, Succession

AU1701073096 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by M. Banov and S. Jovanovska for NOVA MAKEDONIJA and Macedonian Radio and Television; place and date not given: "Slovenia Cannot Give Up Its Markets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] My visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], is a friendly visit to President Gligorov who has returned to office after the assassination attempt against him. I am firmly convinced that friendship has to be fostered with care, and that is why this visit is primarily dedicated to him and to proving our friendship with Macedonia. In spite of this nature of the visit, the discussions encompassed cooperation, the situation in the Balkans, inclusion in the international community, and the international situation in general, and the views of our countries on most of these questions are similar.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How do you view the Balkans after the Dayton Agreement?

[Kucan] We believe that this was the most important event in international policy in the last year, because, finally, the international community, under pressure from the United States, gathered forces to end the war. You asked me about my opinion about Dayton. This is a fragile sign that announces the end of the war, a step toward peace. This is a sign of the will of the international community to provide the miserable people and the victims of war with the minimum conditions for a normal life. This is neither peace nor war as long as the United States and IFOR [Implementation Force] are present and as long as there is a will for the economic revitalization of this region. I believe that we can expect Bosnia to survive as a state, but other events can also take place.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Today, you raised the problem of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] succession in your discussions with President Gligorov. Can you tell us more exactly about the common view of Macedonia and Slovenia on this question?

[Kucan] First, there are no differences regarding the succession. Macedonia and Slovenia have firm stances that conform with the Badinter Commission's view that Yugoslavia as a state has broken up and that all the new states are its successors. All the states that have been created on the territory of former Yugoslavia, including Serbia—that is, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] —are successors to this state, but on an equal footing with all the others. This is perhaps the central question. It is not irrelevant whether we are going to solve this question alone—that is, in direct mutual contacts among the states that have been created on this territory—or whether it will be the task of an international commission or body. In my opinion, as well as in the opinion of President Gligorov, the first alternative is better.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] We have the impression that somehow, with the Dayton Agreement, the question of succession has slipped through the keyhole in favor of the FRY. Do you share the same opinion?

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[Kucan] For me, the essential fact that has to be accepted is that all the states are equal successors. Of course, Serbia—that is, the FRY—wants to inherit the seat in the United Nations, in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and so on. It is also in our interests for the FRY to become a member of all these organizations, but only after it has fulfilled the criteria for membership as a new state, the way that we, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had to.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] What are the present relations between Slovenia and the FRY?

[Kucan] Slovenia has adopted the act of recognition, but it does not mean that Slovenia will give up its stance on succession or that it legitimizes the policy of the FRY, which broke up Yugoslavia and led to violence. The intensity of the cooperation will depend on the interests of the two countries and on the equality of these interests, while the quality of cooperation will not differ from the cooperation that Slovenia has with other countries in Europe.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Today, you also discussed the economic cooperation between Slovenia and our country. What does Slovenia offer for the reduction of the imbalance in trade at the expense of Macedonia?

[Kucan] Prime Minister Drnovsek will visit the Macedonian Government and meet Prime Minister Crvenkovski. The invitation has been accepted, and we expect discussion on the solution of the most sensitive questions in our relations—the trade surplus—to be held then. The solutions are not simple, they are connected to the trade structure, and to the structure of our economies. It is a fact that Macedonian goods will be exempt of taxes that had been introduced in Slovenia, and, with this goal, we will sign an agreement on free trade that, we hope, will balance the exchange. I cannot say what the modalities will be. It will all depend on the interest in long-ranging economic cooperation. As far as I could see today, there is such an interest.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] In fact, how interested is Slovenia in developing cooperation with the other former Yugoslav republics?

[Kucan] The data shows that Slovenia realizes 65 percent of its gross national product from foreign exchange, of which three quarters is with countries of the European Union. This date speaks for itself. It must be mentioned that Slovenia has a small-scale economy, and it must be interested in cooperation with all. It is not by pure chance that Macedonia comes seventh out of Slovenia's trade partners, and therefore it cannot give up its markets in the countries that were created from the former Yugoslavia. As would be expected, the quality of the relations will not be the same as before. It all depends on the total power of the regions and on the fact that competition is open on this market, but tradition, acquaintances, and even personal relations are of great importance, and we will discover the level of interest after the agreements have been signed.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How do you assess Macedonia's present position in the Balkans and in the world in general, and how do you assess Macedonia's perspectives regarding its neighbors and further abroad?

[Kucan] I think that Macedonia's position is good. It can be viewed in an optimistic way. It has accomplished some of its existential needs as an international subject—in the last months of the last year, it was admitted to the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and, before that, the United Nations and the "Partnership for Peace." The accord with Greece, although interim, indicates a possible solution to this irrational problem, and Macedonia is on a good road to solving its relations with Albania and the FRY. This is strengthening Macedonia's position, and Slovenia, as a friendly country, will do its best for Macedonia's international position—in all aspects, not only in relation to its neighbors—for it to become a factor in international political life.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] What is your opinion about Slovenia's position in Europe, its internal political situation, and its relations with the neighbors?

[Kucan] Slovenia's goal is full integration in the EU. The first condition is the harmonization of the legislation, a reviewal of the discriminatory clauses on the property ownership rights of foreigners. Slovenia is aware that it has to fulfill this condition, because life in the EU requires this. However, this process cannot be accomplished overnight. Slovenia has already started activities in this field. The second question is the relations with Italy. Italy has practically blocked the signing of the associative agreement and has raised questions of the property of the "option-takers" [Optanti] (those who chose Italian citizenship and left the B-zone after the war). Yugoslavia solved this problem with the so-called Rome Agreement, which provides for compensation, and not the return of property. It is unusual that the Italians have raised this question.

Slovenia's domestic economic situation is good, it gives grounds for optimism and stability. However, we are facing rising unemployment and we are in kind of a transition from social security to other forms of social protection that are associated with investments. A subtle social policy is needed here. In general, this is the year of the elections. We will have parliamentarian elections in November, and they will influence the political life in Slovenia, as is customarily in parliamentarian

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democracies. Public opinion polls show that there will be no substantial changes on the political scene in Slovenia. At this moment, it is impossible to say anything about a possible coalition.

Commentary Considers Reconstruction of Government

AU1301155396 Skopje MIC in English 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The reconstruction of Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government, as it seems, will leave the frame of a possible idea, the way it was announced by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, and enter the phase of concrete activities. High-ranking party officials, from both SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the Liberal Party, although unofficially, claim that each party will contemplate this theme with the utmost seriousness. However, none of them is ready to predict when, how and if it is really going to happen this time. If it does happen, they say, it will not be so soon. And, they are probably right, if it is known what precedes it and what a real reconstruction actually implies.

We have learned that the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia will wait for the prime minister, the president of the party, to return from his trip to France, in order to open the theme in the party organs. It is generally agreed that the personnel changes in the Government are strictly under the prime minister's jurisdiction, however, it is also clear that this most powerful party in the ruling coalition will not allow matters to get out of control, due to which, of course, a strategy will have to be prepared. Even its possible directions can be sensed, and therefore, it is quite likely that the changes in the Government will be made in a different form. The Macedonian Constitution gives the prime minister the right to suggest the dismissal of a member of Government, however, then the Macedonian Parliament makes a final decision on this proposal. This could be extremely uncertain turf, especially if several ministers are in question. Therefore, it will not be surprising if what we learned to be just a theory in SDSM comes true—that the members of Government who eventually find themselves on the "black list" immediately submit their resignations. Hence, there will be no reason for Parliament to discuss the reasons and omissions, but the prime minister will simply inform about the changes he had decided to make. The SDSM is expected to add these questions to the daily agenda at the start of next week.

According to speculations in the public, many are convinced that due to the friction between the Social Democrats and the Liberals, mainly the ministers—members of LP will be encompassed with the eventual personnel changes. This is supported by the announcement that today and tomorrow, the highest bodies of this party will be discussing the pertinent interviews, remarks and comments in the public, which the part regards as very serious. As we have learned, this would be a part of the debate on the overall political situation in the country. The members of LP should adopt appropriate conclusions at these meetings, which, as they say, will be announced to the public, and which could be decisive for the future development of events, in the sense of speeding up or slowing down some processes in the functioning of the coalition.

Further Commentary

AU1601110896 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Jan 96 p 15

[Commentary by Zorica Darkovska: "There Will Be Reconstruction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The idea of government reconstruction, which Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski has recently mentioned as a possibility, has been received by the public as a fait accomplit and necessary. Some of the parties in the government's coalition are acting similarly and are seriously preparing to initiate this topic. Let us here attach the public opinion poll which evaluated negatively the work of the government so far. If we also add the differences among the coalition partners on some key questions, which cannot be hidden or softened in spite of so many attempts, then the prime minister will undoubtedly have difficulties in withdrawing his announcement, regardless of how carelessly and "unskillfully" he did this.

The assumption that reconstruction will finally take place here with us gives birth to other assumptions concerning all the activity, particularly in relation to the meaning of the word reconstruction. Some of the ministers in government state that there exists small, medium, and large reconstruction, and a large number of lawyers, with whom we have discussed, understand the term reconstruction as substantial changes and not just one to two personnel changes. In the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] the following is written: The prime minister can suggest reshuffling one member of the government. The Assembly can decide to abolish a member of the government at its next session. If the prime minister proposes reshuffling more than a third of the members of the government, the parliament decides according to regulations on election of a new government. If all this is applied to the number of ministers in the present government, the prime minister could reconstruct the government by reshuffling up to

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six ministers, while the seventh and every following reshuffle means that the parliament will have to vote for the election of a new government.

If the prime minister decides to come out in front of the members of parliament with proposals to reshuffle some ministers, then this proposal has to be discussed, including the reasons which led to this, the responsibility that can be expanded and that can lead to unpleasant results. Some people think that this idea, which has been only unofficially announced so far—can be performed through resignations of the ministers to be reshuffled as a wise act which will eliminate any great risk. Another idea that can be incorporated well in the term government reconstruction is to make a ministerial shift. Instead of having some ministers leave the government, they can be shifted to other ministries. However, this idea is at present nothing but speculation, although it is possible.

The public is most interested in knowing which ministries will be encompassed in the reconstruction. For now, none of those who are supposed to be familiar with this are mentioning any names. The names that are "confidentially" mentioned can be taken more as wishes, provocations, and speculations of individuals. Nevertheless, it is totally possible that the ministers of the parties which make up the government will be equally encompassed for the sake of keeping balance in the coalition.

Prime Minister Crvenkovski's criterium on when (and if) reconstruction will start is of the greatest priority. Only recently, that is, last summer, his cabinet applied a criterium that was explained as "unsatisfactory results in work" to reshuffle some officials of a lower rank in the ministries. Some of them were not even said to be personally guilty, but since they were heading sectors which had slipups, they were removed from their positions. At that time, the ministers of those sectors which had slipups were exempted. Is it their turn now?

When the prime minister was reproached for selecting unprofessional and incompetent persons at the head of some ministries just after the election of the present government, he used to say: This is a political and not an expert government and its legitimacy comes out of the parliamentary majority and the elections, and not out of professional criteria. This is a common practice in parliamentary democracies, Crvenkovski used to say. He also used to stress that the minimum correct judgment on the abilities and possibilities of some persons has to be based on the results achieved and not prejudices about some personalities and positions. So, on one occasion, he said that time will be the best judge for the competence of the persons performing their duties.

Let us return to the latest opinion poll on the work of the government. The opinions of the 1,200 citizens disclose the feelings of the Macedonian citizens and have to be taken very seriously. These citizens, who were randomly selected, created the negative rating list and assessed the ministers of economy, finance, labor and social policy, internal affairs, development, and so on as the biggest failures.... This was aimed at learning the people's opinions on where things went wrong. Will the prime minister share their opinions or will he have other opinions on his interventions in the cabinet and the ministries? There is great hope that there will be an answer to this.

Liberals Support Reconstruction

AU1601095396 Skopje MIC in English 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic Committee of the Liberal Party, in view of the stances of the Liberal Party concerning its affiliation with the "Alliance for Macedonia," supports the prime minister in his efforts to analyze the work of the government over the past year, and to reconstruct the same on the basis of his findings.

"The Republic Committee of the Liberal Party hopes that the subsequent reconstruction of government will contribute to better understanding and respect between the parties comprising the Alliance for Macedonia, to the strengthening of its role and efficiency in fulfilling its election promises pledged before the citizens, as well as the growing of the trust between the parties from the parliamentary majority," the Republic Committee of the Liberal Party says in the announcement from its session held Saturday [13 January].

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Officials View Partnership for Peace Seminar

WS1701120296 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 15 Jan 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Andrzej Medykowski: "Deputy Minister A. Karkoszka and J. Onyszkiewicz Exclusively for POLSKA ZBROJNA; The Huge Dimensions of Partnership for Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation that participated in an international seminar: "Heritage of the Marshall Plan and Partnership for Peace" has returned from a 12-day visit to the United States, which was abundant in adventures. Immediately after returning, Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, the delegation's head, first secretary of state and first deputy defense minister, among other things, said the following to POLSKA ZBROJNA: "I would like to underscore one pleasant fact for the Polish delegation, namely that aside from two states which were represented by ministers, only our state was able to present—from the main rostrum—its assessment of the situation in Europe and the prospects for the Partnership for Peace program. This indicates the recognition of the Polish role and Poland's contribution to the partnership—from the beginning of implementing the intensive program for cooperation, up to our constant support of its acceleration."

The seminar gave the opportunity to hold many conversations in addition to its main sessions. A. Karkoszka pointed out: "We held conversations with representatives of the city of Washington, D.C.'s political elite—in the Pentagon and in the UN Security Council. We also held many conversations with representatives of the American Polonia, who have done a lot to support Poland's image, as well as to support the course of the U.S. Administration and to maintain close ties with our country."

Janusz Onyszkiewich, deputy chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission, who also participated in the seminar, pointed out: "Unfortunately, due to intensive snowfalls, Washington was in a state of natural calamity and the government almost did not function, which limited the opportunity to establish contacts with the outside world." He also underlined that: "We had the opportunity to personally meet with representatives of the Illinois State National Guard, which is our partner. This supplements the Partnership for Peace program by additional partnership with U.S. states. Chicago, with its large concentration of Poles, is located in this state. The fact that several people were of Polish origin in the group which accompanied us and took care of us was a nice gesture. Partnership between Poland and the State of Illinois seems to be very promising given that it expands the possibility of contacts."

Andrzej Karkoszka underscored: "It was a very good initiative to hold such a seminar. It allowed the possibility to generalize certain postwar processes connected with the Marshall Plan and U.S. assistance rendered to countries destroyed by the war. At the same time, an opportunity has been opened to compare those processes with the Partnership for Peace program, which also means political, material, and technical assistance to the countries which have lived through the Cold War."

Kwasniewski on EU, NATO, Relations With Russia

BR1601160996 Brussels LE SOIR in French 16 Jan 96 p 2

[Telephone interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Pol Mathil in Warsaw; date not given: "The Postcommunist Presidency in Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mathil] For the first trip by a postcommunist president you have chosen an almost symbolic itinerary. Does the choice of Bonn, Paris, and Brussels mean that, despite the suspicions expressed in some media following your election, the pro-Western option remains a priority for Polish foreign policy?

[Kwasniewski] All first visits are symbolic. As are these. My aim was to reaffirm the direction of our foreign policy as pursued by Poland since 1989 and which is based on the desire to integrate into European structures as soon as possible, especially NATO and the European Union. I also wanted to resume bilateral relations with Germany and France, which are particularly important countries for Poland, and also with Belgium, which has long been close to us (Prime Minister Dehaene recently visited our country) and which is now the home of key international organizations.

[Mathil] Do the results of your visits to Bonn and Paris seem encouraging in this respect? Do you not have the impression that the doors to the West are closed and that the process of integration into these structures is virtually blocked?

[Kwasniewski] No. It is most certainly not correct to speak of closer ties with the EU being blocked in any way. The decision at the Madrid summit, namely to begin negotiations on enlargement six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference, which starts shortly, seems perfectly reasonable to us. Such a period also allows us sufficient time to prepare. A considerable and at times painful effort awaits us. But I can affirm that both Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac believe that Poland will be one of the first countries to join an enlarged Union.

[Mathil] That concerns the EU. What about NATO?

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[Kwasniewski] That is not the same thing and we should not confuse the two paths. The European Union is an easier matter politically but more difficult to achieve. NATO on the other hand is easier to achieve but much more complicated politically. In regard to NATO, 1996 will be a year of waiting for the results of the presidential elections in Russia....

[Mathil] ....and in the United States....

[Kwasniewski] Yes, also. It is in our interest to see a positive development of democracy in Russia. If Russia progresses on the road to democracy, the matter of NATO enlargement will become easier to resolve....

[Mathil] What is happening on the border between Dagestan and Chechnya is not part of a democratic process....

[Kwasniewski] The aims of our political strategy remain unchanged. We continue to believe that NATO must expand to include Central European countries and that this will be a key element in the construction of Europe's new security architecture....

[Mathil] What will you do about the Russian veto of enlargement?

[Kwasniewski] In late March or early April I hope to be able to take up President Yeltsin's invitation to meet with him in Moscow. We will then have the opportunity to try and convince our Russian neighbors face-to-face that our desire to join NATO is not directed against Russia. If we want European security to be seen as a process in which NATO is a fundamental factor, the Atlantic alliance must change. Personally, I do not believe in a NATO reform which does not include the inclusion of the country which lent its name to the Warsaw Pact. Only when that happens can we genuinely speak of a NATO which will no longer be simply a factor in the Western order but also a factor in the European order.

[Mathil] Have you not detected traces of Western distrust of a president drawn from a postcommunist political party? Are you not suspected of seeking to return, as a result of the presence of former Communists in the governments of both countries, to "privileged relations" with Moscow?

[Kwasniewski] I have detected no distrust. It is understood very well that more dynamic relations between Warsaw and Russia are also in the interest of our Western partners.

[Mathil] Why will they now be any easier or more dynamic?

[Kwasniewski] Easier? I really do not know. But I hope so, just as I hope that they will be more dynamic.

[Mathil] Does not the arrival of Primakov as foreign minister worry you?

[Kwasniewski] As long as there are no signs that he wishes to conduct anything other than a friendly policy toward Poland, there is no reason to close any doors. In general, Kohl and Chirac, who are trying to establish the best possible relations with President Yeltsin, see nothing surprising in the efforts of the Polish president to move in the same direction, quite the contrary in fact. They rightly believe that this will stabilize the situation in Europe.

[Mathil] On this particular point, does not the "Oleksy affair," involving your prime minister who is accused by his own interior minister of spying for the Russians, complicate your actions and put your professions of faith in democracy and Europe in a somewhat different light?

[Kwasniewski] This is a very sad affair. It is not going to complicate either my action or my credibility. Proof of this lies in the fact that my visits to the West have been accepted particularly quickly, just two weeks after I took office. I naturally informed my interlocutors of the Oleksy affair, so as not to allow any shadow to be cast over the meetings and in order to be sincere, which is an essential element of any useful dialogue. But it was at my initiative and not in reply to questions put to me. As to the basis of the affair, there are certain legal and political procedures which must be respected in a democracy. That is the only way Poland is going to emerge stronger from this experience. As for me, I will not be judge or advocate, and certainly not the accuser.

[Mathil] Lech Walesa, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, who in the West symbolizes victory over communism and remains popular here, has just announced that, for financial reasons, he will be returning to his old job as electrician at the Naval shipyards in Gdansk. Is it not both paradoxical and unjust to see General Jaruzelski, the man who introduced martial law, live a materially comfortable existence when Lech Walesa, your predecessor, is in danger of having to face such day-to-day material difficulties? Do you not think that a former Polish president deserves a life sheltered from such financial concerns?

[Kwasniewski] I am totally of that opinion. We must progressively become a more normal country. And in my opinion a normal country is one where there is a president and one or more former presidents. Without any doubt we need a law which states what the country owes to a former president and under what conditions he can pursue any political or other action. A former president is a public person who must be able to pursue profitable and positive action in the country. I am

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awaiting a parliamentary initiative which will propose such an arrangement, from which Mr. Walesa would certainly immediately benefit.

[Mathil] But is not Walesa's reference to his past at the Gdansk shipyards also a return to his spiritual source in order to launch a new political initiative based on the legend of Solidarity with a view to the 1997 legislative elections?

[Kwasniewski] You cannot join the same river twice....

[Mathil] So Lech Walesa has no chance of becoming your opponent at the presidential elections in five years time?

[Kwasniewski] Time will tell. Everything is possible. But we must not forget one principal factor: the entry, in five years time, of an entirely new generation to Polish political life, a generation born neither of Solidarity nor the former Communist Party. For them, even Aleksander Kwasniewski, who will then be 45, will perhaps seem too old!

Ministry Official on Defense Needs

WS1601145096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Jan 96 p 4

[Article by Brigidier General Stanislaw Koziej, professor and director of the Department of the Defense System within the Ministry of National Defense: "Formulation and Expression of Defense Needs; Some Members of the Military Still Consider It Appropriate To Solve All Military Matters Only Within Military Circles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Defense needs have always been and always will be a starting point for the construction of a state's defense system. It is on the basis of defense needs that requirements for a defense system are defined. These requirements, synchronized with a state's potential, decide about the size, structure, and rules for the functioning of a defense system. Without specifying defense needs it is impossible to build a rational security system that would match all threats to the state's security and would be coherent with the state's potential. If defense needs are established wrongly, this creates the threat of either running excessive costs and expenditures that can lead to a socioeconomic breakdown of the state, or a risky lowering of the defense potential and, because of that, a loss of credibility for the state in the international environment. In the first case, this leads to an internal breakdown of the state, and, in the second case, to an external one. Thus, both of the wrong estimates are extraordinarily dangerous for the existence of a state as a functioning and real political subject.*

Correct Estimate of Needs

If we bring the general statements to the particular Polish conditions at the turn of the 21st century, it is not difficult to notice how important it is to estimate defense needs in the correct way. Poland is currently introducing historic political and economic changes. This is a delicate operation, susceptible to all—even the slightest—impediments, and one that requires dedication and sacrifice. It combines with the necessity of making investments for the future at the cost of satisfying current needs. In the latter case, excessive defense needs and requirements would be a decisive load and impediment for the necessary economic changes. They would absorb the resources necessary for development needs, slow down Poland's economic transformations and, possibly, they could even lead to the loss of our historic opportunity.

Equally dangerous would be to underestimate the defense needs in the current political situation. With a defense potential built upon such [wrong] estimates and not appropriate for the conditions, Poland would not only risk its own security but it would also create a significant area of instability, uncertainty, and potential sources of threats in its decisive place in Central Europe. The existing "gray" zone of security would grow even wider. This would undoubtedly be incomprehensible for our partners, with whom we would like to integrate in the future. We would not be able to count on serious treatment if we disregard the problems of security.

An able and realistic estimate of defense needs is of crucial importance for our state. However, this is only one side of the problem. Equally important is to verify the estimates, as well as to bring them to the knowledge and acceptance of the highest decisionmaking bodies, so that the estimates will be taken into account in the state's policy. It is not enough to be right and preach the truth. One's good idea has to be transformed into a causative factor; it must have a practical value added to it. It is necessary, then, to create a safe line of communication between the analysts of security matters, who make the estimates, and the highest decisionmaking circles—the government, the president and the parliament. Without such a communication line even appropriate estimates would not be reliable and the decisions would be postponed or taken upon conjecture, as well as the subjective estimates and wishful thinking of decisionmakers. In such a case, it would be impossible to gather public effort around the case of security, which would be, inevitably, directly reflected in the defense budget. It is difficult to imagine devoting serious means to something that one is not emotionally attached to. This is a natural, psychologically based rule of human behavior—both individual and collective.

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Military and Nonmilitary Threats

The modern military threat encompasses many aspects. The main aspect is the military one. However, it is accompanied by a whole array of equally dangerous nonmilitary threats—political, social, economic, public and ecological ones, etc. How to detect them, how to realistically estimate them, how to weigh the degree of their imminence for the country, how to estimate the probability of their coming into effect—these are the problems faced by a modern defense analyst. Already at this point we shall notice that we are talking about a "defense" analyst, and not a "military" one.

A second feature of the modern military threat which is characteristic for the current situation in Poland is the difficulty of defining the enemy. At this point we do not have a defined opponent, Poland does not treat anyone as an enemy—e.g., as someone who is consciously preparing for an invasion. Certainly this does not mean that there are no real—and, independent even of the will of the particular states—potential sources of military threat which can be activated in an appropriate situation. A cool analyst and specialist know about this, but does the awareness of this fact also exist within the society and among decisionmakers? That still remains an open question. This must be taken into account while someone is expressing the estimates and opinions on the subject of defense needs.

The lack of a defined contender and the great diversity of Poland's closest neighboring countries—we have neighbors that are world and nuclear powers, and some that are much smaller than we are—all these factors make the process of estimating defense needs complicated. We can no longer rely on the classical method which was successfully used for decades during the existence of the two contending blocks—the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Now, under the realities of multicentrality of European security and with the independence of Poland's defense, such a simple and direct procedure for the estimation of defense needs obviously cannot have any practical use. The required size of military forces cannot be estimated through a simple comparison with military forces of neighboring states, if only for the reason that we have very diverse neighbors, and the world powers exceed us by so much that any attempt at keeping military forces that would be strategically comparable (in the sense of defense potentials) with those of our neighbors, is impossible.

In such a case, it is necessary to introduce methods of indirect comparison and estimates. Our defense needs should be estimated at a level proportional to the degree of the defense effort of other European states, and especially West European states with whom we want to form a common security system in the future. The size of the armed forces should be proportional to the size of the country. (For example, the size of the military should be kept in a similar percentage relation to the size of the population in a given country). The relation between military expenditures and the economic potential of the state should also be similar to that in other countries. The point is that Poland's defense effort and our contribution to the common system of international security should be proportional to the security effort of other European countries. Making such estimates and valuations is, of course, complicated and requires comprehensive analyses. Undoubtedly, it also requires a certain international cooperation and working out of common methods, procedures, and measurements that would be accepted by the other countries. This is the only way to arrive at realistic estimates of defense needs which would be appropriate for modern conditions.

Common Defense

It is also important to understand that modern defense needs are determined not only by threats. They are influenced more and more by chances for a future strengthening of security through a common international effort. In building a common security system for every country, a member of such a system will be bigger than the individual contribution of the country, bigger than the expenditures [made by the country]. That is why common defense is always cheaper, more economical than individual defense. These are the main reasons for Poland's accentuating its will for integrating with NATO and becoming a part of the Western security system.

In estimating our security needs we should take into account the chances that are created for our safety by both the existing and developing international situation, especially including the highly visible tendencies for the creation of effective mechanisms of a common, large scale defense system.

These chances must, certainly, be taken into account, though not uncritically. It is important to establish the degree of their probability. This also regards the threats. A synthesis of the chances and threats, with a provision for their probability, gives final grounds for the formulation of relatively objective defense needs.

For the accomplishment of this goal it is necessary to have teams of high-class specialists—analysts from different fields and branches of defense studies. Military structures, or even the entire Defense Ministry, will not be able to match that accomplishment by themselves. Making analyses, estimates, comparisons, discussing them, making selections, and preparing them for decisions should necessarily involve different gov-

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ernment and nongovernment institutions, scientific circles and, finally, individual experts in the field of defense. A coordinating function should be performed by the Ministry of National Defense. The proposals should be finalized and prepared for political-defense decisions taken at the highest state level.

Not Only Military Men Are Responsible for Defense

In Poland, up till now we have been unable to create such an analytical-planning system—such a network of many different cells involved in the conceptual preparation of the defense doctrine. We have the foundations for such a system but its development and implementation is not simple or easy. Throughout our entire modern history, defense matters were almost entirely identified with military might. In the 19th century Poles were actively fighting to regain an independent state. The Polish-Soviet war of 1920 and World War II form the most recent historical experience of the nation, pointing to military might as crucial for the state's existence. It was, then, not a coincidence that military men played a major role in the structures of the Polish state in the period between the two world wars.

After World War II, the stress on military power—due to the lack of other forms of state power—which was characteristic of the Soviet system, found natural support in our own tradition.

That is why security matters were attended mostly by military men, and the armed forces were regarded as almost the only means of defending the state's security. A consequence of this was the lack of civilian specialists and civilian institutions dealing with defense matters, as well as a superficial and rather formal treatment of security problems by civilian branches of the state's administration responsible for state's defense. These questions were practically settled between the Ministry of National Defense, which was a military organ, and the military structures of the Warsaw Pact. Slightly simplifying things, one can say that Polish civilian authorities merely approved the coalition's settlements in the field of defense matters, and guaranteed their implementation.

Such an approach towards security matters, which is historically conditioned and which has been supported by the practice of the last decades, has formed specific attitudes in regard to these questions among professional military men, as well as among civilian politicians and within the entire society.

Military men still feel responsible not only for the armed forces and their use, but also for the whole defense system and the state's defense policy. In the period of the [current] political transformation, with the lack of means and, not that rarely, with the lack of proper concern on the part of the state's organs for defense matters, military men feel left alone with the problems of transforming the armed forces. We still lack a large circle of civilian specialists on defense matters, with a possible exemption of specialists in the field of international security. Only this year was it possible to organize courses for the state administration cadres and the deputies in the National Defense Academy, as well as to start the National Security Faculty at the University of Warsaw for students—candidates for a career in the sphere of security matters. Moreover, not long ago it was only possible to incite significant interest in security tasks among the state's organs, including the highest, central and local branches of the state's administration. In our society as a whole, defense awareness still has more of an emotional that rational character. Poles are ready to go fighting in the defense of their motherland at any time; they are capable of sudden efforts and great accomplishments, but real, everyday knowledge about the complicated structure of modern defense remains low. We still tend to identify questions regarding the state's security with the armed forces. A system of common and rational training about general security matters is still proceeding at a slow pace.

The situation is changing, but it is changing slowly. This is quite natural due to the scope of these changes—they have to encompass the armed forces, the system of governing the country, and the whole society. For that reason, in Poland the process of formulation and expression of defense needs has not yet achieved the level that is characteristic for a developed, democratic state.

The Ministry of National Defense has not yet been fully established as a civil organ of political power. The organizational and reorganizational processes that continue there do not foster the effectiveness of its functioning, including of course the formulation and expression of security needs. In spite of this, in the Ministry of National Defense it was lately possible to develop a comprehensive appraisal of the state's defense needs as an element of security planning, as well as within the framework of a long term program for the development of the defense system.

Dislike of Civilians by Military Men

Because of such a vaguely shaped and inefficient system of formulation and expression of defense needs, but—probably—also because of a certain attachment to tradition, some military men still consider it appropriate to solve all military matters within military circles, as it used to be done previously. They sometimes look with suspicion at the construction of civil structures dealing

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with the armed forces and defense matters, as well as at politicians whose are responsible for the most serious defense matters and the armed forces. Unable to see an effective expression of the needs of the armed forces on the part of political and decisionmaking circles—the reasons for which I will overlook at this moment—some of the military men try to do the politicians' job themselves. For obvious reasons, such behavior also cannot be effective within a democratic system.

Thus, it is necessary to introduce important changes and bring forth new solutions and actions to adjust the process of formulation and expression of the state's defense needs to the new external and internal objectives.

Necessary Directions of Change

The first area of consideration is, undoubtedly, the sphere of public awareness of defense matters, an awareness that would be backed up by knowledge. It is necessary to implement a program of wide-ranging citizens' education on defense issues. In that way it would also be possible to build an appropriate lobby for the defense matters within the parliament and the government. Defense matters must be commonly viewed as one of the main pillars of statehood, and they should be treated as such. The beginnings of this look encouraging because of the training courses in defense matters for the civilian administrative cadre and [the existence of] the National Security Faculty at the University of Warsaw. The National Defense Committee still has to look into a broader and more comprehensive vision of national training in general security matters that would encompass a system of general education on defense. The successful implementation of the proposed solutions will create a wide range of opportunities for the use of civil potential in the solution of defense questions.

The second area of activities is connected with legislation and includes the necessary solutions regarding the creation of a clear layout of competence and responsibilities for particular state organs in the field of defense. We especially wait for new constitutional settlements, as well as for appropriate bills that would regulate separate questions, including the relationship between the civil and military structures of the Department of National Defense. Only if this is done will it be possible to organize and effectively conduct appropriate work on the estimation of needs and formulation of defense decisions.

Finally, the third area of tasks is more of an organizational character. It is necessary to organize new institutions and structures for studies, analyses and planning in the field of defense, and stabilize the existing ones. This regards both the establishment of independent institutes and the creation of consultative assemblies (especially among academic circles and the media), and the strengthening of executive structures of the administration that are responsible for defense matters. What we need is the existence of a center for studies on international and defense analyses. The National Security Council should prepare appropriate analyses, opinions and estimates concerning the most important defense problems for the president of the Polish Republic. For that reason, the National Security Office, which is an executive office of the president and which provides services for the National Security Council, should have suitable teams of competent analysts in the field of national security. In a short time it is absolutely necessary to strengthen the professionalism of the Defense Committee within the Council of Ministers. The secretariat of that Committee should play a major role in coordinating the implementation of defense preparations in the country, especially in the nonmilitary part of the defense system.

A special role within the whole defense system is played by the Ministry of National Defense. The ministry is directly responsible for the main element of the defense system—the armed forces. Therefore, this branch of the government must take the lead in the establishment of defense needs and the creation of policy and defense strategy of the state. Especially needed is to maintain a high analytical and conceptual level of the operational and strategic cells of the General Stuff in the Polish Armed Forces. It is also necessary to stabilize, strengthen, and develop the analytical and political-strategic parts of the ministry. Of course, all these elements should function in a common and complementary manner within an integrated and homogeneous—and not divided—Ministry of National Defense.

Upgrading of the analyses, estimates and decisionmaking projects concerning the state's defense needs will be helped by an interdepartment, computerized analytical-planning center functioning within the Ministry of National Defense, and prepared by the Ministry's Department of International Security and Department of the Defense System. That purpose will be served also by the implementation of a computerized defense resources management model (DRMM) that has been obtained from the Defense Department of the United States. This will make the estimates of our defense needs be more realistic and verifiable, inevitably helping us to make proper decisions which will be decisive for the position of Poland within the system of common defense and for our integration with NATO.

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Kwasniewski Comments on Privatization Referendum

LD1601200296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski said before leaving for Belgium that he did not envisage any government reshuffle. The president also said that he will decide on the possible rescheduling of the privatization referendum after a meeting of the National Assembly.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] I expect that a meeting of the National Assembly will take place on 19 January. I will decide on the referendum after a discussion at the National Assembly. As it happens, this will be shortly after my return from Belgium, so there is no delay or prevarication over this matter. I have agreed with the Speakers that I will make no decisions either on rescheduling or retaining the date before the end of the deliberations at the National Assembly. We have agreed that there will be no decisions on this matter before Friday. [end recording]

During his three-day visit to Brussels, President Kwasniewski will visit, among other things, NATO Headquarters, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.

Kwasniewski Wants Vetting of Senior Officials

LD1601225196 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish in Polish 2000 GMT 16 Jan 96

[Passages within quotation marks recorded; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski wants high-ranking state officials to be checked by the secret services to ensure they do not collaborate with foreign intelligence services. The president said before his departure for Brussels that the ministers newly appointed by him were subjected to such procedure. According to him, the current events in our country will have no effect on the speed of Poland's entry to NATO and the European Union.

[Correspondent Matczak] During his talks in Brussels the president will present to the top authorities of NATO, the European Union, the Western European Union, and Belgium the priorities of our foreign policy and he will also discuss the prospects for Poland's entry to these organizations. According to him, the political events in Poland and the accusations against the prime minister are appraised in the West much more calmly than at home.

[Kwasniewski] "I will also be trying to persuade them that the most important things in Poland, that is economic development, development of democracy, are taking place and here there are no threats of any kind. And I think that the optimism of the Western world can be transferred, and I hope it will be transferred, also to our Polish scene."

[Matczak] According to the president, many of the press reports are improbable, while collaboration accusations against high-ranking officials could unleash a spy mania in Poland which would strike against politicians of both the coalition and the opposition.

[Kwasniewski] "I believe that in Poland today, as far as the entire political leadership is concerned, and here I make no distinction between the coalition and the opposition, there is no threat of infiltration by any foreign intelligence service. Either by the KGB or the CIA or the BND or Mossad or anybody at all. Because were we to follow the route that you are now suggesting, ladies and gentlemen, we could easily prove that some of the Polish politicians had contacts with one lot, while others had contacts with the other lot. After all, during the 1980's, contacts were also maintained with representatives of embassies of the Western world. This is a blind alley. I emphasize, this is a blind alley."

[Matczak] According to the president, there should be an operation similar to vetting which would amount to our special services checking out all high-ranking national officials.

[Kwasniewski] "I have asked for such reports in all my recent appointments."

[Matczak] According to the president and the prime minister, there are no threats to the present coalition, although the authorities are surprised by the lack of calls from the coalition's critics for new elections. According to the president, there is no alternative to the present ruling political arrangement. [passage omitted]

Commission Continues Investigating Oleksy Case

WS1601133396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "JACH, KES, MONTY": "Sharp Conflict Ahead Within the Commission Examining the Oleksy Case; Fonfara Has No Doubts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The military prosecutor is demanding the Office of State Protection [UOP] provide information on agents who worked on the Oleksy case. [Interior] Minister Konieczny is still keeping the materials which were to be submitted to the prosecutor's office. General Fonfara is to deny Konieczny's testimony.*

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"The prosecutor's office cannot use the operational material collected in the so-called Oleksy case unless the UOP completes them," said head of the prosecutor's office of the Warsaw Military District Colonel Andrzej Komarski on "Wiadomosci" [main television newscast] yesterday. He added that the UOP was requested to reveal the so-called personal information sources, meaning agents.

"The materials submitted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] on 19 December to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office together with the motion that an investigation against Prime Minister Oleksy be launched are largely based on information collected by the agents," Col. Komarski explained. He claims he has to receive their personal data because only then will he "be able to hear them as witnesses."

The penal code, however, allows hearing witnesses only after an investigation is instituted. No one can be heard in the preliminary proceedings which are currently being carried out by the prosecutor's office. This may imply that Col. Komarski assumes an investigation will be opened.

He claims the materials are worthless without the information he has requested. Komarski added that the MSW is aware of the expectations of the prosecutor's office. As we learned from unofficial sources, however, Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny already received the supplementary information requested by the prosecutor's office on 11 January. For unknown reasons the minister has not yet passed the documents on, although UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski announced they would be submitted by 12 January.

Today the special Sejm commission is to be acquainted with further operational materials in the Oleksy case at the MSW. Col. Janusz Luks (chief of intelligence until July 1994, currently a member of the prime minister's team of experts) and his former deputy for operations at the UOP Intelligence Board, Col. Janusz Wojciechowski, (also no longer employed by the UOP) are to be heard by the commission tomorrow.

According to a high-ranking UOP officer, a storm is about to break within the commission. A week ago Konieczny told the deputies that General Czempinski and head of the Investigation Board Wiktor Fonfara confided in him that they had doubts as to the quality of the collected materials. The commission deemed Konieczny's testimony as "important new circumstances" and decided to hear the MSW officers anew.

In a conversation held with our interlocutor yesterday, however, Fonfara denied ever having shared any doubts as to the validity of the material with Konieczny. He assured he would repeat that in front of the commission.

"The prosecutor's office will either launch an investigation 'into the case' or refuse to institute proceedings, but it cannot open an investigation against the prime minister," said Col. Komarski yesterday. "According to the binding procedures, an individual is considered a suspect only after the prosecutor's office brings a charge against him. In this particular case the individual in question is protected by parliamentary privilege."

Security Officer on Oleksy Case History

WS1701104596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Jan 96 p 4

[Article by Jerzy Jachowicz: "The Majorca Operation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A Polish intelligence officer has told GAZETA WYBORCZA that the first "leak" about Jozef Oleksy's espionage activities came from the West. Then, a decision was made to organize a meeting in Majorca.*

Public opinion heard about Majorca on 2 January, when Colonel Vladimir Alganov, a former KGB officer, told a specially held news conference in Moscow that at the end of July he had met with Polish super spy Marian Zacharski, who was a colonel at that time and is currently a general.

Majorca According to Alganov

Let us recall Alganov's version presented on 2 January at a specially held news conference.

Zacharski had allegedly told Alganov that "Polish special services will not allow the transition of power into the hands of new forces"; therefore, "they are collecting evidence against Polish politicians, including Kwasniewski." Zacharski allegedly demanded that Alganov provide "at least indirect evidence of Oleksy's cooperation with the KGB."

Majorca According to Zacharski

After being heard by the special Sejm commission for examining the Oleksy case, General Zacharski said to journalists: "Alganov did not lie on one issue only. It is true that we did meet in Majorca."

Here is a story by a high UOP [Office of State Protection] officer. He had acted at the periphery of the group that worked on Alganov, and asked me not to mention his name. His story has been confirmed by another officer of Poland's special services. The meeting between Alganov and Zacharski had been

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meticulously planned and organized by the Polish intelligence. However, first things first.

Neighbors in the "Red Bay of Pigs"

The Polish intelligence had been observing Alganov for five years, for there had been suspicions that under the cover of business deals Alganov was still conducting espionage activities. Earlier, in 1981-92 [as published] Alganov did that under the cover of performing his functions at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw. His official retirement was nothing but a smoke screen created by Russian intelligence.

Polish counterintelligence conducted routine operational activities regarding Alganov, which included observation and tapping of his telephone calls. In mid-1994 the UOP became confident that Alganov was still conducting espionage activities.

Operational data also confirmed that Jozef Oleksy, who was Sejm speaker at that time, belonged to the circle of Alganov's close friends. In a natural way this was facilitated by the fact that both lived in the Wilanow Compound (Oleksy still lives there), which Warsaw residents sometimes call the Red Bay of Pigs.

The UOP did not see any major threat resultingfrom Oleksy's acquaintance, even a certain familiarity with Alganov, although there was a danger of unpremeditated passing of information valuable to the KGB.

Our expert points out: "For intelligence, even a very trite piece of information may become the first step toward a major success."

For this reason, on 4 September 1994 UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski warned Jozef Oleksy against Alganov. Czempinski directly told Oleksy that his Russian close acquaintance was a professional intelligence officer.

Meanwhile, nothing attractive was added to the "Alganov file," nothing that could serve as pretext for his detention as a foreign intelligence agent. The UOP was sure that Oleksy was "clean." The situation remained unchanged until early summer 1995.

The First Signal From the West

Between May and June 1995, Polish intelligence received the first signal to the effect that Prime Minister Oleksy, according to our interlocutor, had been a KGB informer for at least 10 years: "The first report arrived from one of the strongest intelligence services of the West. That service probably could not pass the report without the approval on the part of the Americans. The Polish security services have been within 'the family of Western intelligence' for five years now, and very distinct rules are applied in that 'family,'in which the Americans play the leading role, given their financial potential and unique equipment."

People remain the most important factor in intelligence, with all their emotions, hard work, and luck. However, equipment is of a major help.

Polish intelligence services have used U.S. equipment several times within the last five years, often assisted by U.S. specialists.

Oleksy's Number

As early as mid-June, Polish intelligence, greatly assisted by counterintelligence (although the two usually "are not very fond of each other"), managed to obtain strong evidence. According to the UOP officer, it included Oleksy's identification number and secret name under which he was registered in the KGB files.

My interlocutor believes that practically no KGB officer has a chance to obtain an agent's identification number unless he deals with that agent's "work file." All secret KGB documents are permanently kept in the so-called current archive, which is one of the most guarded places in the world. The documents stored in that archive date 35 years back. Only a dozen people know the secret code opening the locks. However, under no circumstances can they enter the archive alone or accompanied by only one person. Three people have to enter and leave the archive simultaneously. When a file is taken out of the archive, all three "interested parties" sign a form. A similar procedure is observed when "interested parties" read documents inside the archive. The Russians believe that the threesome system is the best guarantee of the security of information. A single person can take documents out; two people can reach an agreement. For three people it is hard to conspire, because everyone is afraid that one of them may be an agent provocateur.

Nevertheless, it is not an unusual deed to obtain an agent's identification number from KGB officers. All officers from deputy chief up, know that number. These people work with agents' files in their special sections (for instance, "Poland's economic section.") Identification numbers are always used as a password. Nobody says: "Give me the file of the agent with secret name 'X.'" Instead, they say "Give me number 'Y.'"

According to my interlocutor, Oleksy's identification number was bought from a person who had once "worked his file" and either remembered the number or had written it down. The UOP officer claims that along with the identification number and Oleksy's secret name ("Olin," which has been made public), there was

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naturally the date of registering Oleksy as a qualified informer.

Preparations: Agreeing on the Price

The secret services lacked the most essential data: what kind of information Oleksy had provided, or what kind of documents he had passed. It could be expeditiously bought from the Russian special services. Talks were initiated to reach an agreement. Perhaps aside from money the Polish intelligence threw other cards on the table.

My interlocutor was confident that Russian intelligence also knew about the Majorca meeting arranged by Polish intelligence: Alganov was "exposed" to Polish intelligence by his superiors. In their turn, his superiors had received approval "from above." It could not happen otherwise, given that Alganov was supposed to sell a person who held a very high position. Those kinds of operations could not be handled by secret services alone.

Our expert says: "I know KGB methods. Alganov went to Majorca with at least one general instruction: If nothing extraordinary happens, you should pass important information to their man. You do not have to worry about the future. Most probably, they told Alganov how much money he would receive."

The Majorca Trip

Following this kind of coordination, Zacharski went to Switzerland in mid-June. There, he established a small commercial company under a false name and continued his trip to Majorca in the "disguise" of a businessman. Our interlocutor adds that Zacharski arrived in Palma with an attractive young woman who played the role of his business partner from Switzerland.

Security for the Majorca action was provided by a third Polish intelligence officer, who had checked in the same hotel several days earlier. He had to check whether Alganov was accompanied by KGB men.

When Zacharski got a "clue" that Alganov was alone, he sent a message to Warsaw asking for the dispatch of a fourth participant for the "Majorca action"—a "paymaster" with money.

Zacharski shared an apartment with his female companion. The security officer occupied a room next door.

Accidental Encounter?

Our interlocutor believes that the version of an accidental encounter of the intelligence aces is ridiculous. Late July is peak tourist season in Majorca. Rooms in a luxurious hotel (the UOP officer did not want to reveal its name) had to be reserved in advance. The action demanded that three rooms had to be reserved at the same time.

Majorca had been chosen. Crowds of tourists allow one to remain unnoticed. Majorca suited the Polish side, too, given that the Russians do not have their residents there. The Russians also were aware of that fact, which is another proof that Alganov was "exposed." Why did the Russians expose him? What was the price? Our informer did not want to disclose that.

First Day: "Mellowing Out"

According to our interlocutor, the operation in Majorca lasted for two days. On the first day, Zacharski was trying to make Alganov "mellow out." This was done during walks, sunbathing, and dinners accompanied by drinks. Zacharski's female companion left the two gentlemen one on one from time to time (which is a usual practice) to give Zacharski opportunities to open more cards. It is also evident (another routine practice, according to the UOP officer) that the lady discreetly charmed Alganov. She was keeping him unsure as to whether this was only a game or did he really stand a chance.

Second Day: Recording

It is hard to say how, but the next morning Alganov emerged in Zacharski's apartment and spent almost 24 hours there. Our interlocutor believes that most probably, during that time he presented to Zacharski a more or less detailed report about Oleksy's cooperation with the KGB.

Prior to that, Zacharski's apartment had been stuffed with sensitive microphones connected to recording equipment in the adjoining room. A Polish officer in headphones constantly monitored the quality of recording. We cannot rule out that Alganov, too, had a concealed miniature recorder.

Our UOP interlocutor claims that during the "session" which lasted many hours, Alganov also sold to Zacharski data on what information and documents Oleksy had passed to the Russian special services. Most probably however, Alganov relied exclusively on his own memory. Therefore, according to the UOP officer, dates and descriptions of documents provided in his story lack precision. That is why some of the evidence presented by Interior Minister Milczanowski to the Military Prosecutor's Office has the same defects.

Alganov was not the Polish intelligence's only source of information. Aside from his report, which has all kinds of facts, our special services possess other serious materials.

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I asked the UOP officer: "Why did you need all that cover and espionage decoration?" The answer was: "The affair had to be kept strictly confidential. It was July. The outcome of the presidential election was unknown. Nobody could foresee that it would be necessary to rapidly complete the investigation, which according to the plan had to be conducted for a long time."

How Much the "Oleksy Operation" Cost

Most probably, we will not find this out soon. During his speech in the Sejm on 21 December, Prime Minister Oleksy claimed that he knows the sum, which is huge. He threatened to disclose it to show the world how much money the intelligence spent on this "dirty provocation."

When I asked one of Interior Minister officers, who had already been interviewed by the Sejm commission, to comment, he said: "I do not know on what the prime minister bases his threats. You will laugh when you find out how much we paid the Russians."

Informed people say that the entire "Oleksy operation" (including the "Majorca operation") cost $1.2 million. In light of the significance of the affair, this is not an overwhelming sum.

Our expert points out that, naturally, it is unknown which portion of that sum was spent on "the Majorca part" and how much the Russians received. One can only presume that Alganov received some peanuts from the entire sum, coordinated with the Russians.

As a rule, this happens in the following way: the person "performing" a certain stage of the operation is in touch with the "paymaster" who is somewhere in the vicinity. Once the "performer" decides that the contractor has met his obligations, he contacts the "paymaster." Zacharski probably gave instructions to pay Alganov right in Majorca.

Our expert adds: "Perhaps when the Polish couple was bidding goodbye to Alganov, our man opened the locks of the Russian's room and deposited wads of dollars in a concealed compartment of Alganov's attache case."

Ombudsman on Use of Secretly Obtained Evidence

LD1601230296 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 16 Jan 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the ombudsman, operational records of the State Protection Office cannot constitute a basis for charging Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy.

[Correspondent Lech Kaczmarek] The ombudsman shared his doubts during a conference devoted to public safety and civil rights and liberties. Tadeusz Zielinski recalled that already last July, after the amendments to the act on the office of the minister of internal affairs, which among other things legalized entrapment purchases and police provocation, he sent a letter to the Senate speaker in which he pointed out that the act did not contain any solutions for the procedural manner of using secretly obtained operational records. In other words, the police can gather evidence using secret operational methods, but the courts have no legal basis for regarding such records as evidence.

[begin Ombudsman Tadeusz Zielinski recording] Operational records in the form of reports from secret collaborators of the police or, for instance, tape recordings in themselves are not evidence in criminal proceedings or in prosecutors' preparatory proceedings or in court proceedings. Such records can be considered only if they are corroborated by witnesses' statements or other evidence presented by the prosecutor or the court. [end recording]

[Kaczmarek] According to the ombudsman, politicians should not do the courts' job of determining what is and what is not evidence.

Internal Affairs Minister Interviewed

WS1101085796 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 13 Jan 96 pp 17-18

[Interview with Polish Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "The Case Was Disclosed Prematurely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Paradowska] Who offered you the post of interior minister first, the prime minister or the president?

[Konieczny] The president.

[Paradowska] Why did you really accept?

[Konieczny] Such serious offers made by top state officials simply cannot be rejected without very important reasons. I did not find any such reason. Besides, throughout my entire adult life I have been dealing with criminology. After 1990, after the huge change that took place in Poland, I was able to apply my ideas and theories in practice. I believe I can still achieve a lot in this field. This was an another reason why I decided to accept the challenge.

[Paradowska] Are you not upset by the opinions held in circles you once belonged to claiming that entering the current government, leaving one political camp to join another, is tantamount to some sort of treason?

[Konieczny] No, I am neither upset nor worried about that. I believe the times of the Polish People's Republic

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are politically over; they do not exist. For me, the new age of the Republic of Poland dawned in 1989, when it became possible to take up public service. I never viewed public service as related with party activism. I have never been a member of any party, although I did receive many offers from different sides. I was never part of any circle, even my social contacts are few.

[Paradowska] You were, however, identified with the governments that came to power after 1989, the year you yourself claim marks the start of your political activity.

[Konieczny] Yes, because that is when the appropriate conditions for taking up such activity appeared. Those conditions are still there. Nothing has ended. After all, we are living in a democratic state. This may sound like a slogan, but it is true and one of my major creeds: there is only one Poland, there is only one Polish security, and it is a supraparty interest. I do realize, naturally, that some may look at me with reproof or even ostracize me, but I do not care much.

[Paradowska] So you will not say of yourself: I was and still am a man from Solidarity, the camp that brought about change?

[Konieczny] You are putting it too strongly. I would not say that. In August 1980 I saw myself as part of Solidarity, although I was not a member of the highest structures. I was an ordinary union member and concentrated rather on the Catholic Intellectuals Club in Katowice. The situation in 1980 was different than in 1995. We now have a democratic state. We have undergone a huge transformation, and ever since 1990 I have believed that I can finally take part in public life.

[Paradowska] Regardless of which political formation invites you to participate?

[Konieczny] Of course. Under the condition that we have democratic order.

[Paradowska] Democratic order did not prevent the dismissals of ministers you could feel closer to than your current colleagues. [Former Foreign Minister] Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and [former Interior Minister] Andrzej Milczanowski left. Do you really not feel any discomfort?

[Konieczny] I am not denying I do. Personally speaking, I strongly regret that Minister Milczanowski handed in his resignation. I persuaded him to stay on after the elections. He clearly did not find any reason to do so. I did not find any reason to turn down the office.

[Paradowska] Do you not feel uncomfortable with entering a political configuration determined by strong party interests? You are already surrounded by ministers from the Democratic Left Alliance, any day now ministers from the Polish Peasant Party will arrive. Deals on these issues are made behind your back.

[Konieczny] This is absolutely normal and unavoidable given the current political configuration. They are the ones who rule and deal the cards.

[Paradowska] You took office at probably the most difficult time for the ministry—immediately after your predecessor had brought charges against the prime minister. Did you lay down any conditions?

[Konieczny] I did not have to. All those who talked to me stressed that impartiality and precision are needed. I intend to demonstrate that impartiality. This is the only declaration that was expected of me.

[Paradowska] The public is very sensitive to nuances in this case. Are you not afraid that the fact you were previously the prime minister's aide and that the chief of the prime minister's team of experts came with you raises questions as to your impartiality?

[Konieczny] All I can say is you will know me by the fruit my activity bears.

[Paradowska] Was the desire to demonstrate impartiality the reason why in you first public speech you distanced yourself to the predecessor you so highly value?

[Konieczny] Yes. This is a completely different issue. Having read the materials on the so-called Oleksy affair, I arrived at a different conclusion. I think the case was handed over to the prosecutor's office prematurely. I am a lawyer and I am entitled to my own views. Please note what Minister Milczanowski is saying. He also admitted the case was handed over to the prosecutor's office prematurely. I do not see the differences in our opinions to be that different. Moreover, I would like to avoid generalizations. We may differ in views on this particular case, or the phase it has currently reached, but I would not like to give the impression that I am distancing myself from what he did as interior minister. I claim Andrzej Milczanowski was an excellent interior minister, and what I saw upon entering the ministry confirms that.

[Paradowska] For the time being, however, we are talking about that one particular case.

[Konieczny] All I can say about this case right now is that as a lawyer I think the case was handed over to the prosecutor's office prematurely.

[Paradowska] Did you arrive at that opinion on the basis of the materials alone, or did consult experts and talk to the officers handling the case?

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[Konieczny] I have, naturally, already entered such talks and began consultations. As I said, this is only my preliminary judgment.

[Paradowska] The first charge the prime minister brought against Minister Milczanowski was that the materials were fabricated either entirely or "to a great extent." Could you either confirm or deny this?

[Konieczny] The term "fabricated" is a metaphor, a journalistic expression. It is impossible to answer such a question professionally.

[Paradowska] I understand fabrication as forgery.

[Konieczny] I do not know what was the prime minister's reasoning behind the conclusion.

[Paradowska] It also has been said that this is a provocation staged by the Polish secret services, that the whole case was concocted by the Polish secret services. Moscow stated likewise. Having read the materials, do you share that opinion?

[Konieczny] Those are opinions formulated in the press and I will not comment on them.

[Paradowska] Vladimir Alganov is not a press reporter, he is a spy.

[Konieczny] He spoke out in public to the media, and I refuse to make any comment on the statements issued by Colonel Alganov.

[Paradowska] Is it usual for intelligence services to officially deny counterintelligence operations in other countries?

[Konieczny] History has given us many examples that on such occasions comments are made and assessments are formulated. They are most often motivated by current tactics and the current political situation. From the viewpoint of the material truth principle, which is binding in our criminal process—we are dealing with this process in this situation—these statements are worthless.

[Paradowska] Since the moment the issue surfaced, the prime minister has been publicly accusing special services of applying operational procedures against him. He was outraged that, as prime minister, he was followed and his conversations bugged. You denied all this.

[Konieczny] That is right. In this case the operational procedure envisioned by internal instructions of the Office of State Protection [UOP] was not applied. Although this is not always the case, usually espionage cases were preceded by operational, counterintelligence procedures. In this case such procedures were not applied.

[Paradowska] Was this a mistake?

[Konieczny] This is only an answer to the disinformation that the prime minister was followed by someone and that his conversations were bugged. The prime minister, who talked about this, was apparently misled by someone. There was nothing like that—I am saying this firmly.

[Paradowska] Does this mean that the entire issue was not aimed against the prime minister? Does it only mean that it was a case like any other, but at a certain point the prime minister appeared in it?

[Konieczny] Yes, it does.

[Paradowska] Can we put a name to this case?

[Konieczny] No, we cannot.

[Paradowska] How do you assess the fact that the prime minister has publicly admitted to having had neighborly and friendly relations with a KGB officer for many years? How should a person holding a high public office act when he is officially informed about it or warned against it?

[Konieczny] You have mentioned two issues. The first is the issue of maintaining contacts. All participants in public life meet quite a few special service officers. This is only natural, and knowledge on this subject is quite extensive in political circles, although it may still be insufficient. On the other hand, we still have not managed to specify precisely what is and what is not a state secret. Knowledge on mechanisms related to security, on possible consequences of certain kinds of behavior is skimpy; sometimes it is embarrassingly skimpy. This is really a big area where a lot needs to be done.

[Paradowska] You have already mentioned the concept of a state secret. Did Minister Milczanowski reveal a state secret when he presented information on this issue in the Sejm?

[Konieczny] I know that the possibility of criticizing the minister from this angle is being analyzed.

[Paradowska] I know that, too, because I sometimes visit the Sejm and I know that right after the minister delivered his speech, the prime minister's entourage accused him of disclosing state secrets. But what is your opinion?

[Konieczny] I have no opinion on this issue.

[Paradowska] What would you have done with those materials if you had been there instead of Minister Milczanowski?

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[Konieczny] This is speculative. I would have thought about it. Anyway, at this moment this discussion is baseless, because the situation has already been determined.

[Paradowska] However, a lot is being said about the necessity of finding political solutions to such problems, about the necessity of resolving such issues in the quiet of offices.

[Konieczny] I really do not know. I have never come across a problem that a piece of secret information is obtained which says that the prime minister may be a spy. This is an unprecedented situation. There are no ready-made solutions here.

[Paradowska] Can you see any possibility of pursuing this case further?

[Konieczny] It is being further pursued. The prosecutor did react to the motion requesting institution of proceedings; currently we are supplementing our materials.

[Paradowska] This issue is a burden over our political life, and it is difficult to predict how heavy this burden will turn out to be. The sooner the issue is cleared up, the better. When do you think it can be finally elucidated?

[Konieczny] It is impossible to make a forecast if one does not know what stand the prosecutor's office will take.

[Paradowska] If the prosecutor's office refuses to institute any proceedings after UOP supplements its materials, will this spell the end of this case, that is, the end of the case for you and for UOP?

[Konieczny] This will certainly be very thoroughly analyzed.

[Paradowska] What about the fact that Minister Milczanowski prematurely revealed some of the elements in this case? Did it do much harm to the entire case?

[Konieczny] Any operational procedure is secret and premature disclosure of information is detrimental. In such an event, some things are irretrievably lost, even for the the most important part of the case. Perhaps... However, here I would begin speculating.

[Paradowska] Do you agree with the statement that Minister Milczanowski played only a political game, something he is often accused of?

[Konieczny] I cannot say this. Andrzej Milczanowski is an excellent lawyer, and an experienced public prosecutor. He submitted his motion at a prosecutor's office, which was the proper organ. Thus, it is blatantly contrary to facts to say that he was solely guided by political motives.

[Paradowska] Right now a vehement political attack has been launched on the special services. Do you think that this case is going to be very detrimental to these services? Do you think that it will paralyze their activities? Or do you believe that it will save us from the total power of the special services?

[Konieczny] We will be able to formulate such assessments only after the issue is resolved. If it turned out that principles of professionalism were violated, that someone was involved in some kind of manipulation, it would certainly harm these services. Therefore, I am going to perform all my duties related to elucidating this issue very scrupuously.

[Paradowska] Mr. Minister, the prime minister's case is certainly the most important issue that you are dealing with now that you have been appointed internal affairs minister. However, you have assumed this office to handle other things as well. Could you talk about this now? Could you tell us what new ideas you have?

[Konieczny] As I have already said, Minister Milczanowski left the ministry in a good condition, which does not mean that there is nothing left to be done. First of all, I would like to strengthen the efficiency of police operations by starting certain mechanisms of self-defense in people. We will not reverse the trend toward increasing crime unless we finally acknowledge that it is a problem which requires cooperation between police and the people. In many countries there are various forms of such cooperation, there is social initiative, and we must reach for it all. This can be achieved fairly quickly and at low cost. In the United States the movement of crime stoppers has resulted in a breakthrough in crime detection. I am also going to come back to the concept of establishing the National Guard. There were not only many opponents of studies on this subject, but also a lot of ardent supporters.

[Paradowska] The project was abandoned because of [former] President Lech Walesa, who was constantly being suspected of wanting to act against democracy by force.

[Konieczny] That is true. However, the truth is that, for example, a considerable part of the potential of the Vistula Units is simply going down the drain in the current legal situation. Another issue which is extremely urgent is the need to pass a law on state secrets. This area must be put in order really quickly. The same goes for the issue of starting proper, legally specified procedures which would verify people who are about to assume public offices; there is also the issue of specifying the principles in line with which people should be allowed to hold state offices, and so on. Really, there is a lot to do.

[Paradowska] Thank you for the interview.

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Iliescu Backs Magureanu Openness on Securitate Tie

AU1701095996 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 13 Jan 96 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Ion Iliescu Believes That Virgil Magureanu Did Not Make a Mistake by Publishing the File"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Iliescu said that he did not advise the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] director in any way, regarding the latter's decision to make public the file that shows that he was a Securitate collaborator. President Iliescu said he believes Magureanu has the right to proceed in whatever way he considers appropriate.

Asked by journalists about this on his return from Paris, where he had attended the funeral of former French President Mitterrand, the head of the Romanian state mentioned that, from Virgil Magureanu's viewpoint, he had not made a mistake in making public his cooperation with the former Securitate.

Ion Iliescu also said that, compared with the SRI director's cooperation with the Securitate in his youth, in judging Virgil Magureanu's political position previous to the December 1989 Revolution, his activities in the years preceding the 1989 events are much more important, because, at that time, he was under surveillance and even had to suffer reprisals.

PSM Calls For Alliance of Left-Wing Parties

AU1601215096 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 9 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Mihai Radulescu: "The PSM Calls For the Establishment of a Center-Left-Oriented Electoral Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] leadership held its first news conference this year on 8 January and returned to the idea that is considered a priority for this term—namely, to establish a left or central-left-oriented alliance. The Socialists are calling on all parties of an identical orientation, and that have social and economic programs similar to those of the PSM, to "make efforts" to reach an understanding on cooperation during the electoral campaign. According to PSM President Ilie Verdet, the foundation for the understanding would be the minimal objectives of the program platform adopted by the plenary meeting in December 1995.

Without identifying the parties that have been called upon, Verdet said that he expects responses from both the parliamentary formations and nonparliamentary parties. In order to respect the identity of their programs, the PSM suggests that each allied party run on separate tickets during the first round of elections, while in the second round, they should unanimously support the left-wing parties' best-rated candidates.

Gavra Recommends PUNR-PD-PL'93-PAC Alliance

AU1601214596 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 9 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by MEDIAFAX: "Ioan Gavra Wants To Strike Alliance With the PD, the PL'93, and the PAC"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The PD Rejects the Offer, While Petre Litiu Believes That the Suggestion Ought To Be Discussed

In an interview granted to the daily ADEVARUL DE CLUJ, Ioan Gavra, the vice president of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], claimed that an alliance between the PUNR, the PD [Democratic Party], the PL'93 [Liberal Party '93], and the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] would be able to win the elections.

Gavra is ready to take back all the insulting remarks he has ever made about those three parties. The PUNR vice president expressed his belief that such a coalition could win over 43 percent of the votes.

The county branches of the parties in question reacted promptly. Iuliu Pacuraru, the president of the PD Cluj branch, rejected the offer: "No doubt, Ioan Gavra is fantasizing. This is the despair of a man who feels himself cornered and who is losing his lucidity."

PL '93 deputy Petru Litiu has an entirely different opinion. He thinks that Gavra's suggestion is "interesting and ought to be discussed." The liberal deputy and former candidate for the Cluj mayoral office [in the 1992 local elections] rejected such an alliance for the local elections, but left the door open for the parliamentary elections, provided that the new coalition should adopt a liberal governing program.

Ioan5 Gavra made this proposal on his own and informed the PUNR leadership in a long open letter.

The PUNR Central Executive Bureau is to debate Gavra's proposal at its 13 January meeting, which will take place in the town of Bistrita Nasaud.

Details Offer to Opposition

AU1601214696 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 13-14 Jan 96 p 6

[Interview with Ioan Gavra, vice president of the Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR, by Gena Saru;

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place and date not given: "It Would Be Monstrous To Strike an Alliance Between a Ruling Party and One That Is Not Participating in the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Saru] In an open letter, you offered a center alternative [electoral alliance between the Romanian National Unity Party, the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party '93, and the Civic Alliance Party]. What made you initiate these steps?

[Gavra] The center alternative I am offering is to compensate for the already existing alternatives in the Romanian political life, namely, the center-left alternative and the right-wing one, as the latter do not fully cover either the current political spectrum or the electoral options. Therefore, it is our duty to offer a third perspective to the electorate. Furthermore, so far, 30 percent of possible voters have not expressed their options. This means that they have not managed to choose any of the already established Romanian political segments as their own. The center alternative might be an alternative for the part of the electorate that has not made up its mind yet, but also to ensure a balance in Romanian political life.

[Saru] What would be the chances of such an alliance, if it is set up?

[Gavra] The chances of such a possible political alliance are very great. If the alliance is set up after all, then, before the parliamentary elections, it could obtain between 30 and 40 percent of the votes, and thus it could become a genuine political force in this country.

[Saru] You said that your proposal shocked the entire Romanian political scale. How did the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] react after it learned about the proposal you published under your own name?

[Gavra] I did take the entire Romanian political life, from left to right, by surprise. Most of the reactions are quite divergent. However, one thing pleases me: More than the half of those who are eligible for such center alliances, but also generally speaking, the Romanian political life, agree with my angle. Of course, I also took my own party by surprise, but this is an offer I made on my own and, before anyone draws any conclusions, I would like to recommend two essential things to be considered: first, they should all read the text of my two letters very carefully, so that they should genuinely comprehend what I suggest; second, they should admit that there is need for a change in Romanian political life. Otherwise, if the current governing formula is to be continued for another four-year term with the same majority [in parliament], then there will be absolutely no changes. On the contrary....

[Saru] How did the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] react when it learned about the offer you made to these opposition forces?

[Gavra] Politics is like a chess board. One always has to wait until one's adversary makes his moves, and one has to anticipate them. We continue to be in this government alliance with the PDSR, and—as long as the negotiations and the political dialogue with our possible future allies are not concluded—the protocol we signed with the PDSR remains valid. However, as soon as a certain center alliance formula becomes viable, it would be only moral both for us and the PDSR to terminate this government alliance. This is precisely what two of our possible partners, the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] and the PL'93 [Liberal Party '93] request us to do. One cannot strike a political alliance between a ruling party and one that does not participate in the act of governing. That would be monstrous.

[Saru] What is you anticipation of the 1996 electoral year?

[Gavra] It will be a very difficult one, both regarding the political aspect and the social one. Beginning probably with the second quarter of the year, the electoral campaign will become extremely tough and incisive.

[Saru] Who do you think will be the main contenders in the battle?

[Gavra] The battle will be fought between the declared adversaries, but there will be hostilities even within the parties belonging to the same segments of the political arch, namely, within the center-left, the center, and the right-wing ones.

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Federal

Belgrade To Offer Citizenship to 40,000 Refugees

LD1601121396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1114 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 16 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia is ready to grant citizenship to 30,000 or 40,000 refugees in 1996, head of the Serbian government crisis staff for refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina Branislav Ivkovic said here on Monday.

The plan will be put forward to a meeting of the group for humanitarian questions in Geneva on Tuesday by a Yugoslav delegation headed by Minister Tomica Raicevic, said Ivkovic at the start of the joint work of the national habitat post, U.N. Development Program and U.N. Industrial Development Organization.

We sincerely wish the international community will force the appropriators of the property of those who fled their homes to alter their decisions, and we expect physical protection for refugees and villages, not only individual protection on a case to case basis, said Ivkovic, the Serbian minister for urbanism.

There are about 700,000 refugees in Yugoslavia, of whom 250,000 are from Krajina, whose property has been appropriated by Croatia.

We have no definite plan for the return of refugees yet, but we are working together with U.N. agencies on housing projects for those who will stay here, said Ivkovic.

Ivkovic said that in discussions of the housing project program, the Serbian Government bore in mind the basic principle of voluntary return.

Head of UNHCR's Belgrade office Margaret O'Keefe said the construction of housing projects for 30,000 refugees is planned for 1996, as the first step to further cooperation with the Serbian Ministry for Urbanism.

The UNHCR has invested funds in the reconstrction and part of the equipment of homes for refugees that have nowhere to return to.

A representative of the U.N. Habitat who came for the occasion from the body's seat in Nairobi, Baris Petrishian, said the aim of his visit was to gather as much information on the refugees in Yugoslavia in order to raise more funds from donators.

Srem-Baranja Population Said To Need Protection

LD1601151896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1125 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Jan 16 (TANJUG)—The head of the Yugoslav mission at the United Nations, Vladislav Jovanovic, said that full security and protection of the rights of population in the Srem-Baranja area was a prerequisite for a successful implementation of the agreement for the area in the transition period.

At a U.N. Security Council session on Monday, Jovanovic said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expected from the U.N. peace force in the area to contribute efficiently and impartially to the implementation of the agreement.

At the session, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution providing for the establishment of a transition civilian administration and peace mission in eastern Slavonia, that is the Srem-Baranja area, for a period of 12 months, with the possibility of extending the mission for another 12 months.

Prior to that, Serbs from the Srem-Baranja area and Croatian officials reached agreement in November last year to place the area under U.N. administration.

The Srem-Baranja area (former U.N. Sector East) is the only of the four former U.N.-protected areas of the Republic of Serb Krajina which was not occupied by the Croatian army.

Jovanovic expressed hope that the U.N. Security Council would send to the area enough peacekeeping forces to fulfil their task.

Otherwise, the credibility of the United Nations and efficient implementation of the peace accord would be questioned.

The implementation of the peace agreement, does not solely depend on the United Nations, Jovanovic said, adding that it lies mainly with the signatories of the agreement, as well as the co-chairman of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia and U.S. representative.

The Serb-Croat agreement on the Srem-Baranja area was signed on 12 November 1995 in the presence of U.N. mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg and U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb Peter Galbraith.

Jovanovic said that any breach of the agreement by any side would cause new tensions and new problems with unforeseeable consequences.

Finally, he expressed hope that the peace operation for the Srem-Baranja area called U.N. Transitional

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Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) would be successful and that it would show that even the most complicated problems can be settled peacefully.

Lilic, Russian Delegation Discuss Economic Ties

LD1601172196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1715 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 16 (TANJUG)—The President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic pointed to Yugoslavia's endeavors to restore economic relations with the Russian Federation to the level preceding the imposition of international community sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1992, and to subsequently develop them further.

Lilic Tuesday met a delegation of the Russian Constitutional Court headed by its president Prof. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tumanov, the presidential press service has announced.

Referring to the priorities of Yugoslavia's internal and foreign policies, Lilic underlined the determination of the leaders of Yugoslavia and its two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, to duly implement the Dayton peace agreement. Yugoslavia will honor its commitments without any reservations, he said.

Absolute priority is given to Yugoslavia's economic recovery and to the restoration of all economic ties that had been broken off or weakened due to comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, in a most efficient manner and on a stable and lasting basis, Lilic said.

The majority of countries have already suspended the anti-Yugoslav sanctions and the rest of the international community is expected to follow suit shortly, the president said, adding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should take its rightful place in the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international financial institutions.

Tumanov said that the constitutional legislature in Yugoslavia was developing according to best traditions, as demonstrated by the fact that Yugoslavia was the first country in the region to establish a constitutional court.

REUTER, TANJUG Sign Agreement

LD1601174096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1638 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 16 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav news agency TANJUG and the British REUTER agency signed Tuesday a contract on renewed cooperation, the first such contract after the suspension of the international community's sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.).

The contract was signed by TANJUG's Director Slobodan Jovanovic and REUTERS representative for the Balkans Christian Schmid.

'REUTERS is the world's biggest and first agency, while TANJUG retains a high place among the leading agencies in the world,' said Jovanovic, noting that this contract virtually continues cooperation which was not disrupted during the sanctions against and the isolation of the F.R.Y.

Assessing that the period of war and drama in the territory of former Yugoslavia had definitively been over, Jovanovic voiced confidence that time is coming for objective and professional reporting of which REUTERS and TANJUG are setting good examples.

Jovanovic noted that TANJUG, irrespective of the 3.5-year-long sanctions and isolation, was maintaining relations with all agencies and media in the world, which showed to be very useful for the ultimate resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

Jovanovic expressed gratitude to REUTERS for understanding the financial, material and technological difficulties in which the Yugoslav agency had found itself because of the comprehensive and mandatory sanctions and the imposed-on circumstances. He also thanked REUTERS for readiness to write off part of TANJUG's debt.

'As of this year, we shall cooperate upon the purely economic principles which are regulated by this contract, and we hope that there will be no more demands and needs for particular understanding,' said Jovanovic.

Singled out by Jovanovic as a very significant element was REUTERS' readiness to help TANJUG's speeding up its production technologically. He added that economic information would account for a significant segment of future cooperation.

In his statement to TANJUG, Schmid voiced content with having had an opportunity to sign the first international contract with his agency after the suspension of sanctions, underscoring the significance of the two parties' readiness to renew cooperation after a period of difficulty through which the F.R.Y. had passed.

Schmid voiced hope that cooperation would be successful, especially as regards development of a joint economic service.

Donald Forbes, head of the Belgrade-based REUTERS office for the F.R. Yugoslavia who was present at the signing of the contract, said that the suspension of sanctions was opening great possibilities for REUTERS and TANJUG, above all in the economic sphere which

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was very significant and in which the two agencies could cooperate well.

Poll Lists Most Popular Politicians, Parties

AU1601093296

[FBIS Editorial Report] Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian on 12 January on pages 20-21 carries an approximately 700-word report by R.M. on the results of an opinion poll on the popularity of politicians and political parties in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

According to the report entitled "Slavko Perovic and DPS Are the Most Popular," "the Pancevo-based Mark Plan agency carried between 11 and 15 December an opinion poll among the Serbian and Montenegrin public, interviewing 1,200 people of different sex, age, and education. The results refer mainly to the popularity of politicians, political parties, pop stars, sportsmen.... MONITOR presents the results of the research that it considers to be interesting for its readers."

All figures are in percentages as published:

Top 10 Trusted Politicians in FRY	
Slobodan Milosevic	32.3
No one	22.2
Vojislav Seselj [Serbian Radical Party]	6
Vuk Draskovic [Serbian Renewal Movement]	5.2
Vojislav Kostunica [Democratic Party of Serbia]	5.1
Zoran Djindjic [Democratic Party]	5
Dragoslav Avramovic [National bank governor]	4.1
Momir Bulatovic [Montenegrin president]	2.6
Slavko Perovic [Liberal Alliance of Montenegro]	2
Novak Kilibarda [People's Party of Montenegro]	1.8
Milo Djukanovic [Montenegrin prime minister]	1.3

Politicians Trusted in Montenegro	
Slavko Perovic	16
Momir Bulatovic	15.3
Novak Kilibarda	13.3
Slobodan Milosevic	9.3
Milo Djukanovic	8.7

Top 10 Trusted Political Parties in FRY	
None	27.5
Socialist Party of Serbia	27.2
Democratic Party	8.1
Serbian Radical Party	7.2
Democratic Party of Socialists [of Montenegro]	5
Democratic Party of Serbia	4.8
Serbian Renewal Movement	4.8
People's Party [of Montenegro]	3.1
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro	2.2
Yugoslav United Left	1.7
New Democracy	1.3

Political Parties Trusted in Montenegro	
Democratic Party of Socialists	46.7
People's Party	29.3
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro	22
Socialist Party of Serbia	15.3
Serbian Radical Party	14.7

Do you favor early elections in the first half of 1996?	
Yes	49.9
No	27.1
Don't know	23

Do you favor early elections in the first half of 1996?			
Territory	Yes	No	Don't know
Belgrade	53.7	27.9	18.4
East Serbia	51.5	28.6	19.9
West Serbia	43	27.7	29.3
Vojvodina	42.8	28	29.2
Montenegro	63.1	20.8	16.1

The report says that the respondents were asked to state who they considered to be the most popular and the most disliked foreign politicians. "It turns out that U.S. President Bill Clinton leads both tables. On the list of 'positive' politicians, the first place in fact went to no

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one (30.3 percent). On the list of the 'negative' politicians, behind Clinton come the politicians whom the local state propaganda has branded the main enemies and anti-Serbs—Tudjman, Kohl, Izetbegovic, Yeltsin (!), and Kucan. On the list of the 'more positive characters,' behind Clinton are Papandreou, again Yeltsin, Butrus-Ghali, Bildt, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and Zhirinovskiy."

Serbia

Witnesses Fail To Appear at War Crimes Trial

AU1601180996 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jan 96 p 15

[Report by M.M.: "Witnesses in Hiding"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sabac—The trial of Dusko Vuckovic (32), nicknamed Repic, from Umka near Belgrade, who has been accused of war crimes—killing 16 and wounding 20 Muslim civilians in the village of Celopek near Zvornik [in Bosnia-Herzegovina]—has again been postponed because of the non-appearance of the witnesses. Even his own brother Vojin Vuckovic Zuca (33), commander of the Zute Ose [Yellow Wasps] paramilitary formation, did not appear in court (owing to illness) before the five judges presided over by Vladimir Bajic. Zuca is out on bail, charged with the illegal possession of arms and giving a false name.

The main hearing started on 22 November two years ago and since then the court has tried on several occasions to produce the main witness Aca Bojic from the village of Trsic in the Serb Republic [Serb-held part of Bosnia-Herzegovina], who was on guard duty near the community hall in Celopek, the scene of the crime on 27 or 28 June 1992.

The new hearing has been scheduled for 13 May this year.

Milosevic, Bosnian Serbs Discuss Drina Border

AU1601185696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by BETA: "Opening of Border on Drina River Agreed To?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The Bosnian Serbs and the Belgrade authorities have, in principle, reached an agreement on opening the border on the Drina River and resuming economic ties between the Serb Republic [RS] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, BETA has learned from Serb sources in Banja Luka. An agreement on this was reached at a meeting between a delegation of the Bosnian Serb leadership and Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade on 11 January.

The same sources say that RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic is to arrive in Belgrade today in order to talk with the Yugoslav monetary authorities about the resumption of payment operations. Due to the blockade on the Drina River, the RS is facing an economic collapse and the interruption of payment operations with Belgrade has almost completely stopped the turnover of capital in the RS.

BETA sources call the agreement reached on 11 January a "major event" and stress that conditions were made for opening the border on the Drina River after the Serb side in Bosnia had made possible the implementation of the peace agreement. Bosnian Serbs wish for economic, cultural, and political cooperation with Yugoslavia at the same level that the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has with Croatia. Sources in Banja Luka claim that it has still not been established when the border on the Drina River will be opened, but they do not exclude the possibility of that happening in the course of the coming 10 days.

Minister Urges Caution Regarding Foreign Capital

AU1601213896 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by R.P.: "We Are Not For Sale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac—"The great economic powers are now eyeing our country as an empty space on a chess board. Those who were the harshest toward us are now coming in numerous delegations. They are eyeing our railroads, traffic, and the largest companies," Serbian Industry Minister Oskar Fodor says, adding:

"Those who are now coming most frequently believe that they should invest their capital in state or parastate companies since that is the safest. They are asking for state concessions for large investments such as the highway, the railroads, and so on. There are also those who are coming with dishonest intentions, such as when the world capital wants to take over our assets for next to nothing. However, the experiences of neighboring countries warn us against doing anything in haste as that could end up costing us a lot in future," Fodor said.

Commentary Warns of Economic Collapse

AU1501182196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jan 96 p 11

[Commentary by Bojana Jager: "Where Has the New Money Come From?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After claims that the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ] will be maintaining the

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stability of the exchange rate and has taken measures against insolvent, mostly small banks, yesterday the news came in that the governor, after a lengthy illness, is to resume his regular duties, which overall should be viewed optimistically: Things are under control and Program 2 is not endangered. It is said that Avramovic is returning to work on his own initiative, although he has to undergo dialysis twice a week. To what extent he will be acting as an indirect supervisor and how much time he will really spend in his office is not important because it is clear even to the political establishment that the governor is the key psychological lever of the mood behind stabilization and what is really important is that the public thinks he is in the game.

But Program 2 is certainly endangered since prices have begun to move dangerously upwards in recent days, while many new price increases are being announced, including, in addition to electricity, the price of gas by more than 200 percent. This has again been postponed until late February for psychological reasons, it is being said. If monetary policy remains solid, this price blitz might turn out to be ephemeral and without any considerable repercussions on the dinar exchange rate, because last year there were periods in which prices were rising, but exchange rate remained stable. However, if a sweeping inflation brings about the printing of dinars, then prices on the exchange rate will inevitably be affected, of course at the higher level. For the time being, the exchange rate on the street is hovering around the official rate (around 3.4 dinars to the German mark), while the German mark is around 3.45 dinars for wholesalers.

But there are still signs that before the New Year, which is when wages and pensions are paid out, more dinars were circulating. A large amount of new banknotes, which looked as if they had just come off the printing press, appeared, which could mean that, when the salaries and pensions were to be paid, the authorities borrowed some money from the treasury. About such loans, and particularly their repayment, the public has never known much anyway, so now, too, one can only guess where these brand-new banknotes came from.

Until 7 January [Orthodox Christmas], neither the banks nor the Social Auditing Service [SDK] were working normally, so the situation on the money market can be judged only by December's events. That month saw nine banks in the red, while 14 showed no profit, where accounts in the red were mostly cancelled out by loans from the central bank and through early redemption of commercial and NBJ treasury bonds. Hence the interest, in addition to a more favorable interest rate, in central bank bonds, in which, actually, a dinar surplus and money reserves, put aside for rainy days, are being invested.

Whoever has money is very careful about whom he will lend it to, so, despite the highly insolvent economy in December on the money market and short-term securities, the 18-percent target was not achieved, that is, 8.2 million dinars. The interest rate was 52.6 percent annually (lower than the one offered by the NBJ for its own treasury bonds), but these deals are always popular, because in addition to lending dinars there is always a possibility that some extra arrangements may be made, compensation and that sort of things. The interest rate is also influenced by the fact that some earlier credits are often prolonged, which means that only half of fresh money is usually offered. On the parallel money market the most extreme interest rates have fallen to 0.6 percent per day, which is for those in a hurry. How large the central bank's discount rate will be in January is still not known. At the last auction of its bonds, an annual interest rate of 112 percent was set. If the discount rate were to be set according to the average weighted interest rate at auctions (so far there have been five of these), in January it should amount to 95.3 percent.

The insolvency of our economy is still huge and the pressure on the central bank to issue more money is great. True, in the NBJ it is being said that import needs of our economy are satisfied, but these are only test samples, which are, as a rule, to be discarded. The pressure on the exchange rate will also depend in the future on whether firms will be able to satisfy in a regular way their demand for the hard currency needed for importing. Of course, it will also depend on the amount of dinars available.

The financial situation in the economy and its capacity to increase production are something else, though, and this story needs the answer to the question of how much money firms and citizens really owe, and without much in the way of prospects. The governor is really facing an extremely difficult problem: If he really believes in the fairy tales about exports and issues additional money, the stabilization program will definitely collapse, and if no additional money is issued and the state continues to saddle us with taxes even on the air that we breathe, production will collapse. Additional money and privatization are waiting for the political decisions.

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Montenegro

Djukanovic Warns Businesses About Army Insolvency

AU1601093496 Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Mr. Milovic: "Work on the Slate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 7 Jan—The Montenegrin economy, primarily the firms in the special purpose industry, 4th November of Mojkovac and 1st December of Pljevlja, are dissatisfied with the attitudes of the Army of Yugoslavia towards them. The main reason is money. The army has been owing companies a large amount of money for some time. This is why they are seeking the help of the Montenegrin Government.

"You should dispel the illusions that you will be best off in the state's and the army's embrace," Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic warned Montenegrin businessmen. "The stories that the army is the safest partner have shown themselves to be incorrect. The army owes large amounts of money. If I were a director, I would be looking for a safer partner. It does not matter if this partner is the army, a cooperative, or a private company. Whoever offers business and sure money is welcome. I will do my best to see that you receive the money that is owed to you," the prime minister promised the businessmen. "After that, we will see whether we should bring any of the strategic military firms here to Montenegro. However, we will have to change logic. No one is a good partner a priori any longer. Good partners will only be those who have money. Unfortunately, thanks to the situation in the country, the army has found itself in a very difficult position. It is true that it is prudent to remain in touch with military projects as the situation in the army will probably improve, but.... It would also be prudent for the directors of the firms in the special purpose industry to think about turning to the civilian market. They should be seeking other opportunities," Prime Minister Djukanovic recently advised businessmen.

Kosovo

Secessionist Conference in Pristina Detailed

LD1601223096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2210 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Jan. 16 (TANJUG)—Ethnic Albanian parties and groups that advocate the secession of Serbia's southern province of Kosovo-Metohija are holding a conference in the province's centre of Pristina on Tuesday.

The conference deals with further activities following clear and repeated international warnings that the solution to the problem of Kosovo-Metohija has to be sought only within Serbia and through autonomy.

The warnings have led to a rift in the ethnic Albanian separatist movement and obvious discontent with the policy of President of the Ethnic Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo Party Ibrahim Rugova.

The conference represents an attempt at reconciliation and the building of a single action strategy.

The meeting is being held behind closed doors and the agenda, partly carried by the Albanian-language Kosovo paper BUJKU, says that international decision-making centres do not accept the "independent Kosovo" option despite ethnic "Albanians' political will for independence."

Participants in the discussion urge a radicalization of the ethnic Albanian movement in order to make it look like it did during the ethnic Albanian violent demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981 and 1989.

In a statement to the Albanian-language paper KOHI, the conference organizer and parliamentary party president Bajram Kosumi called for changing the methods of the ethnic Albanian separatist movement.

Kosumi accused advocates of current action methods of making a big mistake for blunting the edge of the movement.

A strong separatist movement, which has been active in Kosovo- Metohija for decades, is aiming at detaching the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexing it to neighbouring Albania.

Serbian authorities have repeatedly offered a dialogue to ethnic Albanian leaders about all problems except the province's secession, but they refused it.

Belgrade Laws on Return of Albanians Protested

AU1501184096 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 6 Jan 96 p 2

[Commentary by B. Reka: "The Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problem of the return of the Albanians from the West will be one of the primary issues for Kosova in the future. The most recent incident at Belgrade Airport and similar cases at Han i Elezit [Djeneral Jankovic, on Kosova- Macedonian (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) border], in which Albanians were presented from returning to Kosova, have been warnings of the determination of the Serbian regime to preserve the ethnic structure after this great end-of-the-century exodus. It has been learned that the "legal" basis for closing Kosova's doors to Albanians who are at present in the West is a regulation, or decision, under which all those whose passports carry an exit stamp more than three months old are forbidden to enter the self-styled FRY! This at least was the excuse given by the border authorities to those who have recently not succeeded in entering Kosova.

However, alongside this restriction and also the Citizenship Bill (which provides for preventing the entry

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or return of all those who do not possess FRY citizenship, although they have lived in Kosova for years), Belgrade has also recently issued a law that will apparently be a blow for those who are currently abroad, who will lose certain civil rights because of the obstructions raised to prevent their return. Following the famous law on preventing the sale of real estate (which applied only to Kosova), under which not only Albanians but Serbs and Montenegrins too were denied the basic civil right recognized throughout the world to dispose of private property "inter vivos," Belgrade has also introduced a restriction covering the disposal of assets "mortus causa." Under the new Serbian Inheritance Law (Article 4), "all those who have left the country in order to evade their obligations for its defense" are deprived of the right of inheritance. What does this mean in practice? It seems that this disposition is mainly aimed at that the vast number of young people who have fled abroad from Kosova in recent years because they did not wish to fight in the former Yugoslav People's Army in a war of aggression against other states. Under this law, these young Albanian men face not only criminal prosecution under three charges according to the Penal Code, but also property sanctions, and the danger that, if there is no other member of the family, their property will pass to the state of the occupying power!

Even Serbian public opinion outside the government has reacted against this law. Twenty-six nongovernmental organizations and human rights groups met on 15-17 December last year and called for the repeal of all such discriminatory dispositions in the Inheritance Law. They also called for an amnesty for all young men who had refused to go to war and for "all political prisoners sentenced by political trials in Kosova."

Such discriminatory laws and regulations introduced by Belgrade are the best testimony to Serbian "democracy" and its "peaceful" post-Dayton efforts.

Albanian 'Distrust' of Serbs Called Inevitable

AU1501182696 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 6 Jan 96 p 2

[Commentary by Behlul Beqaj: "Necessity of a Three-Sided Discussion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian-Serb dialogue has more or less become our daily political bread. The Serbian side, through its own missionaries, proposes various suggestions and structures without disputing the need for dialogue as the way to overcome the self-evident crisis. The Albanians illogically wait for the Serbian side to start the dialogue, as if they had occupied Serbia rather than the other way round. They moreover insist on the participation of a third party, which is the most disputed point, because Serbia considers Kosova its internal problem. Thus, the opposing sides, instead of drawing closer, remove themselves ever further from dialogue, even though any delay will involve frightful consequences for both sides. All this happens because the Albanians have lost absolutely all faith in the Serbs, just as the Serbs have lost faith in their opponents and in the international community, except when they ask it to mediate in their interest. How far do these theories hold water?

First, the Albanians' distrust is a result of about eight years of segregation, which culminated in the open ascent to power of national chauvinism in Serbia, which homogenized the Serbian nation and exploited the myth of Kosova for hegemonistic purposes, and whose first victims were the Albanians. This is not disputed in the many reports by specialized international institutions dealing with violations of human rights and freedoms. This distrust is a product of many generations of bitter experience of pro-Serb regimes throughout history, which the present regime is trying to round off, leaving behind no witnesses or evidence. No force exists in Serbia that will think about the cause of the Albanians in the way that the Serbs outside Serbia are considered. When there is not even such minimal readiness to reconsider the anti-Albanian policy in the government, the opposition, the Serbian Academy of Sciences, and the church, it is entirely reasonable for the Albanians to distrust the policy that has merely grown stronger in its contempt of and discrimination against the Albanians. Distrust is a practical result of life together with the Serbs, in which the Albanians have mainly executed Serbian policies to their own detriment.

Formally, the Albanians have lost faith in the self-styled Yugoslavia because it behaves in contravention of its own constitutional order. Even though proclaimed to be a federal state, it objectively functions as a contracted community of independent states, as was seen in Ohio, where the self-styled Yugoslavia was not represented by its president but by its republican presidents with separate duties, whose roles went beyond the competences of the president of Yugoslavia, because they exerted influences and made decisions on behalf of Serbs who have been left behind in other internationally recognized states. An additional example can be found in the flagrant contradictions between the responsibilities of the republican laws and constitutions and those of the federation. When we remember that these acts were passed without the involvement of the Albanians and against their will, then this distrust becomes inevitable. The Albanians cannot respect a state that does not respect itself, and which is defined as a democracy but behaves like a police state. It is defined as a state of equal citizens, but behaves like a national-chauvinist state.

Albanian-Serbian dialogue cannot be successful without the participation of a third party, also because the Serbs are scared of suffering the same fate that they have dealt to others, and therefore do not trust their opponents either. Otherwise, even they would treat the questions of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina as internal matters for the states concerned. In practice, the opposite has happened. The Serbian regime cannot insist on solving the problem of the Serbs outside Serbia

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with the participation of a third party, while refusing to solve the problem of the Albanians in Kosova in the same way.

In the end, those who caused the crisis in Albanian-Serbian relations cannot solve the issue of Kosova, still less when they do not possess a minimal readiness to reconsider and redefine their anti-Albanian intentions. The same policy pursued in Bosnia - Herzegovina and Croatia failed in Kosova too. Seeing the errors and consequences of this policy, a third party must respect the right of the Albanians, and this requires a three-sided discussion.

Activist Says Separatist Movement 'Waning'

LD1401200496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1944 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Jan. 14 (TANJUG)—An ethnic Albanian activist from Serbia's southern province of Kosovo-Metohija said Sunday that ethnic Albanian separatist leaders could no longer deceive their people.

In an interview to the local radio in Kragujevac, Basri Plana said that a growing number of ethnic Albanians were joining the Socialist Party of Serbia and other non-Albanian parties, which showed that the influence of separatists leaders was waning.

Plana, who heads the association of Serbs, Montenegrins, ethnic Albanians, Turks and Romanies for a common Yugoslav state said it was good that ethnic Albanians in Serbia and Yugoslavia were coming back to the political life.

Leaders of the ethnic Albanian separatist movement, which aims at detaching Kosovo-Metohija from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexing it to neighbouring Albania, have been pressuring for years their fellow ethnic Albanians to boycott all institutions of the system.

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija have even refrained from using the rights guaranteed to them under the constitution, which are equal to the rights enjoyed by all the other minorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

U.S. Office Hailed as 'Pre-Recognition' Move

AU1301192696 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 10 Jan 96 p 1

[Commentary by Blerim Reka: "U.S. Legitimization of Kosovo's Status"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most recent statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke about opening a U.S. Information Office in Prishtina announces a second practical step toward the more advanced diplomatic handling of the issue of Kosovo. Together with permission from the State Department for opening an office of Kosovo in Washington, Holbrooke's most recent announcement broadcast by Voice of America at least implicitly demonstrates recognition of a definite judicial international status for Kosovo. Thus, even though the United States has still not officially recognized the state of Kosovo, these two steps by Washington show that official political contacts are being maintained and even raised to a higher level.

The idea of opening a U.S. Information Office in Prishtina dates back to 1991. The first requests were made by Senator Claiborne Pell in his letter of 19 April 1991 addressed to then Secretary of State James Baker, and in a subsequent letter sent on 1 April 1992 to Baker's deputy Lawrence Eagleburger to open a "U.S. Information Agency in the capital city of Kosovo." In May 1995, the Smith Amendment to the law on U.S. foreign policy interests sought the opening of a U.S. office in Prishtina, and in the same year the U.S. Senate also approved the Helms Amendment, which authorized the U.S. secretary of state to open a U.S. office and residence in Prishtina. The bill on Kosovo sponsored by Eliot Engel in 1995 also asked in Paragraph 4, Part 3 for a U.S. Information Agency to be opened in Prishtina.

Such practical U.S. diplomatic steps are therefore only a logical continuation of several years of U.S. foreign policy interest in the problem of Kosovo. They can therefore be considered as a form of international pre-recognition of Kosovo and of course as an even more advanced internationalization of the issue of Kosovo's political status.

From the point of view of U.S. strategy, the establishment of a U.S. representation in Prishtina also means the establishment of a U.S. presence in Kosovo, which the Belgrade regime has so far refused. Following the announcements of several other Western countries that they will follow the U.S. move by opening their own representations, the international presence in Kosovo will be rounded off and this will be an important development before a start is made to the international solution of the issue of Kosovo.

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